Argument Β· heard from pro-Palestinian voices
βWhat would you do if you were oppressed for 75 years? October 7 didn't come from nowhere.β
Two million people were locked in Gaza under blockade after decades of occupation, expulsion and bombing. Any people treated like that would eventually break out. You can't condemn October 7 without first condemning what caused it, and anyone who asks 'but do you condemn Hamas?' is avoiding the real question.
Made publicly as a pro-Palestinian argument by Hamas and Harvard Undergraduate Palestine Solidarity Committee and 33 co-signing student groups
Where it's been said
βWhat was expected from the Palestinian people after all of that? To keep waiting and to keep counting on the helpless UN! β¦ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on Oct. 7 was a necessary step and a normal response to confront all Israeli conspiracies against the Palestinian people and their cause.β
βIt is important to also recognize the attacks by Hamas did not happen in a vacuum. The Palestinian people have been subjected to 56 years of suffocating occupation.β
ββ¦ hold the Israeli regime entirely responsible for all unfolding violence.β
βa historic win for Palestinian resistanceβ
Heard two ways
'Resistance' (muqawama), as applied to 7 October
- The milder meaning: Lawful armed struggle against an occupation, aimed at soldiers. Hamas's 2017 document: 'Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws.' Its January 2024 account of 7 October: its fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons', and 'if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently'.
- The harder meaning: A principle that outlasts any agreement, with the whole land as its aim. The same 2017 document: agreements on the current basis 'will not lead to peace. Resistance and jihad for the liberation of Palestine will remain a legitimate right'; escalation or de-escalation 'should not be at the expense of the principle of resistance'; the aim is a state on 'the entire national Palestinian soil'. On 7 October itself, Human Rights Watch found that 'killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought, a plan gone awry, or isolated acts'.
Both meanings are sourced below. Neither is assumed for any given speaker; ask which one is meant. See one word, two meanings.
Who makes this argument, and what they say they want
- Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) (originator) β fits its stated aim. Its own account justifies the attack by the occupation's toll ('11,299 Palestinians' killed 2000β2023, 'the great majority of them β¦ civilians'). Its account of the attack itself is disputed (see above).
- National Students for Justice in Palestine (National SJP) (originator) β goes beyond its stated aim. The argument explains 7 October by oppression; the quoted statement goes further and celebrates it as 'a historic win for Palestinian resistance'.
From the organisations' own pages: each one's stated aim, sourced tests of it, and how this argument compares. Who repeats an argument is a separate question from who makes it: people who share it can have their own reasons, and polls of supporters show how far those differ (see same slogan, different goals).
Traps in play:β Where does the story start?β The strict enemy frame
Why people find it convincing
- The context is real: the 1948 expulsions, military rule in the West Bank since 1967, the blockade of Gaza since 2007, and repeated wars with heavy civilian losses.
- UN Secretary-General Guterres told the Security Council on 24 October 2023 that the attacks 'did not happen in a vacuum' and that Palestinians had been 'subjected to 56 years of suffocating occupation'.
- Hamas gave its own reasons in January 2024. The operation, it said, 'targeted the Israeli military sites, and sought to arrest the enemy's soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails'. It set this against 'official figures': 11,299 Palestinians killed 'between January 2000 and September 2023', 'the great majority of them β¦ civilians' ('Our Narrative β¦ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood').
- History has many uprisings by the oppressed that we now admire, and armed resistance to occupation has a place in UN texts: in 1982 the General Assembly 'Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle', naming 'the Palestinian people' in the next paragraph (resolution 37/43, 3 December 1982, adopted 120 to 17 with 6 abstentions, per the UN library's table; Assembly resolutions are not binding). What such a resolution leaves to the laws of war β who may be targeted β is the other half: Human Rights Watch found that on 7 October 'killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack' (see below).
- Demands to 'condemn Hamas first' can be used to shut down discussion of Palestinian suffering.
- Some describe the attack as a 'prison break' (e.g. the socialist site Marx21 US two days later: 'Gaza prison break: Only an end to the occupation can bring peace'): a people besieged for sixteen years breaking out of the fence that enclosed them, which frames it as resistance before any question about who was killed.
What's true
October 7 has a context, and naming it is not the same as justifying it.
