Trap · reasoning move
◆ Who speaks for them?
Sounds like: “Palestinians want… / Israelis want…”
Activists abroad speak in the name of a people: 'Palestinians want the whole land', 'Palestinians reject Israel', 'Israelis want Gaza gone'. The loudest voices of the movement are taken to be the voice of the people who live there.
Signs
'Palestinians want…' or 'Israelis want…' from someone who lives elsewhere; a movement's slogan presented as a people's demand; polls quoted only when they confirm.
Questions to ask
What do the people who live there say, in their own surveys and in their own languages? Who could say otherwise at home without danger? Which Palestinians or Israelis does this movement never invite? A note on this site's own labels: 'pro-Palestinian' and 'pro-Israel' describe which way an argument points, not what Palestinians or Israelis think.
Example
a Western rally chanting for 'resistance' while Gazans in a poll prefer a peaceful settlement.
The mirror
a Diaspora campaign against any Palestinian state while many Israelis are divided about it.
The people who live there often think differently from the movements abroad.
On the eve of October 7, Arab Barometer's survey in Gaza (fieldwork completed on 6 October 2023) found that 44% of Gazans had no trust at all in the Hamas authorities and another 23% not a lot, while 29% trusted them 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot'; 54% favoured a two-state solution on the 1967 lines, 73% a peaceful settlement, and 20% a military solution that could end Israel; Hamas was the preferred party of 27%, slightly behind Fatah. Two years into the war the picture is harder. In the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research's poll of 22–25 October 2025, 'a slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution' (support is 'nearly twice as high in Gaza' as in the West Bank); Hamas's approval (60%) far exceeds President Abbas's (about 20%); 53% still call the October 7 decision correct (59% in the West Bank, 44% in Gaza); and 80% want Abbas to resign. The readings move with events, and Gazans — who live under both the war and Hamas — answer differently from West Bankers, who mostly see the war from outside. In March and April 2025, Gazans marched in several towns chanting 'Hamas out' (see the timeline). Much of the Western movement, meanwhile, chants 'from the river to the sea' and treats 'resistance' as beyond criticism. The dissent includes voices from inside the movements. Mosab Hassan Yousef, son of a Hamas founder, told the UN Human Rights Council in 2017, speaking to the Palestinian Authority: 'The Palestinian people did not elect you, and they did not appoint you to represent them … You are the greatest enemy of the Palestinian people. If Israel did not exist, you would have no one to blame.' He spent years as an informant for Israel's Shin Bet and spoke on behalf of UN Watch, and for many that settles it: he crossed over, so he can't be believed. But crossing over is also how he came to know what he describes. A rule that disqualifies everyone who changed sides after seeing the inside guarantees that only the unchanged are heard — the same rule that is turned against Israelis who testify about their own army: when NAZA, a documentary by two Israeli filmmakers built on soldiers' and intelligence officers' testimony, won a prize in Venice in September 2026, Israel's culture minister called it 'an act of treason against the state' and pledged to revoke their citizenship, and 'traitors' was painted beside their faces on a wall in Ashdod; 43 Israeli organisations and more than 1,000 Israeli filmmakers defended them: 'The central role of art and journalism is to hold up a mirror to the society in which they exist' (Jerusalem Post, 16 September 2026; see 'Identity as authority'). The same two directors had been judged from the other side a year and a half earlier. They are two of the four co-directors of the Oscar-winning No Other Land (Variety), and in March 2025 the Palestinian boycott campaign PACBI found that film in breach of its anti-normalisation rules 'regardless of intentions', partly because 'some of the team's Israeli members are not on record supporting the comprehensive rights of the Palestinian people' (see 'The purity loop'). Judge the claims, not the crossing. A harder test of the rule, because he never crossed over: the Gazan photojournalist Motaz Azaiza, whose own posts attacked Israel ('F*** Israel. Every day, every minute and whenever I take a breath', as quoted by the Jewish Chronicle) and whom a children's entertainer introduced to her young audience in 2025 as 'my friend Motaz', said in September 2026 that a group chat he describes as Hamas-run included every journalist working in Gaza at the time and steered their coverage (the Jerusalem Post's paraphrase; the Post adds that it has not independently verified the group's membership; see 'If there are any journalists in Gaza who aren't Hamas, they're damn hard to find.'). The answer came quickly: a Palestinian press network called him 'the member of Avichay's network', after the Israeli army's Arabic-language spokesman (Palestinian Press Network, 18 September 2026; Arabic, this site's translation). If he is disbelieved now, the rule was never about crossing sides; it was about what gets said.
