Argument · heard from pro-Palestinian voices

“Israel never wanted peace — it breaks every ceasefire and uses talks to take more land.”

Every peace process was cover for more settlements; every ceasefire ended with an Israeli strike. Netanyahu even boasted on camera that he destroyed Oslo. 'The Palestinians never miss an opportunity' is propaganda: it's Israel that doesn't want a solution.

Made publicly as a pro-Palestinian argument by Mahmoud Abbas

Where it's been said

“a colonial occupation that does not believe in peace and has no regard for the principles of truth, justice and human values”
Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority — Address to the UN General Assembly (full text, The Times of Israel), 2023-09-21 ✓
The mirror, from the other side
“the Palestinians have actually never, not for a single moment, accepted the two-state solution”
Einat Wilf, former Labor member of the Knesset (2010–13), author of 'The War of Return' — Interview, The Times of Israel, 2018-07-30 ✓
Context
“I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan - and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.”
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel — Post on X, after a call with President Biden (as quoted by CNN), 2024-01-20 ✓
Context
“The settlement enterprise did not suffer from the Oslo Accords but rather thrived.”
Peace Now, Israeli settlement-monitoring organisation — '30 Years After Oslo – The data that shows how the settlements proliferated following the Oslo Accords', 2023 ✓

Heard two ways

'Security control' (west of the Jordan)

  • The milder meaning: A security arrangement that could sit alongside a limited Palestinian state. The Prime Minister's Office gave the purpose as 'to ensure that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel'. After a call with Netanyahu, President Biden said: 'There are a number of types of two-state solutions … a number of states that have limitations, and so I think there's ways in which this can work' (January 2024).
  • The harder meaning: No Palestinian state. Netanyahu, the next day: 'I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan - and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.' His office called the requirement one 'that contradicts the demand for Palestinian sovereignty'. Here the speaker himself stated the harder meaning; the milder one came from an ally.

Both meanings are sourced below. Neither is assumed for any given speaker; ask which one is meant. See one word, two meanings.

Traps in play:◆ "They all…"◆ The strict enemy frame

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • Settlements kept growing through the peace process. At the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 there were about 110,000 settlers in the West Bank; thirty years later there were about 465,000. Peace Now, the Israeli settlement monitor, concludes that 'the settlement enterprise did not suffer from the Oslo Accords but rather thrived', and that 'Even in years when few new settlements were established (1993–1997), infrastructure work continued'. It also records that Rabin 'decided to freeze most of the construction in the settlements', and that after his assassination and Netanyahu's rise 'this policy changed drastically'.
    • In a 2001 video, shot 'apparently without Netanyahu's knowledge' while he spoke with settlers who had lost family members to Palestinian attacks, and broadcast by Israel's Channel 10 in 2010, Benjamin Netanyahu, then out of office, said 'America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction' and described how he would interpret the Oslo accords 'in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders' (the often-quoted 'I de facto put an end to the Oslo Accords' is attributed to the same tape by the Institute for Middle East Understanding, which cites Tablet Magazine; Tablet's page is behind a bot wall here, so the line and its translation are not checked ⚠).
    • Sharon's adviser Dov Weisglass told Haaretz in 2004: 'The significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process', and that the Gaza withdrawal 'supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'. He later said the intention was 'not to hold a political process with the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] in its present state', and Sharon's office restated its support for the US-backed roadmap, blaming 'Palestinian violence' for any freeze (BBC, 6 October 2004).
    • Israel ended ceasefires with strikes: a raid on 4 November 2008, which Israel said targeted a tunnel dug to abduct soldiers, was the 'first clash since June truce' (six killed); Hamas said it proved Israel 'was not interested in continuing the ceasefire', though sporadic rocket fire from Gaza had also continued during the truce (Al Jazeera); and on 18 March 2025 Israel resumed the Gaza war with strikes that killed more than 400 people, ending the January ceasefire. The prime minister's office said it 'follows Hamas's repeated refusal to release our hostages, as well as its rejection of all of the proposals' from the US envoy and the mediators, while the Hostages and Missing Families Forum said the government 'chose to give up the hostages' (BBC, 18 March 2025; the toll is the Hamas-run health ministry's).
    • The current Prime Minister has said it in so many words. In January 2024, after a call with President Biden: 'I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan - and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.' His office added that this was 'a requirement that contradicts the demand for Palestinian sovereignty' (CNN). In July 2024 the Knesset voted 68 to 9 for a resolution opposing 'the establishment of a Palestinian state on any piece of land west of the Jordan River', warning that such a state would be taken over by Hamas (Jewish Chronicle, via JNS).
  2. What's true

    Israeli leaders have undermined talks, and Israel has broken ceasefires.