Occupation, blockade and past wars are real, and understanding why people turn to violence is necessary for stopping it. Guterres said the same, and in the same Council speech also said, as he pointed out the next day, that 'the grievances of the Palestinian people cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas' (UN News, 25 October 2023). Explaining isn't excusing, and the question 'what drives people to this?' deserves an answer.
primary documentUN News, 'UN chief hits back at "false" claim he justified Hamas terror attacks' (2023) incident β
24β25 October 2023: the 'vacuum' remarks and the clarification that grievances 'cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas'. Re-read 2026-10-12: on 25 October Guterres said he was 'shocked by the misrepresentation by some of my statement' and stressed he had also said in the Council that 'the grievances of the Palestinian people cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas.'
What's left out
Asked about one side only, the question explains the anger but not the targets.
'How would you feel?' is never asked about the Israelis attacked that day: festival-goers, kibbutz families, among them peace activists, and the 251 people taken hostage. Grievance may explain rage; it doesn't explain choosing to kill civilians, children among them, in their homes and to take hostages, which Human Rights Watch found were 'central aims' (below); a UN mission led by Pramila Patten found 'reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred in multiple locations, including rape and gang rape in at least three locations in southern Israel', while noting it was 'not investigative in nature' and that 'in some locations' it 'could not verify reported incidents of rape' (UN News, March 2024); the mission's own release adds that at Be'eri 'at least two allegations β¦ widely reported in the media, were unfounded'; and Human Rights Watch 'documented Palestinian fighters setting fires in apparent attempts to drive civilians out of their safe rooms, either to capture or kill them', while noting that in other cases 'fires may have been the consequence of the use of small arms and explosives' (HRW, July 2024). Most Palestinians under the same occupation took no part in it. Hamas's own 2024 account presents the attack as aimed at 'Israeli military sites' and at capturing soldiers to free prisoners (quoted below), which the investigations contradict; how its founding documents frame the wider war is set out elsewhere (see 'From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.' for its 2017 document). And context works both ways: Israel's war in Gaza also 'didn't happen in a vacuum', and the argument does not extend that to it. The investigations that looked at the day itself found a plan, not an outburst: Human Rights Watch (July 2024) concluded that killing civilians and taking hostages were 'central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought', and Amnesty International (December 2025) concluded that 'the vast majority of civilians who died were killed by Palestinian fighters' and that many of the violations 'constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and torture'. And it wasn't what most Gazans wanted: on the eve of the attack, only 20% of Gazans in Arab Barometer's survey favoured a military solution; 73% favoured a peaceful settlement (see 'Who speaks for them?'). The same Hamas document claims its fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons', that any targeting of civilians 'happened accidently', and that 'maybe some faults happened β¦ due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system'. Human Rights Watch, after 144 interviews and review of more than 280 photos and videos, found the opposite: 'Killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought, a plan gone awry, or isolated acts'.
Traps here:β Where does the story start?β "What about you?"
advocacy / viewHuman Rights Watch, 'I Can't Erase All the Blood from My Mind': Palestinian Armed Groups' October 7 Assault on Israel (17 July 2024) (2024) pattern β 1 cluster
Checked on hrw.org: 'Killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought, a plan gone awry, or isolated acts'; al-Qassam Brigades and at least four other groups; 144 interviews, 280+ photos and videos. Re-read 2026-09-29: citing AFP, 815 of 1,195 killed were civilians, 'Among them were at least 282 women and 36 children'; 251 taken hostage, including '39 children'.
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
advocacy / viewAmnesty International, 'Targeting Civilians: Murder, Hostage-Taking and Other Violations by Palestinian Armed Groups in Israel and Gaza' (11 December 2025, MDE 15/0282/2025) (2025) pattern β 1 cluster
Read (2026-09-28), report page: 'It concludes that the vast majority of civilians who died were killed by Palestinian fighters and that all held in Gaza were unlawfully detained as hostages β¦ It determines that many of these violations constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and torture.' (Replaces a Times of Israel link that returned 404.) Full report (PDF) read 2026-10-11 for its sources: Amnesty 'interviewed 70 people', including 17 survivors, visited sites 'from March 2024' (Nova, Road 232, Be'eri, Re'im, Ofakim) and 'reviewed 354 open-source videos and photographs'; it also 'reviewed β¦ reports' by 'international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch', and cites HRW's July 2024 report by title 13 times. Figures (approximate, compiled by 'comparative analysis' of HRW's report, Kan's 7.10.360 memorial, a list of '1216 Murdered and Fallen', the Foreign Ministry's and National Insurance's data): 'Around 1,200 people were killed β¦ more than 800 civilians, among them at least 36 children, and around 300 Israeli soldiers'; around 100 of the dead 'were members of emergency response squads (kitot konenut), the Israeli police and other Israeli security forces, excluding the Israeli military'. Hostages: 'Of the 251 people, 27 were soldiers on active duty at their assigned positions. The vast majority of the remaining 224 people were civilians. They comprised 124 men, 64 women and 36 children.' Attribution: 'while some civilians were indeed killed by Israeli forces, the vast majority of those who died were killed by Palestinian fighters'; at Be'eri and Nahal Oz 'up to 12 people and three people, respectively, were killed by Israeli military fire, according to Israeli military investigations'; footnote: 'around 14 civilians were killed by Israeli fire' (citing the UN Commission of Inquiry, June 2024).