dataArab Barometer, 'What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas' (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2023), survey of Gaza completed 6 October 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓
Checked against the article (Jamal and Robbins, Foreign Affairs, 25 Oct 2023): fieldwork 28 Sep – 8 Oct 2023, 399 respondents in Gaza, interviews completed 6 Oct; trust in Hamas authorities: none at all 44%, not a lot 23%; a great deal or quite a lot 29%; two-state 54%; peaceful settlement 73%, military solution 20%; party closest: Fatah 30%, Hamas 27%.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (fieldwork 22–25 October 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
1,200 interviews face to face (760 West Bank, 440 Gaza). Read on pcpsr.org 26 Sep 2026. Re-read 2026-10-10 (poll of 22–25 October 2025): 'Support for Hamas's decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank'; satisfaction 'Hamas (60%) … President Abbas (about 20%)'; 'Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip'; opposition to disarmament 'even if this is a condition for the war to not to return', 69% overall (78% West Bank, 55% Gaza). Press release of 28 October 2025, read in full 2026-10-12 (https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2096%20press%20release%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%2028%20Oct%202025.pdf): '45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution'; 'A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion'; Gazans 'consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements' than West Bankers.
primary documentMosab Hassan Yousef, statement to the UN Human Rights Council, Item 7 debate, Geneva, 25 September 2017 (transcript published by UN Watch, on whose behalf he spoke) (2017) incident ✓
Read: full text of the statement addressed to the Palestinian Authority ('The Palestinian people did not elect you … You are the greatest enemy of the Palestinian people. If Israel did not exist, you would have no one to blame'). Host is partisan (UN Watch); the words are his, delivered in a public UN session.
pressThe Jewish Chronicle, 'Children's entertainer Ms Rachel condemns Hamas after backlash over Gaza appeals' (22 July 2025) (2025) incident ✓
Read. Reports the 'letter of the day' video with 'my friend Motaz' (since deleted), quotes an Azaiza Instagram post, and Accurso's statement condemning both Hamas/October 7/hostage-taking and the Israeli government/killing of Palestinian children ('Some of us just want children to LIVE'). Re-read 2026-10-13: an Instagram post of Azaiza's: 'F*** Israel. Every day, every minute and whenever I take a breath.'
pressThe Jerusalem Post, 'Gaza journalists linked to Hamas group given Westminster platforms' (23 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read. Reports Azaiza's 3 Sept 2026 podcast remarks ('Smart' group, 'every journalist working in Gaza', admin identified as Wael Abu Mohsen) and states: 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'While neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group, Azaiza said it included every journalist working in Gaza at the time' (paraphrase, not a quotation); 'the group coordinated media messaging and organized campaigns against journalists whose reporting departed from the sanctioned line. "It was never a spontaneous thing," he added.'
pressThe Jerusalem Post, 'Over 40 Israeli organizations sign joint statement in solidarity with NAZA filmmakers' (16 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read: 43 Israeli human-rights, equality and peace organisations' joint statement; the 1,000+ filmmakers' petition ('The central role of art and journalism is to hold up a mirror to the society in which they exist'); Culture Minister Zohar: 'an act of treason against the state', pledge to revoke the directors' citizenship; Reuters photo of 'traitors' graffiti in Ashdod.
pressPalestinian Press Network (NPP), 'Israeli propaganda exploits Motaz Azaiza's statements and attacks Gaza's journalists' (18 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read (Arabic; our translation): Israeli coverage 'used Azaiza's account of his personal experience to present a general picture of the journalists in Gaza, although the available statements from the episode concern specific experiences, people and a specific media group, and do not include an explicit accusation that all Palestinian journalists work according to specific directives'; calls Azaiza 'the member of Avichay's network' (after the Israeli army's Arabic-language spokesman).
pressVariety, 'Venice Adds "NAZA," Documentary From "No Other Land" Directors Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor, to Competition' (2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read (2026-09-28): 'Abraham and Szor are two of the four co-directors of 2025's Oscar-winning doc "No Other Land."'; NAZA produced by The Guardian and JW Films, executive produced by Jonathan Glazer.
primary documentPACBI, 'PACBI's position on No Other Land' (5 March 2025) (2025) incident ✓
Read (2026-09-28). After the film's Oscar win: PACBI 'has from the start reached the conclusion that this film indeed violates the BDS movement's anti-normalization guidelines in several ways'; 'Regardless of intentions' the two-condition definition applies; 'Palestinians, many Arabs, and many in the solidarity movement globally, have criticized the film as a case of normalization, with some calling for a boycott'; whether to campaign against a project is decided by priorities and 'limited resources'. Reasons given include help from Close-Up, 'an organization that is engaged in normalization', and that 'some of the team's Israeli members are not on record supporting the comprehensive rights of the Palestinian people'.