    The settlement growth during Oslo, Netanyahu's recorded boast and Weisglass's 'formaldehyde' are all on record. Israel has broken truces: in November 2008 an Israeli raid 'ostensibly aimed at preventing Hamas's use of tunnels' was followed by renewed rocket fire before the truce expired in December, each side accusing the other of violating it (US Congressional Research Service), and in March 2025 when it resumed the war, citing Hamas's refusal to release hostages on new terms. Parts of the Israeli right have openly opposed any Palestinian state, and in January 2024 the Prime Minister said full Israeli security control west of the Jordan 'is contrary to a Palestinian state'.

    primary documentNetanyahu recorded at Ofra (2001), aired on Israel's Channel 10 in 2010 (2001) incident ✓

    Al Jazeera, 18 July 2010, on the Channel 10 broadcast of the 2001 Ofra video; the two lines quoted on the page are from this report. Re-read 2026-09-30: 'America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction'; 'I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders'; Netanyahu 'did not hold political office when the recording was made'; he 'was speaking with settlers who lost family members to Palestinian attacks'. The report does not name the settlement (Ofra in other reports, e.g. Gideon Levy's Haaretz column 'Tricky Bibi', not read here); the video was shot 'apparently without Netanyahu's knowledge'. Also: 'Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone.'

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    pressBBC News, 'Sharon plan "blocked peace talks"' (6 October 2004) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 2026-09-30. Weisglass to Haaretz: 'The significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process'; 'It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'; 'this whole package called the Palestinian state … has been removed indefinitely from our agenda'. Later, on Israeli radio: no intention to freeze the 'political process as such', 'But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA in its present state'. Sharon's office: the roadmap is 'the only plan liable to help progress towards a viable political agreement', Palestinian violence to blame for any freeze. Re-read 2026-10-12: after the interview 'he said there had been no intention to freeze the "political process as such". "But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] in its present state,"'; Sharon's office: 'the Palestinian violence should be blamed for any freeze'.

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    pressBBC News, 'Israel launches waves of strikes on Gaza with more than 400 killed' (18 March 2025) (2025) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-29); replaces an NPR report that was never read (not yet read). 'The Israeli military says it is carrying out "extensive strikes" … with the Hamas-run health ministry reporting more than 400 Palestinians have been killed'; 'the largest wave of air strikes in Gaza since the ceasefire began on 19 January'; PMO: 'This follows Hamas's repeated refusal to release our hostages, as well as its rejection of all of the proposals it has received from US Presidential Envoy Steve Witkoff and from the mediators'; the Hostages and Missing Families Forum said the government 'chose to give up the hostages'.

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    pressCNN, 'Netanyahu again rejects Palestinian sovereignty amid fresh US push for two-state solution' (21 January 2024) (2024) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). Netanyahu on X: 'I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan - and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.' PMO statement: 'after Hamas is destroyed Israel must retain security control over Gaza to ensure that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel, a requirement that contradicts the demand for Palestinian sovereignty.' Biden, the day before: 'There are a number of types of two-state solutions … a number of states that have limitations, and so I think there's ways in which this can work.'

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    primary documentUS Congressional Research Service, R40101, 'Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009)' (15 January 2009), via the University of Maryland law library (2009) finding ✓

    Read 2026-10-01 (used inline on the hudna card; carded 2026-10-01). 'Egyptian mediation failed to extend the six-month cease-fire (tahdiya or calm) that expired on December 19, 2008. Each party felt as though the other was violating the terms of the original cease-fire. Hamas demanded—unsuccessfully—that Israel lift its economic blockade of Gaza, while Israel demanded—also unsuccessfully—a full end to rocket fire and progress on the release of Gilad Shalit'; 'After an Israeli raid on November 4 (ostensibly aimed at preventing Hamas's use of tunnels to abduct Israeli soldiers), rocket fire on Israel from Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza resumed with greater intensity'; Hamas on the 19th: 'The cease-fire is over and there will not be a renewal because the Zionist enemy has not respected its conditions.'

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  3. What's left out

    'Israel' isn't one actor, and the record of offers and violations runs both ways.

    Israeli governments made offers: Barak at Camp David and Taba (2000–01), Olmert in 2008; how far-reaching they were is disputed among the participants (see 'The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.'). Israel made peace with Egypt and Jordan, returned Sinai, and withdrew from Gaza. A Prime Minister, Rabin, was murdered by a Jewish extremist for pursuing peace (the 1992 election that brought him to power gave Labor 44 seats and Meretz 12 against Likud's 32; in 1996, six months after his murder and after 'a wave of terrorist attacks … by the Palestinian rejectionist organizations', Netanyahu beat Peres by under one percent, about 30,000 votes, in Israel Democracy Institute's summaries; why voters chose as they did is not measured there ⚠). Ceasefires were broken from the other side too: rocket fire resumed 'with greater intensity' in the last weeks of the 2008 truce (CRS); and Israel and Hamas had agreed a ceasefire in May 2021, after 11 days of fighting, which the UN Secretary-General called on 'all sides to observe' (UN News, 21 May 2021); when Israel fought Islamic Jihad in August 2022, Hamas stayed out, its statements 'consistently stopped short of threatening attacks in retaliation', and an Israeli official credited Israel's 'steps to improve economic conditions in Gaza', such as more work permits (CNN, 7 August 2022); whether a formal truce was in force on 7 October 2023 is not sourced on this page ⚠. 'Israel never wanted peace' treats Netanyahu's camp as all of Israel, just as 'the Palestinians never miss an opportunity' treats Hamas and Arafat's choices as all Palestinians.