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
dataArab Barometer, 'What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas' (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2023), survey of Gaza completed 6 October 2023 (2023) aggregate β
Checked against the article (Jamal and Robbins, Foreign Affairs, 25 Oct 2023): fieldwork 28 Sep β 8 Oct 2023, 399 respondents in Gaza, interviews completed 6 Oct; trust in Hamas authorities: none at all 44%, not a lot 23%; a great deal or quite a lot 29%; two-state 54%; peaceful settlement 73%, military solution 20%; party closest: Fatah 30%, Hamas 27%.
primary documentHamas Media Office, 'Our Narrativeβ¦ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood' (21 January 2024), PDF via Palestine Chronicle (2024) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). 'targeted the Israeli military sites, and sought to arrest the enemy's soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails'; 'between January 2000 and September 2023, the Israeli occupation killed 11,299 Palestinians β¦ the great majority of them were civilians'; fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons'; 'if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently'; 'Maybe some faults happened β¦ due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system'. Re-read 2026-09-30, 'Why Operation Al-Aqsa Flood?', point 7: 'The Israeli Judaization plans to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, its temporal and spatial division attempts, as well as the intensification of the Israeli settlers' incursions into the holy mosque' (first in its list).
pressUN News, '"Clear and convincing information" that hostages held in Gaza subjected to sexual violence, says UN Special Representative' (March 2024) finding β
Read 2026-10-02. The mission 'found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred in multiple locations, including rape and gang rape in at least three locations in southern Israel'; 'clear and convincing information' of rape and sexualized torture against hostages; 'In some locations the mission said it could not verify reported incidents of rape'; 'which was not investigative in nature'; 33 meetings with Israeli representatives, 5,000+ images, 50 hours of video, 34 confidential interviews.
advocacy / viewHuman Rights Watch, 'Questions and Answers: The Hamas-Led Armed Groups' October 7, 2023 Assault on Israel' (17 July 2024) pattern β
Read 2026-10-02. 'Human Rights Watch documented Palestinian fighters setting fires in apparent attempts to drive civilians out of their safe rooms, either to capture or kill them'; 'In other cases, fires may have been the consequence of the use of small arms and explosives, which can cause the ignition of flammable materials'; attacks on civilians 'in their homes, in open fields, driving on roadways, or in public bomb shelters'. Companion to the report on hrw-oct7-2024.
primary documentUN Office of the SRSG on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 'Following visit to Israel and the occupied West Bank β¦ finds sexual violence occurred on 7 October, and against hostages' (4 March 2024) (2024) finding β
Read: 'reasonable grounds to believe' CRSV incl. rape and gang-rape at the Nova site, Road 232 and Kibbutz Re'im; 'clear and convincing information' of sexual violence against hostages; at Be'eri 'at least two allegations β¦ widely reported in the media, were unfounded'; unverified at Kfar Azza and Nahal Oz; calls for a fully-fledged investigation.
