Argument · heard from pro-Israel voices
“The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.”
Palestinian leaders rejected every offer of a state — 1937, 1947, 2000, 2008 — so they bear the responsibility for having none; Israel always said yes.
Made publicly as a pro-Israel argument by Arsen Ostrovsky
Where it's been said
“Palestinians Never Miss an Opportunity to Miss an Opportunity”
Traps in play:◆ "What about you?"◆ "They all…"
Why people find it convincing
- The Arab leadership rejected the 1937 Peel partition proposal and the 1947 UN partition plan, both of which offered an Arab state; the Zionist leadership accepted both in principle.
- At Camp David (2000) and afterwards Yasser Arafat did not accept the offers or the Clinton Parameters without reservations, and the Second Intifada followed.
- In 2008 Ehud Olmert's offer, reported to include about 94% of the West Bank with swaps and an international regime for the Holy Basin, went unanswered by Mahmoud Abbas.
- The line is best known as Israeli diplomat Abba Eban's. The quip is older: the earliest record (1922) attributes it to George Bernard Shaw, about the British prime minister Rosebery. Eban used versions from 1970 ('Some politicians never lose a chance of missing an opportunity'), aimed it at the UN in 1971, and by 1988 the New York Times called it his 'famous quip that the P.L.O. has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity'. The often-quoted wording 'The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity' is 'attributed to Abba Eban after the Geneva Peace Conference … (December 21, 1973)' by the Jewish Virtual Library, and to the same occasion by a 2002 newspaper account. No contemporary record of it has been found here ⚠. Its users take it as a summary of a pattern of refusal.
What's true
Several major offers were rejected or left unanswered by Palestinian leaders.
1937 and 1947 were rejected by the Arab leadership; at Camp David and after, Arafat did not accept; on Olmert's 2008 plan the accounts differ: Israeli officials accused Abbas of rejecting it, while Olmert himself said in 2018, 'President Abbas never said "no" to my plan, never' (AFP via France 24). These are serious facts (see also 'Negotiation as a weapon').
primary documentPalestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Report) (1937) finding ✓
Summary of the Report (League of Nations document, UNISPAL), read: 'An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country'; 'Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does'; 'Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population'. The full report not read.
primary documentUN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II): Future government of Palestine (1947) ✓
Partition plan.
pressAFP via France 24, 'Only Abbas able to make peace: former Israel PM Olmert' (22 September 2018) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02. 'Olmert headed the Israeli government from 2006 to 2009, when a bid to agree on a two-state solution collapsed with Israeli officials accusing Abbas of rejecting a plan proposed by Olmert'; Olmert, on PA television after meeting Abbas in Paris: 'President Abbas never said "no" to my plan, never'; released from prison in July 2017 'after serving 16 months for corruption during his term as mayor of Jerusalem'.
What's left out
What the offers contained, who else said no, and what kind of 'offers' they were.
In 1947 the partition plan 'awarded 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine to 32 per cent of its population', and the Jewish State would have held '497,000 (including 90,000 Bedouin)' Arabs 'against 498,000 Jews', under 'detailed safeguards to ensure the rights of minorities' (UN study, The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, part II); rejecting it was a choice with disastrous results, and how rational it was from their side at the time is argued. Camp David 2000 produced no written offer; accounts by participants from all sides (including US negotiators such as Robert Malley and Dennis Ross) differ on what was on the table and who bears responsibility: Malley and Hussein Agha, both participants at Camp David, wrote in 2001 to answer 'the American and Israeli effort to blame the Palestinians', and Ehud Barak rebutted them in the same magazine (as The Nation describes the exchange). Dennis Ross's account (The Missing Peace, 2004) 'comes down hard on Yasir Arafat … and blames him for the missing peace', holding that Arafat should have accepted Clinton's December 2000 proposals, which the Israelis had accepted 'in principle … with some reservations'; the same review adds that 'a close reading of the book reveals that there is plenty of blame to go around on the Israeli side' (Robert Chira, American Diplomacy, November 2004). In 2008 Olmert's term was ending: in July, citing 'a wave of investigations and criticism' amid a corruption inquiry, he announced he would resign once his party chose a new leader (CNN, 30 July 2008). On the other side: Israel did not take up the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, in which Arab states offered to 'Establish normal relations with Israel' in return for withdrawal 'to the June 4, 1967 lines', a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a refugee solution 'to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194', and settlement construction continued during negotiations: in the Oslo years settlers in the West Bank and Gaza went from 115,700 at the end of 1993 to 176,973 by mid-1999 (Israel's statistics bureau, via the Palestine-Israel Journal, 2000), which Israel's position holds the accords did not forbid (Alan Baker, JCPA, 2011); a round-by-round record for later talks is not sourced on this page ⚠. Refusal has not been one-sided.
