Trap Β· reasoning move
β Same slogan, different goals
Sounds like: βWe all want the same thing: Free Palestine.β
A broad coalition β Western progressives, Palestinian and Arab movements, Islamist groups β marches under one slogan, assuming shared goals.
Signs
a slogan whose supporters give incompatible answers to 'what happens next?'; different messages in different languages; embarrassing statements from allies met with 'context' rather than disagreement.
Questions to ask
What would the people I march with build if they won β and would I want to live under it? Does the Arabic (or the organisers') version say what the English one says? What would my own values say about the parts I'm asked to ignore?
Example
a progressive marching for 'freedom' beside a group whose charter defines the future state as Islamic.
The mirror
liberal Zionists aligned with far-right parties whose goals β annexation, expulsion rhetoric β they don't share.
Shared opposition to the occupation and to the war is real.
The coalition's common ground β civilians in Gaza, the West Bank occupation β is real, and working with people who disagree on other things is normal politics.
The goals differ β and the ambiguity is what holds the coalition together.
Many Western progressives picture one secular democratic state with equal rights, or two states, framed in human-rights and progressive terms. The organised Palestinian movements define Palestine as Arab (PLO Charter; the Arabic chant 'Filastin 'arabiyya') or Islamic (Hamas 2017). Palestinian opinion itself: in PCPSR's joint poll with Tel Aviv University (fieldwork July 2024, published September 2024), a quarter of Palestinians (and 14% of Israeli Jews) supported one state with equal rights for Jews and Palestinians. On social values, Pew's 2013 survey found 93% in the Palestinian territories saying homosexuality should be rejected by society and 4% that it should be accepted (6% in 2011). A small survey of US students (Hassner 2023) found that only 47% of supporters of 'from the river to the sea' could name the river and the sea, and that 67.8% dropped the slogan 'after learning a handful of basic facts', among them what it would mean for Israel's Jews and Arabs (facts chosen and worded by the author, who opposes the slogan). The chants themselves cannot show whether supporters notice the split, or whether organisers who chant 'free' in English and 'Arab' in Arabic intend it; the two versions exist side by side.
dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate β
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights β Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states β Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (Β±3.5%), 17β20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (Β±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (β6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondentsβ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other sideβs behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.
dataPew Research Center, 'The Global Divide on Homosexuality' (2013) aggregate β
Read: 'Overwhelming majorities in the predominantly Muslim countries surveyed also say homosexuality should be rejected, including β¦ 93% in the Palestinian territories'; opinion in Israel 'divided' (secular Jews 61% accepting vs 26% among traditional/religious; 2% of Israeli Muslims). The acceptance percentage is not in the report text; the topline PDF (Pew-Global-Attitudes-Homosexuality-Topline-REVISED-MAY-27-2014.pdf, read 2026-10-02) gives Palestinian territories, Spring 2013: 4% should be accepted, 93% should not, 3% DK/refused (Spring 2011: 6%, 87%, 7%).
dataRon Hassner, 'From Which River to Which Sea?' (Helen Diller Institute, UC Berkeley, 5 December 2023; also a WSJ op-ed) (2023) aggregate β
Read (2026-09-28). 250 US students polled by a survey firm; supporters 32.8% enthusiastic + 53.2% less so; 'only 47% of the students who embrace the slogan were able to name the river and the sea' (answers incl. the Nile and Euphrates, the Caribbean); of 80 shown a map, 75% changed their view; 60% of the 'replace Israel' group on learning it would entail 'the subjugation, expulsion or annihilation of seven million Jewish and two million Arab Israelis'; 14% more on reading many American Jews find it threatening; overall 67.8% 'after learning a handful of basic facts'. Small commissioned sample; the author is not neutral ('screaming for the extermination of millions').
The price of unity: explaining away.