More context
Reading the numbers: who was killed and taken, against 'we targeted military sites'
Hamas's 2024 account says its fighters 'targeted the Israeli military sites' and 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons'. The toll can test that. (1) The dead: around 1,200, of them 'more than 800 civilians, among them at least 36 children, and around 300 Israeli soldiers', with around 100 more from the police, other security forces and local emergency squads (Amnesty, 2025, approximate figures compiled from named lists). Human Rights Watch, citing AFP, gives 815 civilians of 1,195, 'at least 282 women' among them: about 68% civilians (this page's arithmetic). (2) The hostages: of 251 taken, 27 were 'soldiers on active duty at their assigned positions'; the other 224 'comprised 124 men, 64 women and 36 children', 'the vast majority' of them civilians in Amnesty's words. So about 89% of the hostages were not soldiers on duty (224 of 251, this page's arithmetic). (3) Who killed them: Hamas says many died by Israeli fire. Amnesty found that 'some civilians were indeed killed by Israeli forces' β up to 12 at Be'eri and three at Nahal Oz by the Israeli military's own investigations, and around 14 civilians on the UN Commission of Inquiry's count β and that 'the vast majority' were killed by Palestinian fighters. The worst case for each side. For Hamas's account: count every soldier, police officer and armed squad member among the dead as an intended target, and take away every death the sources attribute to Israeli fire; around 800 civilians killed by fighters remain, about two thirds of the dead, and 224 of the 251 hostages were not soldiers on duty, 36 of them children. The account does not survive its own worst case. For 'every death was Hamas's doing': the Israeli military's own investigations put up to 15 deaths in two communities down to its fire. That changes who killed a small number of people, not the overall picture. What kind of evidence: named lists of the dead compared against each other, plus investigations of single incidents; a firmer kind of evidence than an unnamed total, though the totals are approximate and the attribution of every death has not been published. Holds on the evidence here: about two thirds of those killed were civilians, most of them killed by the attackers, and most of the hostages were civilians, children among them. Open, needs a full attribution of each death: the exact number killed by Israeli fire (the sources give partial counts, not a total). Not supported: that the attackers targeted only soldiers and armed men, or that Israeli fire caused most of the civilian deaths (see 'Reading war numbers').
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
primary documentHamas Media Office, 'Our Narrativeβ¦ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood' (21 January 2024), PDF via Palestine Chronicle (2024) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). 'targeted the Israeli military sites, and sought to arrest the enemy's soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails'; 'between January 2000 and September 2023, the Israeli occupation killed 11,299 Palestinians β¦ the great majority of them were civilians'; fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons'; 'if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently'; 'Maybe some faults happened β¦ due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system'. Re-read 2026-09-30, 'Why Operation Al-Aqsa Flood?', point 7: 'The Israeli Judaization plans to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, its temporal and spatial division attempts, as well as the intensification of the Israeli settlers' incursions into the holy mosque' (first in its list).
advocacy / viewAmnesty International, 'Targeting Civilians: Murder, Hostage-Taking and Other Violations by Palestinian Armed Groups in Israel and Gaza' (11 December 2025, MDE 15/0282/2025) (2025) pattern β 1 cluster
Read (2026-09-28), report page: 'It concludes that the vast majority of civilians who died were killed by Palestinian fighters and that all held in Gaza were unlawfully detained as hostages β¦ It determines that many of these violations constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and torture.' (Replaces a Times of Israel link that returned 404.) Full report (PDF) read 2026-10-11 for its sources: Amnesty 'interviewed 70 people', including 17 survivors, visited sites 'from March 2024' (Nova, Road 232, Be'eri, Re'im, Ofakim) and 'reviewed 354 open-source videos and photographs'; it also 'reviewed β¦ reports' by 'international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch', and cites HRW's July 2024 report by title 13 times. Figures (approximate, compiled by 'comparative analysis' of HRW's report, Kan's 7.10.360 memorial, a list of '1216 Murdered and Fallen', the Foreign Ministry's and National Insurance's data): 'Around 1,200 people were killed β¦ more than 800 civilians, among them at least 36 children, and around 300 Israeli soldiers'; around 100 of the dead 'were members of emergency response squads (kitot konenut), the Israeli police and other Israeli security forces, excluding the Israeli military'. Hostages: 'Of the 251 people, 27 were soldiers on active duty at their assigned positions. The vast majority of the remaining 224 people were civilians. They comprised 124 men, 64 women and 36 children.' Attribution: 'while some civilians were indeed killed by Israeli forces, the vast majority of those who died were killed by Palestinian fighters'; at Be'eri and Nahal Oz 'up to 12 people and three people, respectively, were killed by Israeli military fire, according to Israeli military investigations'; footnote: 'around 14 civilians were killed by Israeli fire' (citing the UN Commission of Inquiry, June 2024).
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
advocacy / viewHuman Rights Watch, 'I Can't Erase All the Blood from My Mind': Palestinian Armed Groups' October 7 Assault on Israel (17 July 2024) (2024) pattern β 1 cluster
Checked on hrw.org: 'Killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought, a plan gone awry, or isolated acts'; al-Qassam Brigades and at least four other groups; 144 interviews, 280+ photos and videos. Re-read 2026-09-29: citing AFP, 815 of 1,195 killed were civilians, 'Among them were at least 282 women and 36 children'; 251 taken hostage, including '39 children'.