Why those voices are hard to hear.
Saying it out loud is dangerous at home: critics of Hamas in Gaza and of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank have been beaten, jailed or killed (see 'Who can afford to speak'). The Western movement rarely gives a platform to Palestinians who reject its line, because they don't pass its purity test (see 'The purity loop'). And a poll respondent in Gaza doesn't write op-eds or run social-media accounts; activists abroad do. The result is that the people with the most at stake are the least heard. The same gap appears at state scale in Iran, whose government has called for Israel's removal since 1979: in an anonymous survey three months after the June 2025 war, more Iranians blamed their own government than Israel for starting it (44% against 33%), and Israel was viewed favourably by 39% and unfavourably by 48% — the United States, the regime's other declared enemy, favourably by 53% (GAMAAN, September 2025; an online sample reached through a VPN network, with its own tilt; see 'Israel is a cancerous tumour in the region — the Zionist regime will be uprooted.'). The loudest voice claiming to speak for a people is often its government's.
Traps here:◆ The purity loop
dataGAMAAN, 'Iranians' Attitudes Toward the 12-Day War' (survey 24–28 September 2025; published 5 November 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
Read: 30,372 respondents inside Iran via the Psiphon VPN network; literate residents 15+; 95% credibility level, 5% interval. Blame for starting the war: Islamic Republic 44%, Israel 33%, both 16%; 51% say Israel achieved its objectives; top emotion 'anger at the Islamic Republic' 42%; favourability: US 53% positive / 37% negative, Israel 39% / 48%.
The mirror: pro-Israel is not Israeli.
The same gap exists on the other side. Pro-Israel voices abroad sometimes speak for 'Israelis' in terms Israelis argue over: Israeli society argued fiercely through the war, hundreds of thousands demonstrated for a hostage deal: after six hostages were found dead in September 2024, organisers counted half a million in the streets on the Sunday, the Histadrut called the largest general strike since March 2023, and by the union's count hundreds of thousands protested again the next day (CNN, 2 September 2024). Polls show where Israelis split and where they mostly agree: in early 2025 only 21% thought Israel and a Palestinian state could coexist peacefully (16% of Jewish Israelis, 40% of Arab Israelis), while 44% said building settlements helps Israel's security and 35% that it hurts, and 53% viewed the prime minister unfavourably against 45% favourably (Pew Research Center, June 2025). Diaspora Jews differ from Israelis too: in Pew's survey of US Jews, taken in 2019–20 before the war, 63% thought Israel and a Palestinian state could coexist peacefully, while one in three thought the Israeli government was making 'a sincere effort' toward peace and 12% said so of the Palestinian leadership (Pew Research Center, May 2021; different years from the Israeli figures, so not a direct comparison). What advocacy groups abroad claim on Israelis' behalf is not measured here ⚠. Some Diaspora and evangelical supporters are more maximalist than the Israelis whose lives are at stake.
dataPew Research Center, 'Israeli Public Is Increasingly Skeptical About Lasting Peace' (3 June 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
Read 2026-10-02. Face-to-face survey of 998 Israeli adults, 5 Feb–11 Mar 2025 (during the ceasefire). 21% think Israel and a Palestinian state can coexist peacefully, the lowest since 2013 (16% of Jews, 40% of Arabs); 70% call Jerusalem's status and 52% the settlements a major obstacle; 44% say continued settlement building helps Israel's security, 35% that it hurts; Netanyahu 53% unfavourable, 45% favourable; a third say Israel should govern Gaza after the war (40% in 2024). Pew: ‘a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank’ funded mainly by The Pew Charitable Trusts. No fieldwork in Gaza or the West Bank this round.
pressCNN, 'Netanyahu defiant as protesters demanding a ceasefire-for-hostages deal bring Israel to a halt' (2 September 2024) (2024) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02. After the bodies of six hostages, including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, were retrieved: ‘Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to Israel’s streets’; per the Histadrut, hundreds of thousands joined on Monday, ‘a day after half a million took to the streets on Sunday’ by organisers' count; ‘the largest general strike to have taken place in Israel since March 2023’; Tel Aviv and Haifa municipalities and the main universities joined, the teachers' union did not; police detained demonstrators in Tel Aviv. Headline: Netanyahu ‘defiant’.
dataPew Research Center, 'U.S. Jews' connections with and attitudes toward Israel' (11 May 2021) (2021) aggregate ✓
Read 2026-10-02. Survey 'conducted during the final 14 months of the Trump administration', online and by mail. 'Most U.S. Jews (63%) say they think a way can be found for Israel and an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully' (U.S. adults 55%); 'just one-in-three say they think the Israeli government is making a sincere effort toward achieving peace'; 12% say so of the Palestinian leadership; two-thirds of Orthodox Jews think coexistence not possible; 22% say the U.S. is too supportive of Israel (11% in 2013).
