Trap Β· reasoning move
β The strict enemy frame
Sounds like: βThey are purely evil. / There are no innocents on the other side.β
A worldview that needs a strictly evil enemy, and therefore experiences every complicating fact as an attack β maintained by curated collections of the other side's worst statements.
Signs
'they' with no distinctions; a quote offered as proof of what a whole people wants; every new fact from the other side met with anger or 'whataboutism'; no possible statement by the enemy that would count in their favour.
Questions to ask
Who said this, with what authority, in what context, and did policy follow? Can I name someone on the other side who disagrees with it? What fact from the other side do I find hardest to accept β and why?
Example
a minister's quote presented as the goal of all Israelis.
The mirror
a preacher's clip presented as the goal of all Palestinians. Example C: 'Israel is evil' as the unstated starting point of a movement, so that every Israeli act, including a warning before a strike, an aid convoy or a hostage deal, is reread as proof (see 'Israel is evil and illegitimate β it has no right to exist.' and 'The image does the arguing'); its mirror is 'the Palestinians are evil', under which every ceasefire is a trick.
Many of the quotes are real, and some come from the top.
Pro-Palestinian compilations draw on statements by senior Israeli officials, which the UN Commission of Inquiry itself quotes: Defence Minister Gallant's 'We are fighting human animals' (9 October 2023), President Herzog's 'it's an entire nation out there that is responsible' (13 October), and Netanyahu's Amalek reference, which South Africa's ICJ filing lists among 'Expressions of Genocidal Intent' (the PMO called it 'not an incitement to genocide'); and Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu said on radio in November 2023 that there were 'no non-combatants in Gaza' and a nuclear bomb was 'one of the possibilities' β after which Netanyahu suspended him, calling the remarks 'not based in reality', and Gallant and Gantz repudiated them (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 November 2023). Pro-Israel compilations, such as MEMRI's translated clips (see its org page), draw on Palestinian officials, Hamas leaders and preachers on television. A quote being real is a separate question from whether it was selected fairly; checking the full broadcast or speech is the test either way. Government-level rhetoric carries more weight than a random account.
law / courtSouth Africa v. Israel, Application instituting proceedings (29 December 2023) (2023) β
Application of 29 December 2023, as quoted in ICJ Press Release 2023/77 (UNISPAL copy read). Compiles statements by Israeli officials cited as evidence of intent.
law / courtUN Commission of Inquiry, 'Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Genocide Convention', A/HRC/60/CRP.3 (advance version, 16 September 2025) (2025) finding β
Full report read. Standard of proof 'reasonable grounds to conclude' (para 7); statements quoted at paras 111 and 170β172. Searched in full 2026-10-10 (text of the PDF): 'urban warfare' does not occur; 'military expert' occurs once, an unnamed quote ('Israel is dropping in less than a week what the United States was dropping in Afghanistan in a year, in a much smaller, much more densely populated area') footnoted to the Commission's earlier report A/HRC/56/CRP.4 and a Washington Post article of 12 October 2023; a witness testified that 'munitions experts consulted' concluded a clinic had been 'under significant direct attack'. Its recommendations ask Israel to '(h) Allow the Commission access to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, to continue its investigations'. Re-read 2026-10-12: para. 111, 'Gallant framed the siege as a measure of retribution, announcing "a complete siegeβ¦ no electricity, no water, no food, no fuel. We are fighting human animals, and we act accordingly."'; para. 170, Herzog on 13 October 2023: '"it's an entire nation out there that is responsible. It is not true, this rhetoric about civilians who were not aware and not involved. It is absolutely not true."'; para. 172, Netanyahu's letter of 3 November 2023 to soldiers: '"Remember what Amalek did to you... This is a war between the sons of light and the sons of darknessβ¦"'.
pressABC News (Australia), 'What is the biblical story of βAmalekβ? And why is it being used in South Africa's ICJ case against Israel?' (31 January 2024) (2024) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). Netanyahu, 28 Oct 2023: 'You must remember what Amalek has done to you, says our Holy Bible. And we do remember.' South Africa's filing: 'Expressions of Genocidal Intent against the Palestinian People by Israeli State Officials and Others'. PMO: 'not an incitement to genocide of Palestinians, but a description of the utterly evil actions perpetrated by the genocidal terrorists of Hamas on October 7th'.