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
How to talk about this.
Acknowledge first: Gazans lived under a blockade for sixteen years, with real hardship, and anger at that is understandable. Ask one question: 'does oppression explain targeting families in their homes, festival-goers and children?'; explaining anger isn't the same as justifying what was done. Share one checkable thing: Human Rights Watch and Amnesty found that killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the attack (two reports, but not two fully independent ones: Amnesty's draws on HRW's among its sources, alongside its own 70 interviews and site visits). What not to say: 'it started on October 7', which erases what came before. From the other side: grant the atrocities fully, then ask what would have given Gazans a better choice than Hamas.
Where it leads if pressed
Working it out: explaining the attack, explaining the targets, and what 'resistance' permits.
The argument packs three questions into one. Does oppression help explain why the attack happened? The grievances are real, and the UN Secretary-General's remarks about a 'vacuum' placed the attack in that context, and in the same speech he said that 'the grievances of the Palestinian people cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas'. A General Assembly resolution of 1982 even affirmed struggle against foreign occupation 'by all available means, including armed struggle', a non-binding text that says nothing about targeting civilians. Does it explain the targets? Here the evidence is specific. Hamas's own account says its fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons' and that any targeting of civilians 'happened accidently'. Human Rights Watch, after 144 interviews and over 280 photos and videos, found that 'killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought'; citing AFP, 815 of the 1,195 killed were civilians; Amnesty found 'the vast majority of civilians who died were killed by Palestinian fighters'; a UN mission found 'reasonable grounds to believe' that rape and gang rape occurred in at least three locations. The grievance explains anger; it does not explain the choice of festival-goers and families. What did Palestinians themselves think? In PCPSR's poll of late 2023, 72% called the attack the 'correct decision', but 85% had not seen the atrocity videos and 7% said Hamas committed atrocities against civilians. The worst case for each side. For 'oppression explains October 7': grant every grievance; the investigations' findings on deliberate civilian targeting are the part the grievance does not reach, and Hamas's own account contradicts the investigators rather than justifying the targeting. For 'October 7 came from nowhere': grant the atrocity fully; the blockade, the occupation and earlier wars are documented, and the Secretary-General's 'vacuum' remarks were about that context. Holds on the evidence here: the attack had a political context, and killing civilians and taking hostages were among its central aims. Arguable, as an explanation: that grievance made the attack more likely. Not supported: that grievance justifies the targeting of civilians, or that the attack had no context.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
primary documentUN News, 'UN chief hits back at "false" claim he justified Hamas terror attacks' (2023) incident β
24β25 October 2023: the 'vacuum' remarks and the clarification that grievances 'cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas'. Re-read 2026-10-12: on 25 October Guterres said he was 'shocked by the misrepresentation by some of my statement' and stressed he had also said in the Council that 'the grievances of the Palestinian people cannot justify the appalling attacks by Hamas.'
law / courtUN General Assembly resolution 37/43, 'Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination β¦' (3 December 1982), via the ICC Legal Tools Database (1982) β
Read 2026-10-01; documents.un.org disallowed by robots.txt, the Legal Tools copy is a scan of the official text (90th plenary meeting, 3 December 1982). Para. 2: 'Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity and liberation from colonial and foreign domination and foreign occupation by all available means, including armed struggle'; para. 3: 'Reaffirms the inalienable right of the Namibian people, the Palestinian people and all peoples under foreign and colonial domination to self-determination'. A General Assembly resolution, not binding; the vote count is not in the pages read; the UN Dag HammarskjΓΆld Library's resolution table for the 37th session gives it as 120-17-6 (adopted 3 December 1982, A/37/PV.90; read 2026-10-02, https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/37).
primary documentHamas Media Office, 'Our Narrativeβ¦ Operation Al-Aqsa Flood' (21 January 2024), PDF via Palestine Chronicle (2024) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). 'targeted the Israeli military sites, and sought to arrest the enemy's soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails'; 'between January 2000 and September 2023, the Israeli occupation killed 11,299 Palestinians β¦ the great majority of them were civilians'; fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons'; 'if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently'; 'Maybe some faults happened β¦ due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system'. Re-read 2026-09-30, 'Why Operation Al-Aqsa Flood?', point 7: 'The Israeli Judaization plans to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, its temporal and spatial division attempts, as well as the intensification of the Israeli settlers' incursions into the holy mosque' (first in its list).
advocacy / viewHuman Rights Watch, 'I Can't Erase All the Blood from My Mind': Palestinian Armed Groups' October 7 Assault on Israel (17 July 2024) (2024) pattern β 1 cluster
Checked on hrw.org: 'Killing civilians and taking hostages were central aims of the planned attack, not an afterthought, a plan gone awry, or isolated acts'; al-Qassam Brigades and at least four other groups; 144 interviews, 280+ photos and videos. Re-read 2026-09-29: citing AFP, 815 of 1,195 killed were civilians, 'Among them were at least 282 women and 36 children'; 251 taken hostage, including '39 children'.