Traps here:◆ "What about you?"◆ "They all…"
primary documentArab Peace Initiative (Beirut Summit) (2002) ✓
Official translation adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut, 28 March 2002 (UNSCO copy, read 2026-09-30). Calls on Israel to affirm 'Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines', 'a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194', and a Palestinian state 'with East Jerusalem as its capital'; in return Arab states would 'Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended' and 'Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace'. Rejects 'all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries'.
advocacy / viewRobert Malley & Hussein Agha, 'Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors', New York Review of Books (2001), as described by The Nation (21 October 2025) (2001) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01 via The Nation, 'The Myths of Camp David' (Q&A with Malley, 21 October 2025), which describes the 2001 New York Review of Books essay: Agha and Malley, both participants at Camp David, 'were dismayed by the American and Israeli effort to blame the Palestinians' and 'sought to correct the record'; Ehud Barak published a rebuttal 'in the same magazine'. The essay itself is not read here (a full repost on a third-party site is not used).
advocacy / viewDennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), as reviewed by Robert Chira, American Diplomacy (November 2004) (2004) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01 (the book itself not read). Chira: Ross 'comes down hard on Yasir Arafat … and blames him for the missing peace'; 'Ross plainly believes Arafat should have accepted the final proposals made by President Clinton in December 2000'; 'The Israelis had already signaled their acceptance in principle to those proposals with some reservations'; and 'a close reading of the book reveals that there is plenty of blame to go around on the Israeli side'; suggested title 'The Missing Leaders'.
historyUN study 'The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem', Part II (1947–1977), UNISPAL (1978) finding ✓
Read 2026-09-30. Partition voted on 29 November 1947: '33 votes in favour and 13 against with 10 abstentions'. The Palestine Arab Higher Committee condemned the plan as 'An excess of injustice to Palestine … a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country'; 'The Zionist Organization approved of the partition resolution, although objecting the Jewish state had not been allotted enough territory'. Prepared for the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Also (re-read 2026-09-30): the UK told the UN that if the Assembly recommended 'a policy which was not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it'; abstentions on 29 November 1947 included the 'United Kingdom'; Britain 'announced that it would terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, several months before the time envisaged in the United Nations plan'. Re-read 2026-10-01: the partition resolution 'awarded 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine to 32 per cent of its population'; within the Jewish State 'there would remain a very large number of Palestinian Arabs: 497,000 (including 90,000 Bedouin) against 498,000 Jews', with about 10,000 Jews left in the Arab State; 'The partition resolution contained detailed safeguards to ensure the rights of minorities'. The study includes a chapter on the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and that Committee's recommendations. Re-read 2026-10-12, on the end of the Mandate: 'Jewish forces moved to occupy further territory beyond the boundaries specified by the Partition resolution. Irregular units from neighbouring Arab States had already entered Palestine in the final weeks of the Mandate, and now regular forces from these countries crossed into Palestine. The Arab League informed the United Nations Secretary-General by cable of the reasons for the Arab action.' Partition resolution as quoted there (re-read 2026-10-12): Jewish State '498 000' Jews and '407 000' Arabs and others, 'In addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 (Arab) Bedouins'; citizens and residents 'shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident'.
pressCNN, 'Israel's prime minister to step down' (30 July 2008) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02 (served from edition.cnn.com). 'Citing "a wave of investigations and criticism" at the hands of his political opponents, he said he will resign once his Kadima party elects a new chairman'; 'Olmert has been embroiled in a corruption inquiry'; Barak had said he 'would pursue new elections if Olmert didn't step down'; 'Olmert had said he would resign only if he is indicted on corruption charges'.