Keeping the coalition together means not naming its anti-Jewish parts: after October 7 some groups offered 'context' instead of condemnation (e.g. a New York DSA rally on 8 October 2023; a Harvard student-groups statement holding Israel 'entirely responsible'). Others on the left did condemn β US Senator Bernie Sanders condemned the attack and left antisemitism; Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez condemned the DSA rally's 'bigotry and callousness' β which shows explaining away is a choice. Naming it risks exclusion from the coalition (see 'The purity loop').
Working it out: what the coalition would produce
The question here is not what each marcher intends, but what the coalition would produce if it won: a question about results, not motives. Three groups give three different answers, and the evidence for each is of a different kind. The organised movements say what they want in their own texts. Hamas's 2017 document calls for liberation 'from the river to the sea' while accepting a state on the 1967 lines only as a 'formula of national consensus'. BDS's co-founder Omar Barghouti, speaking in Arabic in 2020, described, in JNS's translation, the end state as 'two states', with 'the Palestinian minority' becoming 'a Palestinian majority of what is today called Israel'. Neither describes one democratic state for both peoples as the progressive marchers picture it. Palestinians themselves, asked in July 2024, split: 40% for two states, 25% for one state with equal rights (Palestinian-Israeli Pulse). The inclusive democratic state is a minority view even among the people it is meant for. What Western supporters mean has not been measured: the one survey here found that only 47% of American students who backed the slogan could name the river and the sea (Hassner), which shows how little the slogan's geography is shared, not what its users want. History offers one well-documented case of such a coalition winning: in Iran, the communist Tudeh party collaborated with the new Islamic regime; by 1983 it was outlawed, some 1,500 of its members had been arrested, and a contemporary report found that 'Islamic fundamentalists have become the only political force in the country' (see 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend'). One case is a warning, not a law; other coalitions may have ended differently, and none is sourced here yet. Holds on the evidence here: the organisations that set the coalition's agenda state aims that are not an inclusive democracy for both peoples, and Palestinians themselves are divided on what they want. Holds only if the organised side prevails within the coalition, as it did in Iran: that sincere supporters end up serving an outcome they would reject. Not supported: that most marchers want Jews expelled or killed, since nobody has measured what they want; or that the coalition is simply about human rights, since its leading organisations say otherwise in their own words.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
primary documentHamas, 'A Document of General Principles and Policies' (1 May 2017) (2017) incident β
Read on PalQuest (2026-09-28; Art. 16 re-read the same day; also checked against Middle East Eye's full-text copy, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-2017-document-full). Art. 4: its definition of Palestinians. Arts. 12β13: return to 'the whole of Palestine'; rejection of resettlement. Art. 16: 'Hamas affirms that its conflict is with the Zionist project not with the Jews because of their religion. Hamas does not wage a struggle against the Jews because they are Jewish but wages a struggle against the Zionists who occupy Palestine.' Art. 17: 'the Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage'; the Zionist movement 'is the most dangerous form of settlement occupation which has already disappeared from much of the world and must disappear from Palestine'. Art. 19: 'There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity.' Art. 20: full liberation 'from the river to the sea'; a state on the 1967 lines as a 'formula of national consensus'. Art. 23: agreements on this basis 'will not lead to peace. Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right'. Art. 25: 'Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws β¦ armed resistance β¦ the strategic choice'. Art. 26: 'Managing resistance, in terms of escalation or de-escalation β¦ should not be at the expense of the principle of resistance'. Art. 27: 'the entire national Palestinian soil'. Art. 12β13 (re-read 2026-10-12 on MEE's full text): return 'whether in the lands occupied in 1948 or in 1967 (that is the whole of Palestine), is a natural right, both individual and collective'; 'Hamas rejects all attempts to erase the rights of the refugees, including the attempts to settle them outside Palestine and through the projects of the alternative homeland.' Art. 4 re-read 2026-10-13 on Middle East Eye's copy: 'The Palestinians are the Arabs who lived in Palestine until 1947, irrespective of whether they were expelled from it, or stayed in it; and every person that was born to an Arab Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.'