Reading the numbers: why 'support for Hamas' runs from 24% to 72%.
Quoted alone, any of these figures can make Palestinians look like one thing. Side by side, they show how much depends on the question, the place and the date. (1) Before the war, in Gaza only: in Arab Barometer's survey completed on 6 October 2023, 29% trusted the Hamas authorities 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot', 67% had little or no trust, and 27% named Hamas as the party closest to them. (2) Weeks into the war, West Bank and Gaza: in PCPSR's poll of late November 2023, 72% called the 7 October attack the 'correct decision'; in the same poll 85% said they had not seen the atrocity videos and 7% said Hamas had committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. (3) Two years on: in PCPSR's poll of October 2025, support for the decision to attack was 'a majority at more than 50%', declining from its peak; Hamas's approval was 60%; support for disarming Hamas was 18% in the West Bank and 44% in Gaza. (3b) Ten months later, in PCPSR's poll of August 2026, Hamas's 'overall support' was 24%, against 35% on the same measure in October 2025 (a different question from the 60% approval above), level with Fatah; 44% said 'neither Hamas nor Fatah deserves to lead', and only 20% thought Hamas had won the war. (4) The same caution applies to Israelis, on the cards this page already carries: in Pew's February–March 2025 survey, only 21% thought Israel and a Palestinian state could coexist peacefully (16% of Jews, 40% of Arab citizens), yet 53% viewed their prime minister unfavourably, and in 2024 'hundreds of thousands' joined protests and the largest general strike since March 2023 after six hostages' bodies were retrieved (CNN; half a million on the Sunday by organisers' count). A low figure on coexistence did not make Israelis one bloc behind their government. So 'support' means different things: trust in a government (low, in Gaza, before the war), approval of one attack (high, during the war, among people who mostly had not seen it), and satisfaction with a movement (high, but lower in Gaza on disarmament). The worst case for each side. For 'Palestinians reject Hamas': take the pre-war Gaza figures at their best; a majority still backed the 7 October attack weeks later and years later, across both territories. For 'Palestinians are Hamas': take the 72% at its worst; it was measured among people 85% of whom had not seen what happened, it has declined since, Gazans, who live under Hamas, are the most willing to see it disarmed, and by August 2026 Hamas's overall support stood at 24%, level with Fatah's. Holds on the evidence here: majorities backed the 7 October attack in both PCPSR polls cited here, at a falling level; trust in Hamas's government in Gaza was low before the war. Arguable, as the 85% figure suggests: that support partly reflected what respondents had and had not seen. Not supported: that any one number says what 'the Palestinians', or 'the Israelis', think.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean
dataArab Barometer, 'What Palestinians Really Think of Hamas' (Foreign Affairs, 25 October 2023), survey of Gaza completed 6 October 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓
Checked against the article (Jamal and Robbins, Foreign Affairs, 25 Oct 2023): fieldwork 28 Sep – 8 Oct 2023, 399 respondents in Gaza, interviews completed 6 Oct; trust in Hamas authorities: none at all 44%, not a lot 23%; a great deal or quite a lot 29%; two-state 54%; peaceful settlement 73%, military solution 20%; party closest: Fatah 30%, Hamas 27%.