data'Facts on the Ground since the Oslo Agreement, September 1993', Palestine-Israel Journal 7(4), 2000 ('Settlements or Peace') (2000) aggregate ✓
Read 2026-10-02. Unsigned data summary; its own call is for ‘our government’ to freeze settlement expansion and negotiate ‘a return to the 1967 borders with minor territorial exchanges’. Opens: ‘There were clearly violations of the Oslo Accords on both sides’. Data (Central Bureau of Statistics; Peace Now): settlers in the West Bank and Gaza 115,700 at end-1993, 176,973 in mid-1999; construction begun on 17,190 housing units September 1993–July 2000; housing stock up 52.49%; bypass roads; 740 house demolitions; closure days. Says most Israelis saw 1993–2000 as ‘years of peace’.
advocacy / viewAlan Baker, 'Israel's Rights Regarding Territories and the Settlements', Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (1 January 2011) (2011) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-02 (the site now redirects to jcfa.org). Baker, the article says, ‘participated in the negotiation and drafting of the Oslo Accords’. The agreements created ‘a special regime – a lex specialis’; ‘there is no specific provision either restricting planning, zoning, and continued construction by either party, of towns, settlements, and villages, or freezing such construction’ (citing Art. 27 of Annex III of the 1995 agreement); ‘the Oslo Accords contain no requirement that prohibits, limits, or freezes construction by Israel in Area C’; Israel's presence in Area C ‘enjoys the sanction of the PLO’ and ‘cannot … be considered “occupied territory”’. An advocacy argument; the UN usage it rejects is set out elsewhere on the site.
More context
How to talk about this.
Acknowledge first: Palestinian leaders did reject partition in 1937 and 1947, and did not accept the offers of 2000 and 2008. Ask one question: 'what would have had to be in those offers for a Palestinian leader to sign and survive?'; it moves the argument from blame to terms. Share one checkable thing: what each offer proposed on Jerusalem, refugees and borders, from the negotiators' own accounts. What not to say: 'Palestinians never want peace'. Their own polls show a divided people, not a single answer: on the eve of October 7, 73% of Gazans favoured a peaceful settlement (Arab Barometer), while in October 2025 a slight majority, 53% against 45%, opposed the concept of two states, mostly because they thought settlement had made it impractical (PCPSR) — see 'Who speaks for them?'. From the other side: grant the settlement growth and the missed Israeli chances, then ask what the Palestinian leadership put on the table in return, and why none of it closed the gap.
primary documentPalestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Report) (1937) finding ✓
Summary of the Report (League of Nations document, UNISPAL), read: 'An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country'; 'Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does'; 'Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population'. The full report not read.
historyUN study 'The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem', Part II (1947–1977), UNISPAL (1978) finding ✓
Read 2026-09-30. Partition voted on 29 November 1947: '33 votes in favour and 13 against with 10 abstentions'. The Palestine Arab Higher Committee condemned the plan as 'An excess of injustice to Palestine … a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country'; 'The Zionist Organization approved of the partition resolution, although objecting the Jewish state had not been allotted enough territory'. Prepared for the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Also (re-read 2026-09-30): the UK told the UN that if the Assembly recommended 'a policy which was not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it'; abstentions on 29 November 1947 included the 'United Kingdom'; Britain 'announced that it would terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, several months before the time envisaged in the United Nations plan'. Re-read 2026-10-01: the partition resolution 'awarded 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine to 32 per cent of its population'; within the Jewish State 'there would remain a very large number of Palestinian Arabs: 497,000 (including 90,000 Bedouin) against 498,000 Jews', with about 10,000 Jews left in the Arab State; 'The partition resolution contained detailed safeguards to ensure the rights of minorities'. The study includes a chapter on the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and that Committee's recommendations. Re-read 2026-10-12, on the end of the Mandate: 'Jewish forces moved to occupy further territory beyond the boundaries specified by the Partition resolution. Irregular units from neighbouring Arab States had already entered Palestine in the final weeks of the Mandate, and now regular forces from these countries crossed into Palestine. The Arab League informed the United Nations Secretary-General by cable of the reasons for the Arab action.' Partition resolution as quoted there (re-read 2026-10-12): Jewish State '498 000' Jews and '407 000' Arabs and others, 'In addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 (Arab) Bedouins'; citizens and residents 'shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident'.