pressJNS, 'BDS co-founder says goal of movement is end of Israel' (1 June 2020), on Omar Barghouti's Gazan Voice interview of 21 May 2020 (2020) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). JNS translation of the Arabic interview: 'There won't be any Zionist state like the one we speak about β¦ There will be two states: One democratic for all its citizens here and one democratic for all its citizens there. The Palestinian minority will become a Palestinian majority of what is today called Israel.' The Arabic interview itself is not checked here; the English is JNS's own translation.
dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate β
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights β Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states β Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (Β±3.5%), 17β20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (Β±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (β6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondentsβ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other sideβs behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.
dataRon Hassner, 'From Which River to Which Sea?' (Helen Diller Institute, UC Berkeley, 5 December 2023; also a WSJ op-ed) (2023) aggregate β
Read (2026-09-28). 250 US students polled by a survey firm; supporters 32.8% enthusiastic + 53.2% less so; 'only 47% of the students who embrace the slogan were able to name the river and the sea' (answers incl. the Nile and Euphrates, the Caribbean); of 80 shown a map, 75% changed their view; 60% of the 'replace Israel' group on learning it would entail 'the subjugation, expulsion or annihilation of seven million Jewish and two million Arab Israelis'; 14% more on reading many American Jews find it threatening; overall 67.8% 'after learning a handful of basic facts'. Small commissioned sample; the author is not neutral ('screaming for the extermination of millions').
pressChristian Science Monitor, 'Iranian crackdown deals communist party a heavy blow' (22 July 1983) (1983) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). Claude van England, Brussels, 22 July 1983: 'the other estimated 1,500 Tudeh members officially arrested'; the party 'outlawed' five days after an arrest on 27 April; Kianouri in a television interview, 'With the help of our members within the armed forces, we used to prepare reports for the Soviet government'; an exiled militant: 'They had been tortured'; a diplomat: 'They looked in good shape and in full control of themselves'; 'Having collaborated with the Islamic regime for several months, Iranian communists are hated by the opponents of the Islamic Republic'; People's Mujahideen: 'Hundreds of their members have been executed'; 'Islamic fundamentalists have become the only political force in the country'.
Why it works on us
- Everyone in the coalition sincerely opposes the suffering in Gaza and the occupation.
- Coalitions always contain differences; demanding agreement on everything would make any movement impossible.
- Secular, left and progressive Palestinian traditions and diaspora voices genuinely exist.
Heard two ways
'Globalise the intifada'
- The milder meaning: Intifada means to 'shake off' and 'rise up'. To globalise it means taking up 'a model of struggle that revealed how ordinary people could resist a system of domination with nothing but their own bodies, voices, and determination', 'a call to steadfastness' (Mondoweiss, 2025).
- The harder meaning: To many who hear it, it recalls the Second Intifada's 'suicide bombings in civilian areas and passenger bus bombings'. The AJC writes that it is 'often understood by those saying and hearing it as encouraging violence against Israelis, Jews, and institutions supporting Israel', while granting that 'the intent of the person saying this phrase may be different'.
'Resistance' on campus (National Students for Justice in Palestine, October 2023)
- The milder meaning: Political action at home. The group's 'Day of Resistance Toolkit': 'We must continue to resist directly through dismantling Zionism, and wielding the political power that our organizes [sic] hold on our campuses and in our communities.'
- The harder meaning: Support for armed attack. The same national group's statement after 7 October called it 'a historic win for Palestinian resistance' and called for 'Not just slogans and rallies, but armed confrontation with the oppressors'. Both quotations come from the ADL, a pro-Israel monitoring group, which quotes the group's own texts; the toolkit itself is not read here. A student joining a 'day of resistance' may mean the first; the organisers' own texts contain both.
Both meanings are sourced below. Neither is assumed for any given speaker; ask which one is meant. See one word, two meanings.
Where this trap shows up
Your side does it too β look at both columns.