Argument · heard from pro-Israel voices
“If there are any journalists in Gaza who aren't Hamas, they're damn hard to find.”
The reporting that comes out of Gaza is Hamas's reporting: its journalists work inside a Hamas-run system, some were fighters, and none are independent — so their footage and numbers shouldn't be trusted, and their deaths shouldn't be counted as journalists' deaths.
Made publicly as a pro-Israel argument by Emma Schubart
Where it's been said
“One of Gaza’s most famous ‘journalists’ has described, in his own words, how Hamas controlled the media environment. … The question is straightforward: Why were British politicians giving a parliamentary platform to journalism produced under Hamas control?”
“It was never a spontaneous thing.”
“These reports used Azaiza's account of his personal experience to present a general picture of the journalists in Gaza, although the available statements from the episode concern specific experiences, people and a specific media group, and do not include an explicit accusation that all Palestinian journalists work according to specific directives.”
Traps in play:◆ "They all…"◆ The strict enemy frame◆ Identity as authority
Why people find it convincing
- A celebrated Gazan photojournalist, Motaz Azaiza — once featured on Western platforms as the voice of Gaza — said on a podcast in September 2026 that a WhatsApp group, 'Smart', included every journalist working in Gaza at the time (the Jerusalem Post's paraphrase), that it was run by a Hamas-affiliated media official 'connected to the Rafah border crossing' (Gatestone Institute's account), and that it coordinated messaging and campaigns against journalists whose reporting departed from the line: 'It was never a spontaneous thing' (as quoted by the Jerusalem Post). The Post adds that 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group'; a Palestinian outlet, PALPS, answers that his account concerns 'specific experiences, people and a specific media group' and was used to paint all Gaza journalists (see below).
- The press-freedom groups' own lists have had to be corrected: in June 2026 the Committee to Protect Journalists removed eight names from its list of journalists killed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', after the groups' own obituaries named them as fighters.
- Criticising Hamas from inside Gaza is dangerous: dissenters have been beaten, jailed or killed (see 'Who can afford to speak'), so a journalist who isn't a member also has reason to report within the lines.
- Early claims from Gaza that went round the world were later corrected, such as the al-Ahli hospital '500 killed by an Israeli strike' headlines (see 'The correction nobody sees').
What's true
Reporting from Gaza has come out of a controlled environment. By Azaiza's account, a Hamas official ran a channel that all Gaza journalists were in, steering coverage and organising campaigns against those who deviated; the Jerusalem Post notes that 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group', and no copy of the group's messages has been read here ⚠. Some people listed as journalists were fighters: CPJ removed eight such names in June 2026, and a further 12 for other reasons. Those who are neither members nor fighters still work where contradicting the authorities carries real risk, which limits how independent their reporting can be. On that account, Gaza reporting needs the checks any reporting from an authoritarian setting needs: where a claim started, and whether it can be verified independently.
pressThe Jerusalem Post, 'Gaza journalists linked to Hamas group given Westminster platforms' (23 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read. Reports Azaiza's 3 Sept 2026 podcast remarks ('Smart' group, 'every journalist working in Gaza', admin identified as Wael Abu Mohsen) and states: 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'While neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group, Azaiza said it included every journalist working in Gaza at the time' (paraphrase, not a quotation); 'the group coordinated media messaging and organized campaigns against journalists whose reporting departed from the sanctioned line. "It was never a spontaneous thing," he added.'
primary documentCommittee to Protect Journalists, 'CPJ undertakes review of its documentation of journalists killed in Israel-Gaza war since 2023' (25 June 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read: eight names removed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', 12 more for other reasons; 209 documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention as of 25 June 2026; Jodie Ginsberg on IHL (affiliated journalists remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities').