advocacy / viewDennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), as reviewed by Robert Chira, American Diplomacy (November 2004) (2004) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01 (the book itself not read). Chira: Ross 'comes down hard on Yasir Arafat … and blames him for the missing peace'; 'Ross plainly believes Arafat should have accepted the final proposals made by President Clinton in December 2000'; 'The Israelis had already signaled their acceptance in principle to those proposals with some reservations'; and 'a close reading of the book reveals that there is plenty of blame to go around on the Israeli side'; suggested title 'The Missing Leaders'.
pressAFP via France 24, 'Only Abbas able to make peace: former Israel PM Olmert' (22 September 2018) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02. 'Olmert headed the Israeli government from 2006 to 2009, when a bid to agree on a two-state solution collapsed with Israeli officials accusing Abbas of rejecting a plan proposed by Olmert'; Olmert, on PA television after meeting Abbas in Paris: 'President Abbas never said "no" to my plan, never'; released from prison in July 2017 'after serving 16 months for corruption during his term as mayor of Jerusalem'.
dataArab Barometer, 'What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas' (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2023), survey of Gaza completed 6 October 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓
Checked against the article (Jamal and Robbins, Foreign Affairs, 25 Oct 2023): fieldwork 28 Sep – 8 Oct 2023, 399 respondents in Gaza, interviews completed 6 Oct; trust in Hamas authorities: none at all 44%, not a lot 23%; a great deal or quite a lot 29%; two-state 54%; peaceful settlement 73%, military solution 20%; party closest: Fatah 30%, Hamas 27%.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (fieldwork 22–25 October 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
1,200 interviews face to face (760 West Bank, 440 Gaza). Read on pcpsr.org 26 Sep 2026. Re-read 2026-10-10 (poll of 22–25 October 2025): 'Support for Hamas's decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank'; satisfaction 'Hamas (60%) … President Abbas (about 20%)'; 'Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip'; opposition to disarmament 'even if this is a condition for the war to not to return', 69% overall (78% West Bank, 55% Gaza). Press release of 28 October 2025, read in full 2026-10-12 (https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2096%20press%20release%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%2028%20Oct%202025.pdf): '45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution'; 'A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion'; Gazans 'consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements' than West Bankers.
Where it leads if pressed
Working it out: which offers, which leaders, and the record on both sides.
The line is a joke about one side, attributed to Abba Eban; the record behind it is real but needs sorting. Offers rejected or left unanswered by Palestinian leaders: the Peel partition of 1937; the UN partition of 1947, whose Arab leadership called it 'a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country' while the Zionist Organization accepted it despite objecting to its borders; the Clinton parameters of December 2000, which the US negotiator Dennis Ross believed Arafat should have accepted and which, by Ross's account, Israel had accepted with reservations. Offers whose status is disputed: Camp David 2000 produced no written offer, and two US participants, Malley and Agha, wrote to correct an 'effort to blame the Palestinians'; on Olmert's 2008 plan, Israeli officials said Abbas rejected it, while Olmert said in 2018 'President Abbas never said "no" to my plan, never', and Olmert had already announced his resignation amid a corruption inquiry. Offers from the other direction: the Arab League's 2002 initiative offered normal relations for full withdrawal to the 1967 lines; Israel's governments did not take it up as offered: Sharon's foreign-policy adviser called it 'pretty much irrelevant, unfortunately' in March 2002, just after an attack in Netanya on families at a holiday celebration (Christian Science Monitor), and in 2016 Netanyahu called it a 'good foundation' that 'must be updated', adding that if offered as 'take it or leave it', 'we'll choose to leave it' (JNS). And the people, as distinct from their leaders: on the eve of 7 October, 73% of Gazans polled favoured a peaceful settlement; in July 2024, 40% of Palestinians backed two states, as against 21% of Israeli Jews. The worst case for each side. For 'they never miss an opportunity': grant every rejection; 2008 is disputed by the Israeli prime minister who made the offer, the 2002 Arab offer went untaken on the Israeli side, and the Palestinians polled in 2023 and 2024 backed a peaceful settlement or two states in large numbers. For 'there were never real offers': grant every dispute; 1937, 1947 and December 2000 were concrete and were turned down. Holds on the evidence here: Palestinian leaders rejected or did not accept several concrete offers, and paid for it; the 2002 Arab initiative also stands on the record. Arguable, as both participants argue: that one side or the other carries most of the blame for a given failure. Not supported: that rejection is a trait of a people, or that no offer was ever real.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean
primary documentPalestine Royal Commission Report (Peel Report) (1937) finding ✓
Summary of the Report (League of Nations document, UNISPAL), read: 'An irrepressible conflict has arisen between two national communities within the narrow bounds of one small country'; 'Partition offers a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does'; 'Sooner or later there should be a transfer of land and, as far as possible, an exchange of population'. The full report not read.
