Theme

“Whose war is it?”

The loudest fights about Israel and Palestine are often between people for whom the conflict stands in for something else: the Western right against Islam, the Western left against colonialism, Iran against Israel and the West, Arab regimes against their own publics. Palestinians and Israelis become symbols in other people's wars.

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • Online, the most intense arguments about Gaza are often between Americans or Europeans arguing about their own politics.
    • Iran funds and arms Hamas, Hezbollah and others as part of its own confrontation with Israel and the United States.
    • Arab states have long championed the Palestinian cause in speeches while restricting Palestinians in practice.
  2. The picture

    Four wars fought over the same people.

    For part of the Western right, the conflict is a front in a war between the West and Islam, and Palestinians become stand-ins for jihadists in Europe. For part of the Western left, it's a front in a war against colonialism and whiteness, and Israelis become stand-ins for European empire, whatever their family history. For Iran's leadership, it's a front against Israel and America, fought through allies it arms and funds: Hamas's Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar called Iran 'the largest supporter of the Izz el-Deen al-Qassam Brigades with money and arms' (2017), and Canada lists Iran's Quds Force as providing 'arms, funding and paramilitary training'. For Arab governments, the cause has been championed in words while Palestinians were treated very differently in practice: after Kuwait's liberation in 1991, Human Rights Watch recorded Palestinians 'expelled without any provision being made for their acceptance by another country', and of some 180,000 who had left during the occupation, Kuwait 'with very few exceptions' let none back (the same report says conditions 'gradually improved as the year progressed'). Each frame can be checked against what Palestinians and Israelis themselves say they want.

    Traps here:◆ The strict enemy frame◆ "They all…"

    press'Relations with Iran are excellent', Hamas leader says (Middle East Eye, 28 August 2017) (2017) incident ✓

    Middle East Eye, 28 August 2017 (read): Yahya Sinwar, newly elected Hamas leader in Gaza — 'Relations with Iran are excellent, and Iran is the largest supporter of the Izz el-Deen al-Qassam Brigades with money and arms'; the report adds that Hamas had angered Tehran by refusing to support Assad, and that regional diplomats said Iranian aid had been sharply reduced and directed to the armed wing. Re-read 2026-10-12: '"This will be reflected in the resistance (against Israel) and in (Hamas's) agenda to achieve the liberation," he said.'

    Open source ↗

    primary documentPublic Safety Canada, 'Currently listed entities': Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Qods Force (IRGC-QF) finding ✓

    Read (2026-09-29). 'the clandestine branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for extraterritorial operations, and for exporting the Iranian Revolution'; it 'provides arms, funding and paramilitary training to extremist groups, including the Taliban, Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)'. Listed 2012-12-17, reviewed 2024-06-07. A Western government's listing. Same page, Ansarallah (listed 2024-12-02): 'commonly referred to as the Houthis … aligns itself with the Iranian-led "axis of resistance", which includes Hamas and Hezbollah'; the IRGC-QF and Hezbollah 'have provided Ansarallah with arms, training, and financial support'; it also records the group's repression in areas it controls.

    Open source ↗

    pressHuman Rights Watch (Middle East Watch), World Report 1992, 'Kuwait' (1992) finding ✓

    Read 2026-10-01. The reinstated government 'disregarded those standards as soon as it returned from exile on February 26, 1991. The pretext for these abuses was a government-inspired quest to root out those who had collaborated with the Iraqi occupiers'; 'Between May and August, as the trials of suspected collaborators inflamed anti-Palestinian and anti-Bedoon hostility, large-scale arrests and forced deportations became the predominant abuse'; 'Stateless Bedoons and Palestinians have been expelled without any provision being made for their acceptance by another country'; 'Between March and August, more than 1,500 residents of Kuwait were deported, including Bedoons, Iraqis and Palestinians'; 'During the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, around 180,000 Palestinians left Kuwait … After liberation, with very few exceptions, Kuwait has refused to allow any of them' back; Palestinian and Bedoon children 'barred from enrolling in public schools after liberation'. Also: conditions 'gradually improved as the year progressed'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'Like Palestinian children, Bedoon children were barred from enrolling in public schools after liberation'; 'around 180,000 Palestinians left Kuwait to avoid the hardships of occupation and war … After liberation, with very few exceptions, Kuwait has refused to allow any of them to return.'

    Open source ↗

    What gets lost: the people who live there.

    Palestinians who want a state and a normal life rather than a caliphate or a revolution; Israelis who want security and an end to the occupation; Gazans who marched in Beit Lahia in March 2025 against 'Israel's genocide and unlawful displacement' and, in the same marches, against 'the Hamas-led authorities' (Amnesty International); an Arab citizen of Israel, Khaled Kabub, who in 2022 became the Supreme Court's first Muslim justice. In the proxy frames they are either props or traitors. That's why this site keeps asking the local questions: what do Palestinians and Israelis themselves want, who among them speaks, and who gets to speak (see 'Who can afford to speak').