What's left out
The witness is himself a Gaza journalist who is not Hamas and says so publicly — and the group's members turned on him for it (by his own account, as Khaled Abu Toameh reports it, stepping outside the line brings 'organized online campaigns, accusations of treason, and physical intimidation inside Gaza' (Gatestone Institute, 21 September 2026)). His testimony describes pressure and coordination imposed on journalists, not that all of them were Hamas: membership in a directed chat is not membership in Hamas, and neither is taking part in hostilities. The same CPJ review that removed eight fighters still documents 209 journalists and media workers killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention since October 2023 (as of 25 June 2026), and CPJ's chief executive cites the legal rule that 'journalists affiliated with non-state actors' remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities'. Tainted is not the same as false: footage and claims from Gaza can be checked against independent evidence (geolocation, satellite imagery, cross-checked lists), one case at a time. The same two questions, where a claim started and whether it can be checked, apply to reporting from inside Israel's lines too; foreign reporters have entered Gaza only on short army-escorted visits, where, by the accounts of three journalists to the Committee to Protect Journalists, raw photos and video had to be shown to the army before publication (one was asked only to blur a name on a road sign; written articles were not submitted), and no contact with Palestinians was allowed; NPR's Daniel Estrin called it 'a tightly controlled military tour' but said it did not amount to 'PR on behalf of the army', and the IDF declined to comment (CPJ, 3 December 2025).
primary documentCommittee to Protect Journalists, 'CPJ undertakes review of its documentation of journalists killed in Israel-Gaza war since 2023' (25 June 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read: eight names removed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', 12 more for other reasons; 209 documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention as of 25 June 2026; Jodie Ginsberg on IHL (affiliated journalists remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities').
pressThe Jerusalem Post, 'Gaza journalists linked to Hamas group given Westminster platforms' (23 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read. Reports Azaiza's 3 Sept 2026 podcast remarks ('Smart' group, 'every journalist working in Gaza', admin identified as Wael Abu Mohsen) and states: 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'While neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group, Azaiza said it included every journalist working in Gaza at the time' (paraphrase, not a quotation); 'the group coordinated media messaging and organized campaigns against journalists whose reporting departed from the sanctioned line. "It was never a spontaneous thing," he added.'
advocacy / viewKhaled Abu Toameh, 'How Hamas Controls the Story Coming Out of Gaza', Gatestone Institute (21 September 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-01. On Azaiza's interview: journalists 'pressured to suppress criticism of Hamas' and in some cases 'to stop filming when Palestinians expressed anger toward the terrorist group'; stepping outside the framework 'exposes journalists to intense backlash, including organized online campaigns, accusations of treason, and physical intimidation inside Gaza'; Azaiza 'grew up supporting Hamas'. A commentary piece; does not mention Jusoor's screenshots. Re-read 2026-10-12: the group 'was managed by a Hamas-affiliated media official connected to the Rafah border crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt'.
pressCommittee to Protect Journalists, '‘Not journalism – theater’: Inside Israel’s press tours to Gaza' (3 December 2025) (2025) pattern ✓
Read 2026-10-02. By Kholod Massalha and Sara Qudah. Three journalists on escorted visits since the October 2025 ceasefire: Noga Tarnopolsky (France 24): ‘Everything was staged … it was theater’, nothing to review; Andrea Krogmann (KNA): all raw photos/video ‘had to be shown to the army beforehand, as is standard when reporting from military facilities’, approved quickly with one request to blur a road-sign name, written article not submitted, no Palestinians met; NPR's Daniel Estrin: ‘a tightly controlled military tour’, not ‘PR on behalf of the army’, raw footage reviewed ‘to ensure no sensitive information was included’. The IDF declined to comment. CPJ's own position: escorted visits ‘cannot replace’ independent access; it filed an amicus brief with the Foreign Press Association's Supreme Court petition; the report itself calls the war what ‘human rights groups and UN experts agree is a genocide’.