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
advocacy / viewAmnesty International, 'Targeting Civilians: Murder, Hostage-Taking and Other Violations by Palestinian Armed Groups in Israel and Gaza' (11 December 2025, MDE 15/0282/2025) (2025) pattern β 1 cluster
Read (2026-09-28), report page: 'It concludes that the vast majority of civilians who died were killed by Palestinian fighters and that all held in Gaza were unlawfully detained as hostages β¦ It determines that many of these violations constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and torture.' (Replaces a Times of Israel link that returned 404.) Full report (PDF) read 2026-10-11 for its sources: Amnesty 'interviewed 70 people', including 17 survivors, visited sites 'from March 2024' (Nova, Road 232, Be'eri, Re'im, Ofakim) and 'reviewed 354 open-source videos and photographs'; it also 'reviewed β¦ reports' by 'international human rights organizations, such as Human Rights Watch', and cites HRW's July 2024 report by title 13 times. Figures (approximate, compiled by 'comparative analysis' of HRW's report, Kan's 7.10.360 memorial, a list of '1216 Murdered and Fallen', the Foreign Ministry's and National Insurance's data): 'Around 1,200 people were killed β¦ more than 800 civilians, among them at least 36 children, and around 300 Israeli soldiers'; around 100 of the dead 'were members of emergency response squads (kitot konenut), the Israeli police and other Israeli security forces, excluding the Israeli military'. Hostages: 'Of the 251 people, 27 were soldiers on active duty at their assigned positions. The vast majority of the remaining 224 people were civilians. They comprised 124 men, 64 women and 36 children.' Attribution: 'while some civilians were indeed killed by Israeli forces, the vast majority of those who died were killed by Palestinian fighters'; at Be'eri and Nahal Oz 'up to 12 people and three people, respectively, were killed by Israeli military fire, according to Israeli military investigations'; footnote: 'around 14 civilians were killed by Israeli fire' (citing the UN Commission of Inquiry, June 2024).
Not independent: Amnesty's 2025 report on 7 October draws on its own fieldwork but also cites HRW's 2024 report by title 13 times β partly one cluster, not two independent confirmations. Why that matters β
pressUN News, '"Clear and convincing information" that hostages held in Gaza subjected to sexual violence, says UN Special Representative' (March 2024) finding β
Read 2026-10-02. The mission 'found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related sexual violence occurred in multiple locations, including rape and gang rape in at least three locations in southern Israel'; 'clear and convincing information' of rape and sexualized torture against hostages; 'In some locations the mission said it could not verify reported incidents of rape'; 'which was not investigative in nature'; 33 meetings with Israeli representatives, 5,000+ images, 50 hours of video, 34 confidential interviews.
dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov β 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate β
72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.
'understandable' becomes 'justified', and 'justified' becomes 'resistance by any means'.
If oppression explains October 7, the next step can be that it justifies it, and then that civilians were legitimate targets because they were 'settlers'. That is the step from context to permission, and it removes any limit on what 'resistance' may do. Polls show the slide is not always what it looks like: in December 2023, 72% of Palestinians called the decision to launch the attack 'correct', but 85% had not seen the videos of the atrocities and only 7% said Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians (PCPSR) β which suggests that much of the support may have been for an attack imagined as a military operation, a problem of information rather than open approval of killing civilians. It also locks the conflict: the same logic lets the other side justify anything in Gaza by pointing at October 7. The narrower claim holds without the slide: the occupation and the blockade must end, and nothing about them makes the murder of civilians acceptable, on either side.
Traps here:β The strict enemy frameβ Where does the story start?
dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov β 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate β
72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.
The usual reply β and its own traps
Arguments travel in pairs. Here is what the other side typically answers. Check whether both lean on the same trick.
heard from pro-Israel voicesβHamas uses Gaza's civilians as human shields, so it is responsible for their deaths.β