Deadlocks · defusion

Regional anchoring

Embed a deal in the region: Arab states offer recognition, money and guarantees in return for Palestinian statehood, so both sides gain more than they give.

Check the effects of this card → put it in a plan for each solution it serves, and see what that plan rests on.

The Arab Peace Initiative's formula: full normalisation of the Arab world with Israel in exchange for withdrawal and a Palestinian state; Gulf funding for reconstruction; Egyptian and Jordanian security roles. It turns a two-party deadlock into a regional bargain. A territorial version widens the map itself: land swaps involving Egypt or Jordan, so the space available is bigger than the two parties' own (see 'Regional land swap (the Eiland plan)', 'The Jordanian option: the West Bank back to Jordan, or a Jordanian–Palestinian federation' and 'The original Mandate: a confederation on both banks of the Jordan').

The deadlocks it addresses

Where it has been tried

  • The Arab Peace Initiative (2002) — partly. In return for 'Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the lines of 4 June 1967', a refugee solution 'to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194', and a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, the Arab states would 'Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, enter into a peace agreement with Israel' and 'Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace'. The same text rejects 'all forms of Palestinian [re]patriation [resettlement]' in Arab host countries. Israel's answer came fourteen years later and only in part: in May 2016 Prime Minister Netanyahu said the initiative includes 'positive elements that can help revive constructive negotiations with the Palestinians', and the UN envoy welcomed the statement (UN News). No formal Israeli acceptance is recorded in the sources read here.
  • The Egypt–Israel treaty (1979) — worked. Egypt's recognition came with Israel's full withdrawal from Sinai, and US aid underpinned the treaty: US military and economic assistance to Egypt increased 'significantly after 1979', and US administrations have justified it as 'an investment in regional stability' built on 'sustaining the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty' (Congressional Research Service, 2025).
  • The Abraham Accords (2020) — partly. Normalisation happened without the Arab Peace Initiative's Palestinian condition. The UAE's Crown Prince said the agreement 'was reached to stop further Israeli annexation'; Palestinian officials rejected that, one calling it 'repackaging this shameful agreement as a service to the Palestinians', and noted that Netanyahu said annexation was only delayed (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2020).
  • Regional land swaps (Giora Eiland, Begin-Sadat Center, 2010) — proposed, not tried. A former head of Israel's National Security Council argued that 'Within the currently-defined, narrow confines of the conventional two-state parameters, no Israeli-Palestinian agreement is likely', and that 'Regional alternatives that widen the scope of actors' could break the impasse — widening the territory as well as the parties (see 'Regional land swap (the Eiland plan)' and 'The Jordanian option: the West Bank back to Jordan, or a Jordanian–Palestinian federation'). Egypt rejected giving up Sinai land.

What you have to believe for it to work

  • Arab states would pay and guarantee, not only recognise
  • Israel values regional normalisation enough to trade for it

Set how likely you find each of these in the builder, and see what a plan using this card rests on.

What has to happen first

  • Arab states willing to condition normalisation on a settlement again
  • A Palestinian leadership able to accept

How it can fail

  • Normalisation proceeds without the Palestinians and the conflict festers
  • Spoilers (Iran and its allies) escalate to stop it, as some read October 7

Sources