Theme

“Jews and Arabs can't live together.”

Either side's claim that coexistence is impossible — used to justify separation, expulsion, or 'decolonisation'.

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • Massacres happened between neighbours: Hebron 1929, and in 1955 in Mazagan, Morocco, a survivor said 'It was our neighbors who did it. We had been living next door to them for twenty years.'
    • Decades of war, terror and occupation have left deep distrust on both sides.
    • Many mixed places have separated over time.
  2. What's true

    Contact is not a guarantee.

    Neighbours have turned on neighbours — the 1955 Mazagan riots in Morocco (NYT, 26 August 1955: 'African Jews Ask Haven in Israel'), Hebron 1929, and many episodes in both directions since. Any account of coexistence that hides this is not credible.

    newspaper'African Jews Ask Haven in Israel' (1955) incident ✓

    The New York Times · 1955-08-26 · checked against the scan

    Newspaper clipping scan

    Scan from the kvetch-of-the-day news archive.

    NYT 1955-08-26 (index date corrected from 1855); kvetch-of-the-day clipping 3add6f94-3ef1-800e-958c-d058f7b1ef0c. Text read from the clipping image (OCR checked 2026-10-13): officially 'eight Jews were killed and thirty injured'; a woman whose home burned: 'It was our neighbors who did it. We had been living next door to them for twenty years.'

  3. What's left out

    Where there is sustained contact, people are more pragmatic than the movements that speak for them.

    Before the 1920s, the Old Yishuv and Arab neighbours lived side by side in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias; many Sephardi Jews spoke Arabic. In the 1929 Hebron massacre, in which 67 Jews were killed, '22 Arab families … risked their lives to shelter Jewish neighbors' and 'saved dozens, if not hundreds' (Jewish Virtual Library); a contemporary report tells of villagers near Hebron who 'sheltered and fed seven Jews' (JTA, October 1929). Mixed cities — Haifa, Jaffa, Acre — function today, with friction. After October 7, about 70% of Arab citizens told the Israel Democracy Institute that they 'feel a part of the State of Israel and its problems', and its Democracy Index found the sense of belonging rose in both publics, while Arab respondents still ranked Arab–Jewish tensions as the main source of tension. In East Jerusalem, 52% preferred Israeli to Palestinian citizenship in a 2015 poll (September per the 2017 article, mid-June per the 2015 one), falling to 21% by 2017 (Washington Institute). In 1860 London's Chief Rabbi, Dr Adler, called on Jews throughout Europe for 'liberal contributions for the poor in Syria', to 'rally to the aid of their Christian brethren in the East, who are children of the same Almighty Father', on the ground that Syria and Palestine were 'the land of their fathers', to which they hoped 'to be restored' (NYT, 25 October 1860). The divide ran along politics and factions, not descent: old Jerusalem families produced both the Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini and the more moderate Nashashibis. Contact can undo a lifetime's image even from inside the most hostile setting. Mosab Hassan Yousef, raised in a Hamas leader's household, said of his first dealings with his Shin Bet handler: 'I first agreed to work with a Shin Bet agent with the idea of killing him at the first opportunity. Then I found myself in his living room, holding his baby in my arms. That was real. Coexistence is possible' (interview in Geneva, May 2015, published by UN Watch; our translation from French).

    referenceJewish Virtual Library, 'The Hebron Massacre (August 23, 1929)'; and JTA Daily Bulletin, '7 Jews in Hebron Were Saved by Arabs from Massacre' (3 October 1929) (1929) ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. JVL: '67 Jews lay dead'; 'A few Arabs tried to help the Jews. 22 Arab families who risked their lives to shelter Jewish neighbors during the pogrom, and saved dozens, if not hundreds, of Hebron's Jews'; Zmira Mani's account of Abu Id Zaitoun's family hiding Jews in a cellar. JTA, 3 Oct 1929 (https://www.jta.org/archive/7-jews-in-hebron-were-saved-by-arabs-from-massacre), relaying Davar: 'Arab villagers of Bectomar, near Hebron, sheltered and fed seven Jews who managed to escape the Hebron massacre'.

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    press'Affairs in Syria' (Chief Rabbi Adler's appeal) (1860) incident ✓

    NYT 1860-10-25, 'Affairs in Syria. Active benevolence of the American missionaries'; text read from the clipping image (kvetch-of-the-day archive) 2026-09-30: 'Dr. Adler, the Chief Rabbi of the Jews, who resides in London, has issued an address to the Jews throughout Europe, calling upon them for liberal contributions for the poor in Syria'; 'Dr. Adler bases his appeal upon the ground that Syria and Palestine is the land of their fathers … they must rally to the aid of their Christian brethren in the East, who are children of the same Almighty Father, and calls upon them to give liberally as they hope to be restored to the land to which their traditions, prophecies, and hopes, point as their future home.' The 1860 massacres themselves are not described in this clipping.