pressJohn Mecklin, 'Israel's Netanyahu suspends minister for suggesting a nuclear weapons option in Gaza', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (5 November 2023) (2023) incident β
Read 2026-10-01. On Radio Kol Berama, Heritage Minister Amichai Eliyahu 'contended that there were "no non-combatants in Gaza," so using a nuclear warhead there was "one of the possibilities"' (the interview reported, not heard here). Netanyahu on X: 'Minister Amihai Eliyahu's statements are not based in reality. Israel and the IDF are operating in accordance with the highest standards of international law to avoid harming innocents'; suspended 'indefinitely'. Gantz: damaging 'and, even worse, added to the pain of the hostages' families'; Gallant: 'good that these aren't the people involved in Israel's security' (via Haaretz). Arab League condemnation quoted via Reuters.
A real quote is not a representative quote.
Curated collections of the other side's worst statements are presented as if they showed what 'they' all think. The honest questions per quote: who said it, with what authority, in what context β and does policy reflect it? Some quotes pass that test; many don't. Meanwhile the evidence that doesn't fit is left out: Israelis who mourn Gaza's dead, Palestinians who condemn October 7 or who shelter and help Israelis, the peace activists killed on October 7 in the border kibbutzim.
The frame shows up in polls on both sides β which is why it matters, and why it isn't everyone.
Pew Research (survey 2014β15, published 2016): 48% of Israeli Jews agreed that Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel (21% strongly; 71% of the religious-Zionist dati'im), while 46% disagreed. PCPSR (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, fieldwork 22 Nov β 2 Dec 2023): 72% of Palestinians called the decision to launch the October 7 attack 'correct' (82% in the West Bank, 57% in Gaza; 1,231 face-to-face interviews, margin of error Β±4). In the same poll, 85% had not seen the videos of the atrocities and only 7% said Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians β the 'correct' answer was given about an attack most respondents didn't believe included the killing of civilians, which is its own problem of information, not only of attitude. Both numbers are real and uncomfortable for each side's supporters; both also leave large minorities who don't hold the frame. Polls measure attitudes at a moment β often of fear or war β and questions shape answers; read the wording before quoting either.
dataPew Research Center, 'Israel's Religiously Divided Society' (8 March 2016) (2016) aggregate β
Read (2026-09-28). 5,601 face-to-face interviews, Oct 2014 β May 2015. 'Israeli Jews are roughly evenly divided between two types of ethnic identity: Ashkenazi Jews (with ancestral roots in Central and Eastern Europe) and Sephardi or Mizrahi Jews (with roots mostly in Spain, elsewhere around the Mediterranean or the Middle East).' Also: asked whether 'Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel', Israeli Jews 'strongly agree (21%) or agree (27%), while a similar share disagree (29%) or strongly disagree (17%)'; 'Roughly seven-in-ten (71%)' of Datiim agree, 'Most (58%)' of Hilonim disagree (re-read 2026-09-30). Also: 'Most Israeli Jews (79%) say Jews deserve preferential treatment in Israel'; 'Roughly eight-in-ten Israeli Arabs (79%) say there is a lot of discrimination in Israeli society against Muslims'; 'the vast majority (74%) [of Jews] say they do not see much discrimination against Muslims'; majorities of all four Jewish subgroups say Israel can be both Jewish and democratic; 'Israeli Arabs generally do not think Israel can be a Jewish state and a democracy at the same time'. Also read 2026-10-10: 'About nine-in-ten Haredim (91%), eight-in-ten Datiim (80%) and roughly six-in-ten Masortim (59%) consider themselves Jewish first, while about six-in-ten Hilonim (59%) take the opposite position, saying they see themselves as Israeli first'; if halakha and democratic principles conflict, '89% of Haredim say halakha should be given preference', while 'among Hilonim, an equally lopsided share (89%) say the state should give preference to democratic principles'; 'The vast majority of Jews (98%), Muslims (85%), Christians (86%) and Druze (83%) say all or most of their close friends belong to their own religious community.'
dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov β 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate β
72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.