    Traps here:◆ Identity as authority

    primary documentAmnesty International, 'Palestine: Hamas security services must stop targeting protesters in reprisal and respect freedom of peaceful assembly in Gaza' (May 2025) (2025) pattern ✓

    On the March–April 2025 anti-Hamas protests and reprisals. Read 2026-09-30 (Amnesty International, NGO): 'Since 25 March, residents of Beit Lahia … have organized multiple marches demanding an end to Israel's genocide and unlawful displacement'; 'Protesters have been chanting slogans and holding signs criticizing the Hamas-led authorities in Gaza, with some people calling for an end to Hamas' rule'; Hamas authorities 'ramping up threats and intimidation against people simply for saying "we want to live"'. The words 'Hamas out' are not in this statement. Re-read 2026-10-13: Amnesty 'has documented a disturbing pattern of threats, intimidation and harassment, including interrogations and beatings by Hamas-run security forces against individuals exercising their right to peaceful protest'.

    Open source ↗

    referenceCardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project (Versa), 'Kabub, Khaled' (justice profile) ✓

    Read 2026-09-30: 'Khaled Kabub is an Israeli-Arab judge and became the Supreme Court’s first Muslim member when he was appointed as justice in 2022'; born 1958; Netanya Magistrate's Court 1997, Tel Aviv District Court 2003.

    Open source ↗

    A test for any argument you meet.

    Ask: if this argument won, would Palestinians and Israelis be better off, or would the speaker's own side at home? An argument that serves a Western culture war, a regime's legitimacy or an axis's strategy can be sincere and still not be about the people it names. One sign to look for: does the argument name specific places and people there, and does it allow for doubt?

    Reading the numbers: the people closest to the war, compared with those further away.

    The page's test asks whether an argument serves the people it names. Polls let one part of that be checked: do those who bear the war think differently from those who watch it? Gaza against the West Bank, October 2025: support for disarming Hamas was 44% in Gaza and 18% in the West Bank; opposition to disarmament, even as a condition for the war not to return, was 55% in Gaza and 78% in the West Bank. July 2024: 54% in Gaza, against 31% in the West Bank, thought the war might open 'an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973'; on choosing a regional peace over a regional war there was 'minimal difference' between the two. Inside Israel: 52% of Arab citizens and 23% of Jewish citizens saw that chance of a breakthrough. On these figures, the people under bombardment are more open to disarmament and to a breakthrough than Palestinians in the West Bank, by 20 to 26 points (this page's arithmetic); outside the region, the one survey on this site, of 250 American students, asked about the slogan rather than disarmament, and found that only 47% of supporters could name the river and the sea (Hassner, see 'One word two meanings'); no poll here asks Western activists the questions put to Gazans, so the comparison stops at the region's edge. The worst case for each side. For 'Gazans want the fight to go on': take the Gaza figures at their hardest; 55% still opposed disarmament, and in December 2023, 57% of Gazans called the decision to launch the October 7 attack 'correct' (PCPSR); but both are well below the West Bank (78% against disarmament; 82% 'correct'), and a majority in Gaza saw a chance for peace. For 'Palestinians all want peace now': 44% for disarmament in Gaza is a minority, and in the West Bank 78% opposed it. Holds on the evidence here: those closest to the war are measurably more open to disarmament and to a breakthrough than Palestinians further from it. Open, needs polls of Western activists: a direct comparison with the movements abroad. Not supported: treating any outside movement's position as the position of the people in Gaza.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (fieldwork 22–25 October 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓

    1,200 interviews face to face (760 West Bank, 440 Gaza). Read on pcpsr.org 26 Sep 2026. Re-read 2026-10-10 (poll of 22–25 October 2025): 'Support for Hamas's decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank'; satisfaction 'Hamas (60%) … President Abbas (about 20%)'; 'Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip'; opposition to disarmament 'even if this is a condition for the war to not to return', 69% overall (78% West Bank, 55% Gaza). Press release of 28 October 2025, read in full 2026-10-12 (https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2096%20press%20release%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%2028%20Oct%202025.pdf): '45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution'; 'A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion'; Gazans 'consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements' than West Bankers.

    Open source ↗

    dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate ✓

    Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights — Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states — Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (±3.5%), 17–20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (−6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondents’ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side’s behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.

    Open source ↗

    dataRon Hassner, 'From Which River to Which Sea?' (Helen Diller Institute, UC Berkeley, 5 December 2023; also a WSJ op-ed) (2023) aggregate ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 250 US students polled by a survey firm; supporters 32.8% enthusiastic + 53.2% less so; 'only 47% of the students who embrace the slogan were able to name the river and the sea' (answers incl. the Nile and Euphrates, the Caribbean); of 80 shown a map, 75% changed their view; 60% of the 'replace Israel' group on learning it would entail 'the subjugation, expulsion or annihilation of seven million Jewish and two million Arab Israelis'; 14% more on reading many American Jews find it threatening; overall 67.8% 'after learning a handful of basic facts'. Small commissioned sample; the author is not neutral ('screaming for the extermination of millions').

    Open source ↗

    dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov – 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓

    72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.

    Open source ↗

On the timeline

Keep exploring

From the archive

How newspapers reported related events at the time — suggested by the archive's own tags, not yet reviewed for this argument. Open a scan and judge for yourself.

Scans: kvetch-of-the-day news archive.