    Open source ↗

    primary document'Interview de Mosab Hassan Yousef : «Les Palestiniens sont élevés dans le mensonge»', Geneva, published by UN Watch, 8 May 2015 (2015) incident ✓

    Read (French): 'j'ai d'abord accepté de travailler avec un agent du Shin Bet dans l'idée de le tuer à la première occasion. Puis je me suis retrouvé dans son salon, tenant son bébé dans mes bras. Ça, c'était bien réel. La coexistence est possible, j'en suis convaincu.' Translation ours. This site's translation, used on the page: 'I first agreed to work with a Shin Bet agent with the idea of killing him at the first opportunity. Then I found myself in his living room, holding his baby in my arms. That was real. Coexistence is possible, I am convinced of it.'

    Open source ↗

    dataIsrael Democracy Institute, 'On a tightrope: Israel's Arab citizens and the War Between Israel and Hamas' and 'The Israeli Democracy Index 2023' (press release, 14 March 2024) (2023) aggregate ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'in a recent Israel Democracy Institute poll, about 70% of Arab Israelis say they feel a part of the State of Israel and its problems'. Democracy Index 2023 (https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53380): 'After October 7, ratings of the level of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole improved dramatically in both the Jewish and Arab publics, as did the sense of belonging to the State of Israel'; 'tensions between Arabs and Jews were ranked highest by Arab respondents in both rounds'; in the Arab public 'the Supreme Court topped the trust rankings'.

    Open source ↗

    dataThe Washington Institute, East Jerusalem Palestinian polls (fieldwork by the Palestine Center for Public Opinion): 'East Jerusalem Palestinian Poll Shows Rising Nationalism as Tensions Grow' (10 August 2017) and 'Half of Jerusalem's Palestinians Would Prefer Israeli…Citizenship' (2017) aggregate ✓

    2017 article: preference for Israeli over Palestinian citizenship 52% (September 2015) → 21% (2017); ~500 face-to-face interviews, ±4%. The 'Half…' piece: reasons given (jobs, health care, benefits, freedom of travel); 'only a very small proportion have actually acquired' citizenship. The 'Half…' piece re-read 2026-10-12 (David Pollock, 'Half of Jerusalem's Palestinians Would Prefer Israeli to Palestinian Citizenship', 21 Aug 2015, washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/half-jerusalems-palestinians-would-prefer-israeli-palestinian-citizenship): 'social taboos and the great practical difficulties of applying for that citizenship mean that only a very small proportion have actually acquired that full formal status to date'; it dates the 52% (vs 42% for Palestinian citizenship) to 'a mid-June poll' by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, up from one-third in September 2010 and 40% in September 2011. The 2017 article calls the same 52% 'the previous poll in September 2015' — the two pieces give different months. Also from the 2015 piece: 'In the earlier polls, East Jerusalem respondents mostly cited practical reasons for this preference: better jobs, income, health care and other social benefits, freedom of travel, and the like' (the reasons come from the 2010–11 polls, not the 2015 one).

    Open source ↗

  4. The picture

    Contact coexists with real grievance.

    East Jerusalem Palestinians face residency revocations, building-permit restrictions and demolitions, and evictions such as Sheikh Jarrah (2021); Arab citizens face unequal land and planning policy. Coexistence where there's contact doesn't erase these — it is the ground on which they can be fixed.

  5. Where it leads if pressed

    Working it out: does contact soften attitudes here, and which contact?

