Theme

β€œGovernments made peace; peoples didn't”

Egypt, Jordan and the Abraham Accords states have treaties and trade with Israel, while their publics remain among the most hostile to it. Is that peace, or just an arrangement between elites?

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • In the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, 84% of respondents across the Arab world opposed their country recognising Israel; only 8% supported it.
    • Egypt has had a peace treaty with Israel since 1979 and close security cooperation in Sinai, yet professional syndicates there punish members for 'normalisation'.
    • Positive views of the Abraham Accords in Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia fell to around 20–25% within a few years, and dropped further after October 2023.
  2. The picture

    The contrast: treaties above, hostility below.

    Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) made peace with Israel and have kept it through wars, intifadas and Gaza. Their armies cooperate with Israel's, and Israeli gas flows to Egypt: in December 2025, two years after the Gaza war began, Israel approved a $35 billion deal to sell Egypt some 130 billion cubic metres from the Leviathan field to 2040, 'the largest gas deal in Israel's history' in Netanyahu's words, for a country whose own output has fallen far enough that it now imports gas on net (S&P Global Platts). The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan normalised relations in 2020, driven by state interests: Iran, trade, technology, US deals. Public opinion moved the other way. In the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, 84% opposed recognising Israel, with Morocco the most open at around 20% in favour. After the Gaza war, opposition rose further, for example in Saudi Arabia from 38% to 68%. In Egypt and Jordan, 'normalisation' is policed socially: unions and syndicates sanction members who deal with Israelis (see 'The purity loop').

    Traps here:β—† The purity loop

    dataArab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha), Arab Opinion Index 2022 (2022) aggregate βœ“

    Read 2026-09-29 (the Index's own 2022 brief, English; Qatar-based institute, see its org page, 'Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies'). 'face-to-face interviews conducted with 33300 individual respondents in 14 Arab countries'; 'An overwhelming majority (84%) of Arabs disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 8% accepting formal diplomatic recognition'; highest refusal Algeria and Mauritania 99%, Libya 96%, Palestine 95%, Jordan 94%, Iraq 92%, Tunisia 90%; in Morocco and Sudan more than two-thirds refused, with support '20% or less'. Post-2023 figures come from the Index's Gaza survey (not read here).

    Open source β†—

    dataWashington Institute for Near East Policy, polls on Arab public opinion and the Abraham Accords aggregate βœ“

    Read (TWI, July 2022): positive views of the Abraham Accords 'hover between 19% to 25%' in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE (March 2022), down from November 2020, when UAE and Bahraini opinion was 'effectively split' and 40% of Saudis and Qataris supported them; countercurrent: 40% of Saudis would allow informal business or sports ties with Israelis.

    Open source β†—

    dataArab Center Washington DC with ACRPS (Doha), 'Arab Public Opinion about Israel's War on Gaza' (2024) (2024) aggregate βœ“

    Read, 2026-10-10. Telephone interviews, 12 December 2023 – 5 January 2024, 8,000 respondents in 16 Arab countries (per the centre's description). 'Arab public opinion is almost unanimous in rejecting the premise of recognizing Israel, at a rate of 89%, compared to only 4% who support its recognition'; up 'from 84% in 2022'; 'the increase in the percentage of those who oppose recognizing Israel in Saudi Arabia, from 38% in the 2022 poll to 68% this round'; majorities in Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan oppose their countries recognising Israel.

    Open source β†—

    pressS&P Global Platts, 'Israel approves $35 bil Egypt gas export deal', as published by Hellenic Shipping News (22 December 2025) (2025) incident βœ“

    Read (2026-10-12). The Israeli government approved the $35 billion agreement to expand gas exports from the Leviathan field to Egypt, which Netanyahu called 'the largest gas deal in Israel's history' (17 December 2025); 'some 130 Bcm of gas' to Egypt's Blue Ocean Energy to 2040; phase one from the first half of 2026, 20 Bcm at 2 Bcm a year; phase two 110 Bcm, bringing Leviathan's sales to Egypt to 12 Bcm a year. Egypt's own production in the first nine months of 2025 was 31.8 Bcm (JODI), and it has become a net LNG importer.

    Open source β†—

    Why it still matters: cold peace has held.