More context
Reading the numbers
The one hard number here is the Committee to Protect Journalists' list of journalists and media workers killed, and its own correction. In June 2026 CPJ removed eight names 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants' and 12 more for other reasons, and kept 209 as killed by Israel. So the list once held about 229 names (this page's arithmetic). Of the 217 who were either kept or removed as fighters, eight is about 4%. Who is in each category matters as much as the count: CPJ's executive director, Jodie Ginsberg, says that journalists affiliated with a party remain civilians under the laws of war 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities'. So CPJ's test is combatancy, while the slogan's 'Hamas' can also mean working for or with Hamas-run media; the list can test the first claim at scale, and says little about the second. Israel's own claims about named journalists, the strongest evidence for the slogan's side, take this form: in October 2024 the army accused six Al Jazeera journalists of involvement with militant groups, which the channel called 'baseless'; when it killed one of them, Anas al-Sharif, in August 2025, its spokesman said 'intelligence information and documents obtained from Gaza, including lists of names, terrorist training records, and payrolls' showed he was 'a Hamas operative', and posted images including a battalion 'phone directory'; CPJ said it did not regard the images as credible, calling them 'clearly not original documents' (CPJ's case page, which is written in its own advocacy voice). Each such claim is evidence about one named person, the kind the 'possible' line below asks for, and each is disputed; none has been tested by an independent body on this site. The worst case for each side. For 'they're all Hamas': assume, against CPJ's own statement, that all 20 removed names were fighters; that is about 9% of the original list, and 209 remain documented as civilians, a review that could only be done because the list named each person. For 'none of them were Hamas': CPJ itself established eight combatants among people first listed as journalists. What the list cannot measure is the more serious claim: that reporting from Gaza was steered. That rests on testimony, not on a casualty count; a Gaza journalist describes a Hamas-run channel and pressure on those who stepped out of line, a membership the Jerusalem Post says it has not independently verified, and a Palestinian outlet points out that his statements concern 'specific experiences, people and a specific media group'. Holds on every reading: some people listed as journalists were fighters, and most of those killed were, on the only named review, civilians; reporting from inside Gaza was not independent of Hamas pressure, and outside reporters were kept out. Open, needs evidence about named people: that more listed journalists were combatants. Not supported by any reading: that all Gaza journalists were Hamas, or that none were, in either sense of 'Hamas' (see 'Reading war numbers' and '"They all…"').
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean
primary documentCommittee to Protect Journalists, 'CPJ undertakes review of its documentation of journalists killed in Israel-Gaza war since 2023' (25 June 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read: eight names removed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', 12 more for other reasons; 209 documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention as of 25 June 2026; Jodie Ginsberg on IHL (affiliated journalists remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities').
pressThe Jerusalem Post, 'Gaza journalists linked to Hamas group given Westminster platforms' (23 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read. Reports Azaiza's 3 Sept 2026 podcast remarks ('Smart' group, 'every journalist working in Gaza', admin identified as Wael Abu Mohsen) and states: 'neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'While neither the Post nor HJS has independently verified the membership of the group, Azaiza said it included every journalist working in Gaza at the time' (paraphrase, not a quotation); 'the group coordinated media messaging and organized campaigns against journalists whose reporting departed from the sanctioned line. "It was never a spontaneous thing," he added.'
pressPalestinian Press Network (NPP), 'Israeli propaganda exploits Motaz Azaiza's statements and attacks Gaza's journalists' (18 September 2026) (2026) incident ✓
Read (Arabic; our translation): Israeli coverage 'used Azaiza's account of his personal experience to present a general picture of the journalists in Gaza, although the available statements from the episode concern specific experiences, people and a specific media group, and do not include an explicit accusation that all Palestinian journalists work according to specific directives'; calls Azaiza 'the member of Avichay's network' (after the Israeli army's Arabic-language spokesman).