    The claim that Palestinians who live alongside Jews are the least hostile can be tested, and the evidence supports a qualified version. The general finding: a meta-analysis of 515 studies across 38 nations found that 'intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice', more so under conditions such as equal status, though those conditions 'are not essential', and that the result is not explained by people selecting themselves into contact. The cases here. Arab citizens of Israel, who live and work alongside Jews as fellow citizens, mostly feel part of the state (about 70% in 2023, rising after 7 October), while about 79% say there is a lot of discrimination (Pew): attachment and grievance together, the pattern of people with 'annoyances they want fixed'. East Jerusalem Palestinians, residents rather than citizens, shifted from 52% preferring Israeli citizenship in 2015 to 21% in 2017 (Washington Institute), so attitudes there move with events. The West Bank and Gaza complicate a simple story: in October 2025 support for disarming Hamas was 44% in Gaza against 18% in the West Bank (PCPSR), and West Bank contact is mostly with soldiers and settlers, not neighbours of equal status. And history has the rescuers of Hebron in 1929 as well as the killers. The worst case for each side. For 'contact makes them least hostile': take the West Bank, where contact is most constant and support for disarming Hamas lowest; the kind of contact decides, not its amount. For 'Jews and Arabs can't live together', at its strongest: the 1929 pogrom in Hebron left '67 Jews … dead' (JVL), and in 2014–15 48% of Israeli Jews agreed that 'Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel' (Pew); even so, 22 Arab families in the same Hebron sheltered Jewish neighbours, and among Arab citizens and in mixed towns about 70% feel part of the state (IDI) despite real discrimination, and single lives show the turn the research describes: Mosab Hassan Yousef said he first agreed to work with a Shin Bet agent 'with the idea of killing him at the first opportunity. Then I found myself in his living room, holding his baby … Coexistence is possible' (interview published by UN Watch, 2015; this site's translation from the French), one account, an incident and not a pattern. Holds on the evidence here: contact generally reduces prejudice, and where Arabs and Jews meet as equals, attitudes are more pragmatic. Possible, and the kind of question the research itself flags ('negative factors that prevent intergroup contact from diminishing prejudice'): that contact under unequal, hostile conditions does little to reduce hostility. Not supported: that proximity alone produces goodwill, or that the two peoples cannot live together.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    historyThomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp, 'A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5) (May 2006) (2006) finding ✓

    Abstract read via Europe PMC, 2026-10-10. 'With 713 independent samples from 515 studies, the meta-analysis finds that intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice'; 'this finding appears not to result from either participant selection or publication biases'; effects 'typically generalize to the entire outgroup'; 'contact under these conditions [Allport's optimal conditions] typically leads to even greater reduction in prejudice', but 'these conditions are not essential'; future work should focus on 'negative factors that prevent intergroup contact from diminishing prejudice'. Not specific to Israel–Palestine.

    Open source ↗

    dataIsrael Democracy Institute, 'On a tightrope: Israel's Arab citizens and the War Between Israel and Hamas' and 'The Israeli Democracy Index 2023' (press release, 14 March 2024) (2023) aggregate ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'in a recent Israel Democracy Institute poll, about 70% of Arab Israelis say they feel a part of the State of Israel and its problems'. Democracy Index 2023 (https://en.idi.org.il/articles/53380): 'After October 7, ratings of the level of solidarity in Israeli society as a whole improved dramatically in both the Jewish and Arab publics, as did the sense of belonging to the State of Israel'; 'tensions between Arabs and Jews were ranked highest by Arab respondents in both rounds'; in the Arab public 'the Supreme Court topped the trust rankings'.

    Open source ↗

    dataPew Research Center, 'Israel's Religiously Divided Society' (8 March 2016) (2016) aggregate ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 5,601 face-to-face interviews, Oct 2014 – May 2015. 'Israeli Jews are roughly evenly divided between two types of ethnic identity: Ashkenazi Jews (with ancestral roots in Central and Eastern Europe) and Sephardi or Mizrahi Jews (with roots mostly in Spain, elsewhere around the Mediterranean or the Middle East).' Also: asked whether 'Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel', Israeli Jews 'strongly agree (21%) or agree (27%), while a similar share disagree (29%) or strongly disagree (17%)'; 'Roughly seven-in-ten (71%)' of Datiim agree, 'Most (58%)' of Hilonim disagree (re-read 2026-09-30). Also: 'Most Israeli Jews (79%) say Jews deserve preferential treatment in Israel'; 'Roughly eight-in-ten Israeli Arabs (79%) say there is a lot of discrimination in Israeli society against Muslims'; 'the vast majority (74%) [of Jews] say they do not see much discrimination against Muslims'; majorities of all four Jewish subgroups say Israel can be both Jewish and democratic; 'Israeli Arabs generally do not think Israel can be a Jewish state and a democracy at the same time'. Also read 2026-10-10: 'About nine-in-ten Haredim (91%), eight-in-ten Datiim (80%) and roughly six-in-ten Masortim (59%) consider themselves Jewish first, while about six-in-ten Hilonim (59%) take the opposite position, saying they see themselves as Israeli first'; if halakha and democratic principles conflict, '89% of Haredim say halakha should be given preference', while 'among Hilonim, an equally lopsided share (89%) say the state should give preference to democratic principles'; 'The vast majority of Jews (98%), Muslims (85%), Christians (86%) and Druze (83%) say all or most of their close friends belong to their own religious community.'

