Solutions · builder (first version)

From here to there

Pick the outcome you want. See what blocks it now, and what has loosened blocks like these elsewhere.

Each target below lists the deadlocks that stand in its way, how each one blocks it, and the defusions that address that deadlock, with the record of their precedents. This is the first step of the solution builder: later versions let you set your own assumptions about each side and see how the picture changes.

Two states

A Palestinian state alongside Israel, roughly on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Each side sees the other's state as a staging post for its own destruction.
  2. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Demilitarisation, border control and the Jordan Valley: each side's minimum is the other's red line.
  3. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — No agreed number of returnees: 'end of claims' against 'right of return'.
  4. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — 'End of conflict' requires both recognitions, and neither side will go first.
  5. Whoever moves first loses — Needs withdrawals and recognitions that each side has learned not to give first.
  6. Distrust as premise — No agreement survives if every act of the other side is read as a trick.

Two states, one homeland (confederation)

Two sovereign states with open borders, shared institutions and a shared Jerusalem; citizenship and residence are separated.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Open borders need trust that the other side accepts you exist.
  2. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Open borders are exactly what the security fear forbids.
  3. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — Residence rights decide how many refugees could live in Israel.
  4. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — A shared homeland needs a shared account of how it was divided.
  5. Whoever moves first loses — Same, plus open borders.
  6. Distrust as premise — Same.

Local rule: clans, cities and cantons

Instead of one national government per people, power lies with local communities that already govern themselves: Arab clans and cities, Jewish towns and communities, federated or coordinated above.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Local leaders who deal with the other side get branded as collaborators or traitors.
  2. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Armed local units, and who disarms them, decide whether cantons are safe.
  3. Whoever moves first loses — Handing power to local leaders is a concession each centre fears.
  4. Distrust as premise — Same.

Parallel states: two states on the same land

Two states, Israel and Palestine, each covering the whole land between the river and the sea. Citizenship follows the person, not the territory: every resident belongs to one of the two states, wherever they live.

  1. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — Two states on the same land defuse borders but not numbers: open residence revives both the demographic fear and the return demand.
  2. Distrust as premise — Shared land with separate sovereignties needs trust on a daily basis, which is the scarcest thing.

One democratic state with equal rights

One state from the river to the sea, every person an equal citizen.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Sharing a state with a people whose movement denies yours feels suicidal.
  2. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Who commands one army and one police force, and which side's fighters join them?
  3. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — Return decides who is the majority, which is the whole question.
  4. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — Whose history goes into the constitution, the schoolbooks, the anthem?
  5. Whoever moves first loses — Both sides give up a state and trust the other not to exploit it.
  6. Distrust as premise — Same.

One state with equal rights that remains a Jewish state

Israel extends its sovereignty and full, equal citizenship to the Palestinians of the West Bank, and keeps its Jewish national character, as it does today with its Arab citizens.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Palestinians won't accept a state whose leaders said they don't exist.
  2. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — It works only if refugees don't return, which Palestinians reject.
  3. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — It asks Palestinians to accept the Jewish character without any acknowledgement of their own story.
  4. Whoever moves first loses — Israel would grant citizenship first and hope for loyalty.
  5. Distrust as premise — Same.

The Trump plan: 'Peace to Prosperity' (2020)

A demilitarised Palestinian state on about 70% of the West Bank, plus Gaza and land swaps. Israel annexes the settlements and the Jordan Valley, and $50 billion of investment is promised.

  1. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Israel keeps overall security control, the borders and the Jordan Valley around a demilitarised state: for Israel the minimum for safety, for Palestinians permanent control with a flag on top.
  2. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — It settles the refugee question on the majority side alone — no return to Israel, limited return to the Palestinian state subject to Israeli agreement — so it offers 'end of claims' without anything the other side counts as justice.
  3. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — It asked Palestinians to recognise Israel as the Jewish state and offered no recognition of the Nakba; Palestinians rejected it at once.
  4. Distrust as premise — Drafted with one side and presented to the other, it was read by Palestinians as confirmation that the process was never neutral, and its annexation map as the real plan behind the offer.

The Gaza plan: Board of Peace and a technocratic Gaza (2025)

End the war, release the hostages, disarm Hamas, and run Gaza through a technocratic Palestinian committee under an international Board of Peace, with an international force, while a Palestinian state stays a conditional 'pathway'.

  1. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Disarmament and a transitional authority are read as the precondition for safety by one side and as permanent control by the other.
  2. Whoever moves first loses — Who disarms and who withdraws first is the plan's core dispute.
  3. Distrust as premise — Every stage depends on believing the other side will do its part — Hamas disarming, the army withdrawing, the international force staying — and each side reads the other's delays as proof it never meant to.

Regional land swap (the Eiland plan)

Make the land bigger: Egypt gives Sinai land to enlarge Gaza, the Palestinians give Israel the settlement blocs in the West Bank, and Israel gives Egypt land in the Negev.

  1. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — Enlarging Gaza into Sinai is read by Palestinians as a new displacement and by Egypt as a transfer onto its soil.