dataPCPSR, Public Opinion Poll No (90), 22 Nov – 2 Dec 2023 (2023) aggregate ✓
72% 'correct decision' on October 7; 85% had not seen the atrocity videos; 7% say Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. See later polls (e.g. No. 92) for the trend. Re-read 2026-10-12: fieldwork '22 November-2 December 2023'; 'The sample size of this poll is 1231 adults, of whom 750 were interviewed face to face in the West Bank and 481 in the Gaza Strip'; 'the margin of error for this poll is +/-4'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'a vast majority (72%) said it was a correct decision and 22% (12% in the West Bank and 37% in the Gaza Strip) said it was incorrect. The belief that Hamas' decision was right is higher in the West Bank (82%) compared to the Gaza Strip (57%)'; preference for Hamas to remain in control of Gaza after the war: West Bank 75%, Gaza 38%.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Public Opinion Poll No. 96 (fieldwork 22–25 October 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
1,200 interviews face to face (760 West Bank, 440 Gaza). Read on pcpsr.org 26 Sep 2026. Re-read 2026-10-10 (poll of 22–25 October 2025): 'Support for Hamas's decision to launch the offensive, while declining from its peak, remains a majority at more than 50%, with recent gains in Gaza and sustained high support in the West Bank'; satisfaction 'Hamas (60%) … President Abbas (about 20%)'; 'Support for disarming Hamas stands at 18% in the West Bank and 44% in the Gaza Strip'; opposition to disarmament 'even if this is a condition for the war to not to return', 69% overall (78% West Bank, 55% Gaza). Press release of 28 October 2025, read in full 2026-10-12 (https://pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll%2096%20press%20release%20FINAL%20ENGLISH%2028%20Oct%202025.pdf): '45% support and 53% oppose the concept of a two-state solution'; 'A slight majority opposes the general concept of a two-state solution, a sentiment rooted in the belief that it is no longer practical due to settlement expansion'; Gazans 'consistently far more supportive of negotiated settlements' than West Bankers.
dataPew Research Center, 'Israeli Public Is Increasingly Skeptical About Lasting Peace' (3 June 2025) (2025) aggregate ✓
Read 2026-10-02. Face-to-face survey of 998 Israeli adults, 5 Feb–11 Mar 2025 (during the ceasefire). 21% think Israel and a Palestinian state can coexist peacefully, the lowest since 2013 (16% of Jews, 40% of Arabs); 70% call Jerusalem's status and 52% the settlements a major obstacle; 44% say continued settlement building helps Israel's security, 35% that it hurts; Netanyahu 53% unfavourable, 45% favourable; a third say Israel should govern Gaza after the war (40% in 2024). Pew: ‘a nonpartisan, nonadvocacy fact tank’ funded mainly by The Pew Charitable Trusts. No fieldwork in Gaza or the West Bank this round.
pressCNN, 'Netanyahu defiant as protesters demanding a ceasefire-for-hostages deal bring Israel to a halt' (2 September 2024) (2024) incident ✓
Read 2026-10-02. After the bodies of six hostages, including Hersh Goldberg-Polin, were retrieved: ‘Hundreds of thousands of protesters took to Israel’s streets’; per the Histadrut, hundreds of thousands joined on Monday, ‘a day after half a million took to the streets on Sunday’ by organisers' count; ‘the largest general strike to have taken place in Israel since March 2023’; Tel Aviv and Haifa municipalities and the main universities joined, the teachers' union did not; police detained demonstrators in Tel Aviv. Headline: Netanyahu ‘defiant’.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No. 97 (12 August 2026; fieldwork 5–8 August 2026) (2026) aggregate ✓
Read 2026-10-14. 'The sample consisted of 1,270 respondents: 830 interviewed in the West Bank across 83 residential localities and 440 in the Gaza Strip across 44 localities. The margin of error was 3.5%.' 'Hamas has also experienced a significant decline in popularity. Its overall support has fallen to 24%, compared with 35% ten months earlier, while Fatah remains at 24%. Among likely voters, Fatah would receive 32% and Hamas 29%, with third forces receiving 18%. Confidence in Hamas's ability to represent Palestinians has also declined, from 41% to 28%, while 44% now say that neither Hamas nor Fatah deserves to lead.' 'Forty-nine percent say they believe that the legislative elections will indeed be held next November, while 44% believe that the elections will not be held on schedule.' 'Support for the two-state solution stands at 44%, while 50% oppose it'; 'support for a specific two-state formula based on the 1967 borders is considerably higher, at 56%'. In Gaza, interviews were conducted 'in areas west, south, and north of what has become known as the “Yellow Line,” areas where there is no Israeli military presence'; 'Interviews with residents of areas under Israeli military occupation, such as Rafah and parts of northern Gaza and Khan Younis, were conducted in shelters.' Also from the release: 'Support for armed struggle as the most effective means of achieving statehood fell from four out of ten to less than three out of ten, while support for negotiations rose from a little over a third to a little less than half, its highest level in four years'; 'half still believe armed resistance has been effective'; '72% oppose Hamas disarming before Israel fully withdraws from Gaza'. 'Only 20% believe Hamas emerged victorious, 15% believe Israel did, and 60% believe neither side won.'
Why it works on us
- The people who speak in the name of a cause are the ones we hear, and they often say they speak for the people.
- Polls in wartime do show hard attitudes on both sides, and those numbers get quoted (see 'The strict enemy frame').
Where it's been said
“The Palestinian people did not elect you, and they did not appoint you to represent them.”