pressCommittee to Protect Journalists, '‘Not journalism – theater’: Inside Israel’s press tours to Gaza' (3 December 2025) (2025) pattern ✓
Read 2026-10-02. By Kholod Massalha and Sara Qudah. Three journalists on escorted visits since the October 2025 ceasefire: Noga Tarnopolsky (France 24): ‘Everything was staged … it was theater’, nothing to review; Andrea Krogmann (KNA): all raw photos/video ‘had to be shown to the army beforehand, as is standard when reporting from military facilities’, approved quickly with one request to blur a road-sign name, written article not submitted, no Palestinians met; NPR's Daniel Estrin: ‘a tightly controlled military tour’, not ‘PR on behalf of the army’, raw footage reviewed ‘to ensure no sensitive information was included’. The IDF declined to comment. CPJ's own position: escorted visits ‘cannot replace’ independent access; it filed an amicus brief with the Foreign Press Association's Supreme Court petition; the report itself calls the war what ‘human rights groups and UN experts agree is a genocide’.
advocacy / viewCommittee to Protect Journalists, case page 'Anas al-Sharif' (August 2025) (2025) incident ✓
Read (2026-10-12). Perspective: a press-freedom organisation's own case page, written in its voice ('murdered', 'smear campaign'); used here for the claims it quotes and its stated response. Israel's military on X: al-Sharif was the 'head of a Hamas terrorist cell' who 'advanced rocket attacks'; spokesman Avichay Adraee: 'intelligence information and documents obtained from Gaza, including lists of names, terrorist training records, and payrolls, confirm that he was a Hamas operative integrated into Al Jazeera.' CPJ: 'CPJ does not regard as credible the social media images, which include a “Phone directory” of a Hamas battalion and a Hamas “Injury Tracking Document from 2023,” which are clearly not original documents.' Al-Sharif was 'one of six Al Jazeera journalists that the IDF accused in October 2024 of involvement with militant groups, a claim that the Qatari-based channel rejected as “baseless.”' The strike of 10 August 2025 also killed the rest of Al Jazeera's Gaza City team and two freelancers. CPJ's request for comment to the army received no response.
Acknowledge first: Gaza's journalists worked inside a system Hamas controlled, a witness from inside says so, and some people listed as journalists were fighters — CPJ itself removed eight. Ask one question: 'which journalist, and what is the evidence about that person?' Share one checkable thing: CPJ's June 2026 review, which removed eight names as combatants and kept 209. What not to say: 'they were all Hamas', which the witness himself contradicts. From the other side: grant that most listed journalists were civilians, then ask how anyone could report freely inside that system — and what that means for the claims the world repeated.
primary documentCommittee to Protect Journalists, 'CPJ undertakes review of its documentation of journalists killed in Israel-Gaza war since 2023' (25 June 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read: eight names removed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', 12 more for other reasons; 209 documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention as of 25 June 2026; Jodie Ginsberg on IHL (affiliated journalists remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities').
Where it leads if pressed
Pressed, 'they're all Hamas' becomes 'none of them count' — no footage to weigh, no dead to count, nothing to investigate. That is the strict enemy frame applied to the press, and it undercuts the very corrections it points to: CPJ's list could be corrected because there was a list, and because the groups' own obituaries could be checked against it. The version that survives is narrower: Gaza's journalists worked under Hamas pressure, so their reporting is not independent and needs checking; some named individuals were fighters, and each case can be shown; and the rest, on CPJ's review, remain listed as civilians whose deaths count. The mirror claim — that every journalist killed was an innocent targeted for being a journalist — gets the same test, case by case.
primary documentCommittee to Protect Journalists, 'CPJ undertakes review of its documentation of journalists killed in Israel-Gaza war since 2023' (25 June 2026) (2026) finding ✓
Read: eight names removed 'because they were later established to have been Hamas or PIJ combatants', 12 more for other reasons; 209 documented as killed by Israel in Gaza and in Israeli detention as of 25 June 2026; Jodie Ginsberg on IHL (affiliated journalists remain civilians 'provided they do not directly participate in hostilities').