Trading the 'Triangle': land and people swapped for settlement blocs

Israel keeps the West Bank settlement blocs; in exchange, Arab-majority towns inside Israel near the Green Line (the 'Triangle' around Wadi Ara and Umm al-Fahm) become part of a Palestinian state, with their residents.

  1. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — The plan exists to shore up the Jewish majority, which is exactly what makes Arab citizens reject it.

Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal

Leave the final status open and make occupation lighter step by step: roads linking the Palestinian areas without checkpoints, more work permits and economic ties, more room for Palestinian self-rule, while Israel keeps security control.

  1. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Every step that eases control is read by Israelis as a risk and by Palestinians as a way to make control permanent.
  2. Whoever moves first loses — Easing steps that are reversed after the next attack teach both sides that moving first costs.

Hudna: a long-term truce without recognition

A ceasefire for 10, 30 or more years in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, without recognising Israel or ending the claims. Hamas has offered versions of it since the 1990s.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Hamas's own texts define a truce as temporary, so Israelis read the offer through its charter; Palestinians read Israel's refusal through 'no such thing as Palestinians'.
  2. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — A truce without recognition looks to Israelis like the textbook staging post: withdrawal now, war later.
  3. Distrust as premise — A long truce depends entirely on believing the other side will keep it.

The Jordanian option: the West Bank back to Jordan, or a Jordanian–Palestinian federation

Instead of a separate Palestinian state, the populated parts of the West Bank return to Jordanian rule or join Jordan in a federation, while Israel keeps security zones such as the Jordan Valley.

  1. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Israel wants security zones on the Jordan; Palestinians see the plan as control through Amman.
  2. Whoever moves first loses — Jordan walked away in 1988 after moving first; neither side wants to repeat the London Agreement's fate.

International trusteeship: an outside administration for a transition

An international or regional body governs Gaza (or all the territories) for a set period, providing security and services while local institutions are rebuilt, before handing over to Palestinian self-government.

  1. A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Israel fears an international force that won't stop rearmament (as in Lebanon); Palestinians fear a new occupation under another flag.
  2. Whoever moves first loses — Israel would move first by handing security to outsiders; the 2005 Gaza withdrawal is the lesson it cites.

Binationalism: one state shared by two nations

One state in which Jews and Arabs are recognised as two national communities with guaranteed shared power, not a majority ruling a minority; the idea behind Brit Shalom and Ihud before 1948.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Parity needs each nation to believe the other accepts it exists; each reads the other's founding quotes as proof it doesn't.
  2. Distrust as premise — Vetoes held by the other nation only work if you trust how it will use them.

A Middle East union: solving it inside a regional framework

Israel and a Palestinian state, alongside their neighbours, join an EU-style regional framework, with open trade, shared infrastructure, security guarantees and eventually freedom of movement, so that borders matter less and the conflict is settled as part of a regional bargain.

  1. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — Freedom of movement in a regional union reopens both the majority fear and the return question.
  2. Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — Arab states offered recognition of Israel in 2002 conditional on Palestinian statehood; the Accords separated the two, and each side reads that differently.

United Arabia: dissolving the conflict into a larger federation

A thought experiment: the whole region, Israel and Palestine included, joins one large federation of autonomous states, so that the question of who owns the land between the river and the sea stops being about sovereignty.

  1. Each side reads the other through its worst quote — A Jewish minority inside an Arab federation would be read through every quote about Jews in Arab lands.
  2. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — It dissolves the majority into a much larger Arab one, which is the fear at its fullest.

The original Mandate: a confederation on both banks of the Jordan

Go back to the map before 1922, when the Mandate for Palestine still included Transjordan: a confederation of Israel, a Palestinian state and Jordan across both banks of the river, in which Jews are a minority of the whole but keep their own state, army and immigration, and Palestinians gain room, a state and a shared economy.

  1. Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — The whole point is a Jewish minority with its own defence; it asks Israelis to drop the majority logic and Palestinians to give up return to Israel proper.
  2. Distrust as premise — A confederation with separate armies can make each army the other's threat.

Outcomes that need a people gone or ruled

These are proposed too, so they are here. No deadlock blocks them in this model, because what stands in their way is not a fear on the other side but the other side itself: millions of people who would have to leave, submit or die. Pick one only after reading what it has meant wherever it was tried.

One state under Jewish rule, without equal rights

Israel annexes the West Bank but does not give its Palestinians citizenship.

Palestinians leave ('transfer' / 'voluntary emigration')

The land becomes Jewish by moving Palestinians out — to Jordan, Egypt, or elsewhere.

One Arab (or Islamic) state from the river to the sea

Israel ends; Palestine covers the whole land as an Arab state (PLO Charter 1968) or an Islamic one (Hamas).

What you have to believe

Every defusion rests on beliefs about the other side, about outsiders, or about your own leaders. Here they are by name, with what the record or the polls say. The next version will let you set each one yourself and watch the picture change — what you think is possible depends on what you assume.