historyUN study 'The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem', Part II (1947–1977), UNISPAL (1978) finding ✓
Read 2026-09-30. Partition voted on 29 November 1947: '33 votes in favour and 13 against with 10 abstentions'. The Palestine Arab Higher Committee condemned the plan as 'An excess of injustice to Palestine … a flagrant violation of the natural rights of the Arabs in their own country'; 'The Zionist Organization approved of the partition resolution, although objecting the Jewish state had not been allotted enough territory'. Prepared for the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. Also (re-read 2026-09-30): the UK told the UN that if the Assembly recommended 'a policy which was not acceptable to the Jews and the Arabs, the United Kingdom Government would not feel able to implement it'; abstentions on 29 November 1947 included the 'United Kingdom'; Britain 'announced that it would terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, several months before the time envisaged in the United Nations plan'. Re-read 2026-10-01: the partition resolution 'awarded 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine to 32 per cent of its population'; within the Jewish State 'there would remain a very large number of Palestinian Arabs: 497,000 (including 90,000 Bedouin) against 498,000 Jews', with about 10,000 Jews left in the Arab State; 'The partition resolution contained detailed safeguards to ensure the rights of minorities'. The study includes a chapter on the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and that Committee's recommendations. Re-read 2026-10-12, on the end of the Mandate: 'Jewish forces moved to occupy further territory beyond the boundaries specified by the Partition resolution. Irregular units from neighbouring Arab States had already entered Palestine in the final weeks of the Mandate, and now regular forces from these countries crossed into Palestine. The Arab League informed the United Nations Secretary-General by cable of the reasons for the Arab action.' Partition resolution as quoted there (re-read 2026-10-12): Jewish State '498 000' Jews and '407 000' Arabs and others, 'In addition there will be in the Jewish State about 90,000 (Arab) Bedouins'; citizens and residents 'shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident'.
advocacy / viewDennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), as reviewed by Robert Chira, American Diplomacy (November 2004) (2004) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01 (the book itself not read). Chira: Ross 'comes down hard on Yasir Arafat … and blames him for the missing peace'; 'Ross plainly believes Arafat should have accepted the final proposals made by President Clinton in December 2000'; 'The Israelis had already signaled their acceptance in principle to those proposals with some reservations'; and 'a close reading of the book reveals that there is plenty of blame to go around on the Israeli side'; suggested title 'The Missing Leaders'.
advocacy / viewRobert Malley & Hussein Agha, 'Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors', New York Review of Books (2001), as described by The Nation (21 October 2025) (2001) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01 via The Nation, 'The Myths of Camp David' (Q&A with Malley, 21 October 2025), which describes the 2001 New York Review of Books essay: Agha and Malley, both participants at Camp David, 'were dismayed by the American and Israeli effort to blame the Palestinians' and 'sought to correct the record'; Ehud Barak published a rebuttal 'in the same magazine'. The essay itself is not read here (a full repost on a third-party site is not used).
pressAFP via France 24, 'Only Abbas able to make peace: former Israel PM Olmert' (22 September 2018) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02. 'Olmert headed the Israeli government from 2006 to 2009, when a bid to agree on a two-state solution collapsed with Israeli officials accusing Abbas of rejecting a plan proposed by Olmert'; Olmert, on PA television after meeting Abbas in Paris: 'President Abbas never said "no" to my plan, never'; released from prison in July 2017 'after serving 16 months for corruption during his term as mayor of Jerusalem'.