Why complexity feels like an attack.
A worldview built on a strictly evil enemy can't absorb facts from the other side without collapsing, so a calm, sourced point β the Farhud or the Mufti to one side, Deir Yassin or settler violence to the other β is experienced as hostility, not information. The test for anyone, on either side: can you take in a fact from the other side without the whole frame breaking? A sentence that passes: 'October 7 was horrific, and what is happening in Gaza is unjustifiable.'
When distrust is the premise, not the conclusion.
Some positions rest on one load-bearing idea: the other side is evil and can never be trusted. Once that is the premise, no act can count in the other side's favour, because every one is reread as cynicism. Warnings before strikes become 'cover'; aid becomes 'PR'; a withdrawal becomes 'a trick'; gay rights become 'pinkwashing'; any explanation becomes 'hasbara'. The mirror version reads every Palestinian gesture as 'taqiyya' and every ceasefire as a ruse. You can test it: ask what the other side could do that would count in its favour. If the honest answer is 'nothing', the distrust isn't a conclusion drawn from the evidence. It's the premise the evidence is sorted by. A movement built on that premise can't survive facts that complicate it, which is why it treats them as attacks (see 'Why complexity feels like an attack').
Traps here:β Where does the story start?β DARVO: deny, attack, reverse
Working it out: how widespread the frame is, how it moved, and what it cannot see.
The frame says the other side is purely evil. A joint poll in July 2024 measured something close to it directly, by asking each side to rate the other's humanity from 0 to 100. Palestinians gave Israeli Jews an average of 6; Israeli Jews gave Palestinians 14. 71% of Palestinians and 51% of Israeli Jews gave a score of zero; 1% of Palestinians and 2.7% of Israeli Jews gave 80 or more. The pollsters note the answer may reflect what people think the other side is, or what they think it has done, or both. In the same poll, 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians said the other side's aim was genocide against them. How it moved: the same series shows the frame is not fixed. The share who thought the other side had peaceful intentions was 33% to 35% among Israeli Jews in 2017β18 and 12% by December 2022; among Palestinians it fell from 44% and 39% to 17%. It hardened over years, on both sides at once, before the war deepened it. What it cannot see: the minority on each side that rated the other highly, the 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis who chose a regional peace over a regional war in the same poll, and the people on each side who sheltered, mourned or worked with the other. The worst case for each side. For 'they are all like that' about Palestinians, at its strongest: 71% gave Israelis a humanity score of zero, and in December 2023 72% called the decision to launch the October 7 attack 'correct' (PCPSR; 85% said they had not seen the videos of the atrocities). Even so, 65% of Palestinians chose regional peace with two states over a regional war in the same 2024 poll, and the frame runs both ways. For the same claim about Israelis, at its strongest: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero, 42% supported annexing the West Bank without equal rights (2024), 48% agreed in 2014β15 that 'Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel' (Pew), and ministers spoke in eliminationist terms (quoted by the UN Commission of Inquiry). Even so, 55% of Israeli Jews chose regional peace over war in 2024, and in 2017 a third saw Palestinians as having peaceful intentions. Holds on the evidence here: the frame is widespread on both sides, measured, and hardened between 2017β18 and 2022 in the same poll series. Open, the series here shows only hardening: that it can shrink as well as grow. Not supported: that either people holds it as one, or that it is a fixed trait of either.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate β
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights β Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states β Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (Β±3.5%), 17β20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (Β±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (β6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondentsβ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other sideβs behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.
dataThe Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll, press release (PSR and Tel Aviv University, for publication 24 January 2023; fieldwork December 2022) (2023) aggregate β
Read 2026-10-10. 1,270 Palestinians face to face; 900 Israelis online (6β13 December 2022). Two-state support 'from 43% in September 2020 to 33% among the Palestinians and 34% among Israeli Jews', 'the lowest support for all groups since the start of the Oslo process'; 'Slightly more Israeli Jews support one unequal state under Israeli rule than the two-state solution'. Incentives: 'an average of 30% of Israeli Jews (compared to 45% in September 2020) who were initially opposed changed their minds'; Palestinians 12% (compared to 21%); 'declining effectiveness of reciprocal incentives'. Peaceful intentions of the other side: Palestinians about Israeli Jews 44% (June 2017), 39% (2018), 18% (2020), 17%; Israeli Jews about Palestinians 33%, 35%, 19%, 12%. 'No peace partner': Israeli Jews 84%, Palestinians 61%.
dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov β 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate β
72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.
dataPew Research Center, 'Israel's Religiously Divided Society' (8 March 2016) (2016) aggregate β
Read (2026-09-28). 5,601 face-to-face interviews, Oct 2014 β May 2015. 'Israeli Jews are roughly evenly divided between two types of ethnic identity: Ashkenazi Jews (with ancestral roots in Central and Eastern Europe) and Sephardi or Mizrahi Jews (with roots mostly in Spain, elsewhere around the Mediterranean or the Middle East).' Also: asked whether 'Arabs should be expelled or transferred from Israel', Israeli Jews 'strongly agree (21%) or agree (27%), while a similar share disagree (29%) or strongly disagree (17%)'; 'Roughly seven-in-ten (71%)' of Datiim agree, 'Most (58%)' of Hilonim disagree (re-read 2026-09-30). Also: 'Most Israeli Jews (79%) say Jews deserve preferential treatment in Israel'; 'Roughly eight-in-ten Israeli Arabs (79%) say there is a lot of discrimination in Israeli society against Muslims'; 'the vast majority (74%) [of Jews] say they do not see much discrimination against Muslims'; majorities of all four Jewish subgroups say Israel can be both Jewish and democratic; 'Israeli Arabs generally do not think Israel can be a Jewish state and a democracy at the same time'. Also read 2026-10-10: 'About nine-in-ten Haredim (91%), eight-in-ten Datiim (80%) and roughly six-in-ten Masortim (59%) consider themselves Jewish first, while about six-in-ten Hilonim (59%) take the opposite position, saying they see themselves as Israeli first'; if halakha and democratic principles conflict, '89% of Haredim say halakha should be given preference', while 'among Hilonim, an equally lopsided share (89%) say the state should give preference to democratic principles'; 'The vast majority of Jews (98%), Muslims (85%), Christians (86%) and Druze (83%) say all or most of their close friends belong to their own religious community.'
law / courtUN Commission of Inquiry, 'Legal analysis of the conduct of Israel in Gaza pursuant to the Genocide Convention', A/HRC/60/CRP.3 (advance version, 16 September 2025) (2025) finding β
Full report read. Standard of proof 'reasonable grounds to conclude' (para 7); statements quoted at paras 111 and 170β172. Searched in full 2026-10-10 (text of the PDF): 'urban warfare' does not occur; 'military expert' occurs once, an unnamed quote ('Israel is dropping in less than a week what the United States was dropping in Afghanistan in a year, in a much smaller, much more densely populated area') footnoted to the Commission's earlier report A/HRC/56/CRP.4 and a Washington Post article of 12 October 2023; a witness testified that 'munitions experts consulted' concluded a clinic had been 'under significant direct attack'. Its recommendations ask Israel to '(h) Allow the Commission access to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, to continue its investigations'. Re-read 2026-10-12: para. 111, 'Gallant framed the siege as a measure of retribution, announcing "a complete siegeβ¦ no electricity, no water, no food, no fuel. We are fighting human animals, and we act accordingly."'; para. 170, Herzog on 13 October 2023: '"it's an entire nation out there that is responsible. It is not true, this rhetoric about civilians who were not aware and not involved. It is absolutely not true."'; para. 172, Netanyahu's letter of 3 November 2023 to soldiers: '"Remember what Amalek did to you... This is a war between the sons of light and the sons of darknessβ¦"'.
Why it works on us
- Some of the worst quotes are real and were said by people in power β a defence minister, a prime minister, Hamas leaders, preachers on state television.
- After atrocities like October 7 or mass civilian deaths in Gaza, moral nuance can feel like betrayal of the victims.
- A clear enemy gives clarity, belonging and purpose.
Where this trap shows up
Your side does it too β look at both columns.