    The Egyptian peace has lasted more than 45 years, through every Gaza war and two intifadas; the Jordanian one more than 30. A peace kept by governments against public mood is fragile in feeling but has proved durable in fact. It also shows what each side can offer the other without winning hearts first. The open question for any solution is whether peace between Israelis and Palestinians could work the same way. They share one land rather than a border, so elite arrangements are harder to insulate from the street.

    Traps here:β—† Negotiation as a weapon

    Two arguments that grow from it.

    Pro-Israel: 'the Arab world is making peace; the Palestinians are no longer the key.' The treaties are real, but the polls show the Palestinian question is still what blocks peace between peoples, and the war after 2023 froze further normalisation. Pro-Palestinian: 'normalisation is betrayal; the Arab peoples reject Israel.' The polls support the second half, but the treaties have also brought Egyptians and Jordanians decades without war. Both arguments take one level, the state or the street, for the whole picture.

    Traps here:β—† The exception as proof

  3. Where it leads if pressed

    Working it out: reading the polls against the treaties.

    Two kinds of evidence point opposite ways here, and each is often read as the whole story. The polls first, read carefully. In the 2022 Arab Opinion Index, 84% of respondents opposed their own country recognising Israel and 8% supported it; in the same centre's survey of December 2023 to January 2024, opposition was 89% and support 4%. The sharpest change was Saudi Arabia, where opposition rose from 38% to 68%, a jump that also shows how unusual Saudi opinion had been before the war. Two cautions: the 2022 survey was face to face and the 2024 one by telephone, so part of any change may be method; and 'recognition by my country' is not the only question. In March 2022, when only about a fifth of Saudis, Bahrainis and Emiratis viewed the Abraham Accords positively, 40% of Saudis would still allow informal business or sports ties with Israelis (Washington Institute). Then the treaties: Egypt's has held for 47 years and Jordan's for 32, through wars in Gaza and two intifadas. What follows. For 'the Arab world is making peace, the Palestinians no longer matter': opposition to recognition rose with the Gaza war, most sharply in Saudi Arabia. For 'the Arab peoples reject Israel, so normalisation is a fraud': the treaties have held for decades regardless, and some of the public accepts informal contact even while rejecting recognition. Holds on the evidence here: Arab publics overwhelmingly oppose recognition, more so since the war, and the existing treaties have nonetheless lasted. Open, not shown here: that informal ties are a path to wider acceptance. Not supported: that peace between governments means peace between peoples, or that public hostility makes the treaties meaningless.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    dataArab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha), Arab Opinion Index 2022 (2022) aggregate βœ“

    Read 2026-09-29 (the Index's own 2022 brief, English; Qatar-based institute, see its org page, 'Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies'). 'face-to-face interviews conducted with 33300 individual respondents in 14 Arab countries'; 'An overwhelming majority (84%) of Arabs disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 8% accepting formal diplomatic recognition'; highest refusal Algeria and Mauritania 99%, Libya 96%, Palestine 95%, Jordan 94%, Iraq 92%, Tunisia 90%; in Morocco and Sudan more than two-thirds refused, with support '20% or less'. Post-2023 figures come from the Index's Gaza survey (not read here).

    Open source β†—

    dataArab Center Washington DC with ACRPS (Doha), 'Arab Public Opinion about Israel's War on Gaza' (2024) (2024) aggregate βœ“

    Read, 2026-10-10. Telephone interviews, 12 December 2023 – 5 January 2024, 8,000 respondents in 16 Arab countries (per the centre's description). 'Arab public opinion is almost unanimous in rejecting the premise of recognizing Israel, at a rate of 89%, compared to only 4% who support its recognition'; up 'from 84% in 2022'; 'the increase in the percentage of those who oppose recognizing Israel in Saudi Arabia, from 38% in the 2022 poll to 68% this round'; majorities in Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan oppose their countries recognising Israel.

    Open source β†—

    dataWashington Institute for Near East Policy, polls on Arab public opinion and the Abraham Accords aggregate βœ“

    Read (TWI, July 2022): positive views of the Abraham Accords 'hover between 19% to 25%' in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE (March 2022), down from November 2020, when UAE and Bahraini opinion was 'effectively split' and 40% of Saudis and Qataris supported them; countercurrent: 40% of Saudis would allow informal business or sports ties with Israelis.

    Open source β†—

Where this argument points

This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions β€” for, against or around them:

Keep exploring