Solutions

The Jordanian option: the West Bank back to Jordan, or a Jordanian–Palestinian federation

Instead of a separate Palestinian state, the populated parts of the West Bank return to Jordanian rule or join Jordan in a federation, while Israel keeps security zones such as the Jordan Valley.

Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Israel would deal with a state it has been at peace with since 1994 rather than with a new one, and could keep security zones along the Jordan. It removes the fear of a Palestinian state as a base for attacks, but not the question of Jerusalem.

What happens to Palestinians

Self-rule or a region within a Jordanian or federal state, with Jordanian citizenship, but not an independent state. Palestinians would be governed from Amman, as the West Bank was from 1950 to 1967.

What it requires

  • A Jordanian king willing to take back responsibility for the West Bank, which Jordan formally gave up in 1988
  • Palestinians accepting Hashemite rule or a federation in place of their own state, after the PLO won recognition as their sole representative (Arab League, Rabat 1974)
  • Israel agreeing to borders and a Jerusalem arrangement Jordan could accept
  • Stability in Jordan itself, where 'More than half of the 6.3 million population … is of Palestinian origin' (Human Rights Watch, 2010)

Who supports it

The Allon Plan (1967) proposed returning the populated West Bank to Jordan while Israel kept the Jordan Valley, and King Hussein proposed a 'United Arab Kingdom' of two regions in March 1972 (how far Labor embraced the option, and how the 1972 plan was received, are not yet sourced here ⚠). The London Agreement between Foreign Minister Peres and King Hussein (11 April 1987) set a framework for an international conference in which 'the Palestinians' representatives will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation'. It was signed by the Foreign Minister 'ad referendum to the Government of Israel' (text on PalQuest), and Prime Minister Shamir rejected it. On 31 July 1988, during the First Intifada, Hussein announced Jordan's 'full legal and administrative disengagement from the West Bank', citing the Arab summits' recognition of the PLO as 'sole legitimate representative' and the aim of 'an independent Palestinian state', and praising 'the glorious uprising of the Palestinian people under occupation' (his address, on the official King Hussein archive). That ended the option in its original form. Jordan's king has rejected the idea that Jordan become the 'alternative homeland' (al-watan al-badil): 'For 25 years, I have been saying no to displacement, no to resettlement, no to the alternative homeland', the Royal Court quoted King Abdullah II as saying in February 2025, adding that 'achieving just peace on the basis of the two-state solution is the only way' to guarantee stability (Anadolu Agency, 17 February 2025). Whether any Israeli party still runs on the option, and the PLO's current position on it, are not yet sourced here ⚠; so is the later idea of a confederation between a Palestinian state and Jordan after independence ⚠.

What history says

  • Jordanian rule over the West Bank, 1950–1967, with Jordanian citizenship for its residents
  • The Allon Plan (1967) and Hussein's federation plan (1972)
  • The Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Action Agreement (Amman, 11 February 1985), signed by Hussein and Arafat: 'Total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 for comprehensive peace'; Palestinians to exercise self-determination 'within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine'; negotiations at an international conference with the PLO, 'the sole legitimate representative of the Palestine people, within a joint delegation' (text on PalQuest). PalQuest's chronology says the agreement left points ambiguous, 'mainly by not explicitly referring to Resolution 242, as Jordan had requested'; the PLO wanted 242 paired with Palestinian self-determination, the United States wanted 'unconditional Palestinian acceptance', and 'This impasse led to the failure of Jordanian-Palestinian talks at the beginning of 1986 and then to the Jordanian decision to terminate the talks'
  • The London Agreement (1987), negotiated and then rejected inside Israel's own government

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

The West Bank under Jordan again — unlikely on the record

if Jordan wants it back (Jordan would take responsibility for the West Bank again)

Jordan governs or federates with the West Bank; its residents hold Jordanian citizenship; Gaza's status is separate.

What it can slide into: If Palestinians reject a king instead of a state: unrest in both banks.

An interim that lasts — likely on the record

if Jordan declines, as it did in 1988 (not: Jordan would take responsibility for the West Bank again)

No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places — more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints — and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.

  • The Oslo interim arrangements (1994–2000) — lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
  • 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s — lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').

What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.

The hard questions

  • Is 'give the West Bank back to Jordan' a solution, or a way of not dealing with the Palestinians as a people (see 'Jordan is Palestine')?
  • Why did Jordan walk away from the West Bank in 1988, and what would make it come back?
  • Would Palestinians who fought for recognition as a people accept a king instead of a state, and should they have to?
  • Was the London Agreement a missed opportunity, and whose?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here