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    dataThe Washington Institute, East Jerusalem Palestinian polls (fieldwork by the Palestine Center for Public Opinion): 'East Jerusalem Palestinian Poll Shows Rising Nationalism as Tensions Grow' (10 August 2017) and 'Half of Jerusalem's Palestinians Would Prefer Israeli…Citizenship' (2017) aggregate ✓

    2017 article: preference for Israeli over Palestinian citizenship 52% (September 2015) → 21% (2017); ~500 face-to-face interviews, ±4%. The 'Half…' piece: reasons given (jobs, health care, benefits, freedom of travel); 'only a very small proportion have actually acquired' citizenship. The 'Half…' piece re-read 2026-10-12 (David Pollock, 'Half of Jerusalem's Palestinians Would Prefer Israeli to Palestinian Citizenship', 21 Aug 2015, washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/half-jerusalems-palestinians-would-prefer-israeli-palestinian-citizenship): 'social taboos and the great practical difficulties of applying for that citizenship mean that only a very small proportion have actually acquired that full formal status to date'; it dates the 52% (vs 42% for Palestinian citizenship) to 'a mid-June poll' by the Palestinian Center for Public Opinion, up from one-third in September 2010 and 40% in September 2011. The 2017 article calls the same 52% 'the previous poll in September 2015' — the two pieces give different months. Also from the 2015 piece: 'In the earlier polls, East Jerusalem respondents mostly cited practical reasons for this preference: better jobs, income, health care and other social benefits, freedom of travel, and the like' (the reasons come from the 2010–11 polls, not the 2015 one).

    Open source ↗

    dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (fieldwork 22–25 October 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓

    1,200 interviews face to face (760 West Bank, 440 Gaza). Read on pcpsr.org 26 Sep 2026. Re-read 2026-10-10 (poll of 22–25 October 2025): 'Support for Hamas's decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank'; satisfaction 'Hamas (60%) … President Abbas (about 20%)'; 'Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip'; opposition to disarmament 'even if this is a condition for the war to not to return', 69% overall (78% West Bank, 55% Gaza). Press release of 28 October 2025, read in full 2026-10-12 (https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2096%20press%20release%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%2028%20Oct%202025.pdf): '45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution'; 'A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion'; Gazans 'consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements' than West Bankers.

    Open source ↗

    referenceJewish Virtual Library, 'The Hebron Massacre (August 23, 1929)'; and JTA Daily Bulletin, '7 Jews in Hebron Were Saved by Arabs from Massacre' (3 October 1929) (1929) ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. JVL: '67 Jews lay dead'; 'A few Arabs tried to help the Jews. 22 Arab families who risked their lives to shelter Jewish neighbors during the pogrom, and saved dozens, if not hundreds, of Hebron's Jews'; Zmira Mani's account of Abu Id Zaitoun's family hiding Jews in a cellar. JTA, 3 Oct 1929 (https://www.jta.org/archive/7-jews-in-hebron-were-saved-by-arabs-from-massacre), relaying Davar: 'Arab villagers of Bectomar, near Hebron, sheltered and fed seven Jews who managed to escape the Hebron massacre'.

    Open source ↗

    primary document'Interview de Mosab Hassan Yousef : «Les Palestiniens sont élevés dans le mensonge»', Geneva, published by UN Watch, 8 May 2015 (2015) incident ✓

    Read (French): 'j'ai d'abord accepté de travailler avec un agent du Shin Bet dans l'idée de le tuer à la première occasion. Puis je me suis retrouvé dans son salon, tenant son bébé dans mes bras. Ça, c'était bien réel. La coexistence est possible, j'en suis convaincu.' Translation ours. This site's translation, used on the page: 'I first agreed to work with a Shin Bet agent with the idea of killing him at the first opportunity. Then I found myself in his living room, holding his baby in my arms. That was real. Coexistence is possible, I am convinced of it.'

    Open source ↗

    Where it leads: more contact, not less.

    People who build contact exist on both sides and are pushed out of view by the purity loop: Standing Together (Jewish–Arab movement), the Parents Circle – Families Forum (bereaved Israeli and Palestinian families), Combatants for Peace, Road to Recovery (Israelis driving Palestinian patients to hospital), Realign for Palestine. The line in this conflict doesn't run between peoples; it runs between ideologues who need an enemy and people who want a solution — and the second group on each side has more in common with the second group on the other than with the first on its own.

Where this argument points

This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions — for, against or around them:

On the timeline

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