pressCNN, 'Israel's prime minister to step down' (30 July 2008) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02 (served from edition.cnn.com). 'Citing "a wave of investigations and criticism" at the hands of his political opponents, he said he will resign once his Kadima party elects a new chairman'; 'Olmert has been embroiled in a corruption inquiry'; Barak had said he 'would pursue new elections if Olmert didn't step down'; 'Olmert had said he would resign only if he is indicted on corruption charges'.
primary documentArab Peace Initiative (Beirut Summit) (2002) ✓
Official translation adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut, 28 March 2002 (UNSCO copy, read 2026-09-30). Calls on Israel to affirm 'Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines', 'a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194', and a Palestinian state 'with East Jerusalem as its capital'; in return Arab states would 'Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended' and 'Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace'. Rejects 'all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries'.
dataArab Barometer, 'What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas' (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2023), survey of Gaza completed 6 October 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓
Checked against the article (Jamal and Robbins, Foreign Affairs, 25 Oct 2023): fieldwork 28 Sep – 8 Oct 2023, 399 respondents in Gaza, interviews completed 6 Oct; trust in Hamas authorities: none at all 44%, not a lot 23%; a great deal or quite a lot 29%; two-state 54%; peaceful settlement 73%, military solution 20%; party closest: Fatah 30%, Hamas 27%.
dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate ✓
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights — Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states — Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (±3.5%), 17–20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (−6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondents’ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side’s behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.
referenceJewish Virtual Library, 'Quotes on Judaism & Israel: Abba Eban' (2026) ✓
Read (2026-09-28): '“The Arabs never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” The quote is attributed to Abba Eban after the Geneva Peace Conference with Arab countries (December 21, 1973).' No primary citation given.
pressThe Christian Science Monitor, 'Historic chance for peace recedes' (29 March 2002) (2002) incident ✓
Read (2026-10-12). The Arab League summit in Beirut agreed 'to extend peace and "normal relations" to Israel if it withdraws completely from lands seized in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and if it agrees to address the fate of Palestinian refugees in accordance with a UN resolution adopted in 1948.' Daniel Ayalon, Prime Minister Sharon's foreign policy adviser: the initiative 'is pretty much irrelevant, unfortunately … We are dealing now with serious issues of security and existence'; the Netanya attack the day before. Zalman Shoval, a Sharon adviser: Israel would be asked for 'far-reaching and irretrievable concessions in exchange for a sort of promise that the Arab world will live in peace with Israel'.
pressJNS, as published by The Algemeiner, 'Netanyahu: Arab Peace Initiative Could be Relevant With Changes on Borders, Refugees' (14 June 2016) (2016) incident ✓
Read (2026-10-12). Two weeks after saying the initiative included some 'positive elements' and that Israel is 'willing to negotiate with Arab states' revisions', Netanyahu told Likud ministers: 'If the Arab states grasp the fact that they need to revise the Arab League proposal according to the changes Israel demands, then we can talk. But if they bring the proposal from 2002 and define it as "take it or leave it," we'll choose to leave it'; the initiative is a 'good foundation, but it clearly must be updated'.
Blame is not a plan.
If the argument is 'Palestinian leaders made catastrophic choices', the record above gives it support — and Palestinians paid for those choices. If it's 'therefore they have no claim to a state now', it doesn't follow; people living today are not bound by 1947. The useful question is what would make the next offer acceptable to both sides — and which leaders on each side want one (see 'Coexistence where there's contact').
The usual reply — and its own traps
Arguments travel in pairs. Here is what the other side typically answers. Check whether both lean on the same trick.
heard from pro-Palestinian voices“Israel never wanted peace — it breaks every ceasefire and uses talks to take more land.” heard on both sides“UNRWA keeps millions of Palestinians as refugees forever — a problem kept alive on purpose.”Where this argument points
This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions — for, against or around them:
On the timeline
Keep exploring
From the archive
How newspapers reported related events at the time — suggested by the archive's own tags, not yet reviewed for this argument. Open a scan and judge for yourself.
1947-09-29 · The New York Times · ✓U.N. to Hear Arabs’ ‘Three Noes’ On Palestine Inquiry Report Today
1949-08-12 · The New York TimesUS Prepares Plan for Refugees
1949-08-28 · The New York TimesArab States Seek Wide Israeli Area
1982-04-22 · The New York TimesIsraelis Approve Sinai WithdrawalScans: kvetch-of-the-day news archive.