A majority of Israeli Jews would accept a Palestinian state with security guarantees (Israelis)
Two states: 21% of Israeli Jews in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, September 2024 — the lowest since polling began (see 'Two states'). →
Record preset: unlikely — 21% of Israeli Jews support two states (Pulse, Sept 2024).
Needed by: Third-party security guarantees · Regional anchoring
A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims (Palestinians)
Two states: 40% of Palestinians in the same Pulse poll, September 2024 (see 'Two states'). →
Record preset: possible — 40% of Palestinians support two states (Pulse, Sept 2024): a large minority, not a majority.
Needed by: Reform the political system · Reparations and compensation
Hamas would keep a long-term truce (Hamas)
Hudna offers since 1994 with durations of 10 to 100 years; a hudna is described as a temporary truce (see 'Hudna' and 'Negotiation as a weapon'). →
Record preset: possible — Hamas has offered long truces, and describes a hudna as temporary.
Needed by: Plan for the spoilers
Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check (Both)
Omagh 1998 isolated its authors; in 1994–96 the Hebron massacre, the bombings and Rabin's assassination did not (see 'Plan for the spoilers'). →
Record preset: possible — Omagh 1998 was contained; the Oslo years were not.
Needed by: Phased steps, each verified before the next · Plan for the spoilers
A leader who makes a real concession survives it politically (Both)
Sadat (1981) and Rabin (1995) were assassinated by opponents of their peace moves (see 'A gesture that breaks the frame'). →
Record preset: possible — Sadat and Rabin were killed; King Hussein's gesture of 1997 held.
Needed by: Reform the political system · A gesture that breaks the frame · Replace the political system wholesale · End the Ottoman remnants · Plan for the spoilers
An outside guarantor would stay and act when tested (Outsiders)
See the precedents on 'Third-party security guarantees' (one worked, one partly, one failed). →
Record preset: possible — The guarantee precedents are mixed: one worked, one partly, one failed.
Needed by: Third-party security guarantees · Phased steps, each verified before the next
Arab states would pay for and guarantee a deal, not only recognise it (Arab states)
See 'Regional anchoring' and its precedents. →
Record preset: possible — Arab states have offered recognition (2002) and a Gaza reconstruction plan (2025); guarantees untested.
Needed by: Regional anchoring
Iran and its allies could be kept from wrecking a deal (Iran and allies)
See 'Iran is the head of the octopus — cut it off and Hamas and Hezbollah fall.' for the case and its limits. →
Record preset: possible — No precedent either way on this card; left at 'possible'.
Needed by: Plan for the spoilers
Settlers would accept evacuation with compensation (Israelis)
Gaza 2005: every settlement dismantled 'against fierce resistance from the settler movement' (see 'Israel left Gaza in 2005 — there has been no occupation there since.'). →
Record preset: possible — Gaza 2005 happened, against fierce resistance.
Most refugees would choose options other than return to Israel if the others were real (Palestinians)
PSR 2003: 10% of 4,506 refugee families chose return to Israel first (see 'A refugee package'). →
Record preset: likely — In PSR's 2003 survey 10% chose return to Israel first.
Needed by: A refugee package: choices, not one right
Host states would give refugees citizenship or a secure status (Arab states)
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt are party to neither statelessness convention; Lebanon bars Palestinians from owning property (see 'Lower the stakes of belonging'). →
Record preset: unlikely — No main host state is party to either statelessness convention; Lebanon bars property.
Needed by: A refugee package: choices, not one right · Lower the stakes of belonging
People can work with the other side without being punished at home (Both)
See 'Who can afford to speak' and the anti-normalisation 'purity loop'. →
Record preset: unlikely — Anti-normalisation sanctions and PA and Hamas repression of dissent (see freedom-to-dissent).
Needed by: A people's mandate · A shared history, told both ways · A truth commission
The public on each side can be moved by what the other side does (Both)
Sadat's 1977 visit 'changed Israeli public opinion almost overnight and led to the 1979 treaty' (see 'A gesture that breaks the frame'). →
Record preset: possible — Sadat's visit changed Israeli opinion 'almost overnight'; such moments are rare.
Needed by: A people's mandate · A gesture that breaks the frame · A shared history, told both ways · A truth commission
Military force can remove a movement, not only its leaders (Force)
See the record on 'Remove the government' (Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Lebanon 1982). →
Record preset: unlikely — Iraq 2003, Libya 2011, Lebanon 1982: leaders removed, movements not.
Needed by: Remove the other side's government · Total military victory · Replace the political system wholesale
Donors would fund compensation and reconstruction at the scale needed (Outsiders)
See 'Reparations and compensation funds'. →
Record preset: possible — The German reparations were paid; large refugee funds have not been raised yet.
Needed by: Reparations and compensation · A refugee package: choices, not one right
The rest of the world would accept a solution imposed by force or displacement (Outsiders)
The Arab League's Cairo summit (March 2025): 'categorical rejection of any form of displacement' (see 'Remove the population'). →
Record preset: unlikely — The Arab League and most states reject displacement 'under any pretext' (Cairo, 2025).
Needed by: Remove the other population · Total military victory