Solutions

Two states, one homeland (confederation)

Two sovereign states with open borders, shared institutions and a shared Jerusalem; citizenship and residence are separated.

Check the effects of this card β†’ pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Israeli citizens; settlers can remain in Palestine as permanent residents under Palestinian law.

What happens to Palestinians

Palestinian citizens; some refugees can live in Israel as residents without changing its citizenship balance.

What it requires

  • Two states on roughly the 1967 lines
  • Freedom of movement and residence across the border
  • Settlers may stay as residents of Palestine; some refugees may live in Israel as residents, voting in Palestine
  • Joint institutions for security, economy, water and Jerusalem

Who supports it

Palestinians35%
Israeli Jews12%
All Israelis20%
Arab citizens of Israel52%

Palestinian-Israeli Pulse (PCPSR / Tel Aviv University), fieldwork July 2024, published September 2024 (pcpsr.org/en/node/989, read 28 September 2026: 'Support for an alternative two-state confederation … 20% of all Israelis … 35% [of Palestinians] in 2024 … 12% of Israeli Jews … but 52% of Arabs').

What history says

  • The European Union, which A Land for All itself calls 'a good analogue' for shared institutions
  • The 'A Land for All' plan (its US site, read): two states on 'a border based on the pre-1967 "Green Line"'; settlers 'could, if they wish, remain in the West Bank so long as they agree to be law-abiding residents under Palestinian sovereignty', voting in Israeli national elections; 1948 refugees and their descendants could 'move to Israel under the same terms – permanent residency' or 'receive agreed upon compensation or restitution'; Jerusalem 'an open city' and 'the capital of both states'. May Pundak of A Land for All adds the other half: 'People who do not accept the sovereign Palestinian state will have to leave' (The Nation, Q&A).

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

Two states with open borders β€” unlikely on the record

if both publics accept open borders and violence is contained (Both publics would accept two states with open borders between them; Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check)

Two states, each with its own citizenship and government, and free movement between them; residents of one may live in the other; Jerusalem shared.

What it can slide into: If violence crosses the open border: closure, and two states at cold peace or worse.

Two states, cold peace β€” possible on the record

if the borders stay closed but the two states hold (not: Both publics would accept two states with open borders between them; Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; An outside guarantor would stay and act when tested)

The agreement holds between governments β€” borders, security cooperation, some trade β€” while each public stays hostile and contact across the border is policed socially.

  • Egypt and Jordan with Israel β€” held, cold. Armies cooperate and gas flows, while 'normalisation' is sanctioned by unions and syndicates and public opinion moved the other way (see 'Cold peace').

What it can slide into: It can warm with time and contact, or break at the next war.

A new state that becomes a front β€” possible on the record

if violence crosses the border (not: Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check)

The territory handed over becomes a base for attacks; the stronger side answers with closure and force; the withdrawal is read on both sides as having failed.

  • Gaza after 2005 β€” collapsed. Rockets after the disengagement and Hamas's 2007 takeover (see the deadlock 'A state as staging post').
  • Southern Lebanon after 2000 β€” collapsed. Hezbollah's build-up after the Israeli withdrawal (same deadlock).

What it can slide into: Renewed occupation or war, and a public on each side convinced that the other never wanted peace.

The hard questions

  • Does open movement work while trust is this low?
  • Who polices violence that crosses the border?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here