    Traps here:◆ "They all…"◆ The exception as proof

    advocacy / viewRobert Malley & Hussein Agha, 'Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors', New York Review of Books (2001), as described by The Nation (21 October 2025) (2001) finding ✓

    Read 2026-10-01 via The Nation, 'The Myths of Camp David' (Q&A with Malley, 21 October 2025), which describes the 2001 New York Review of Books essay: Agha and Malley, both participants at Camp David, 'were dismayed by the American and Israeli effort to blame the Palestinians' and 'sought to correct the record'; Ehud Barak published a rebuttal 'in the same magazine'. The essay itself is not read here (a full repost on a third-party site is not used).

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    primary documentEU Special Representative Miguel Moratinos, 'Non-Paper' on the Taba negotiations (January 2001), UNISPAL copy (2001) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-29). Prepared by the EU envoy 'after consultations with the Israeli and Palestinian sides'. Refugees: 'The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation' of Resolution 194; options: return to Israel, to Israel swapped territory, to the Palestine state; rehabilitation in host country; relocation to third country. 'The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon … a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years … was raised verbally)'. 'The Palestinian side did not present a number.' UNRWA to be phased out over 'five years, as a targeted period'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon … No numbers were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of this program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally).'

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    pressAl Jazeera, 'PA selling short the refugees' (The Palestine Papers, 25 January 2011) (2011) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-29). From the leaked negotiation documents: 'Olmert proposed that 1,000 Palestinian refugees be allowed to return annually to Israel over a period of five years – totalling just 5,000'; Erekat to US diplomat David Hale (15 Jan 2010): the Palestinians offered 'a symbolic number'; Erekat to George Mitchell (21 Oct 2009): 'Palestinians will need to know that five million refugees will not go back'; adviser Ziyad Clot: Abbas 'offered an extremely low proposal for the number of returnees'. Al Jazeera's framing is critical of the PA.

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    law / courtEgypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979) ✓

    Treaty of 26 March 1979, read on Yale's Avalon Project. Art. I(2): 'Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary … and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.'

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    primary documentTreaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan (26 October 1994), Avalon Project (1994) ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). Art. 3(2): 'the permanent, secure and recognised international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967'; Art. 3(3): each other's territory 'inviolable'.

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    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

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    primary documentUS Congressional Research Service, R40101, 'Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza (2008–2009)' (15 January 2009), via the University of Maryland law library (2009) finding ✓

    Read 2026-10-01 (used inline on the hudna card; carded 2026-10-01). 'Egyptian mediation failed to extend the six-month cease-fire (tahdiya or calm) that expired on December 19, 2008. Each party felt as though the other was violating the terms of the original cease-fire. Hamas demanded—unsuccessfully—that Israel lift its economic blockade of Gaza, while Israel demanded—also unsuccessfully—a full end to rocket fire and progress on the release of Gilad Shalit'; 'After an Israeli raid on November 4 (ostensibly aimed at preventing Hamas's use of tunnels to abduct Israeli soldiers), rocket fire on Israel from Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups in Gaza resumed with greater intensity'; Hamas on the 19th: 'The cease-fire is over and there will not be a renewal because the Zionist enemy has not respected its conditions.'

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    pressUN News, 'UN chief welcomes Gaza ceasefire announcement between Israel and Hamas' (21 May 2021) (2021) incident ✓

    Read 2026-10-01. 'The UN chief has welcomed the ceasefire declared between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas, following 11 days of rocket and air attacks'; Guterres spoke 'a few minutes before the negotiated ceasefire was due to take effect'; 'I commend Egypt and Qatar for the efforts carried out'; 'calling on all sides to observe the ceasefire'. Casualties as reported: 'at least 232 Palestinians, including more than 60 children' and 'At least 12 … in Israel'.

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    referenceIsrael Democracy Institute, '1992' (elections for the 13th Knesset) (1992) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. Labor under Yitzhak Rabin 44 seats, Likud 32 (first Labor win over Likud since 1973), Meretz (Ratz, Mapam, Shinui) 12; the right ‘lost many votes due to fragmentation’; a ‘preventive bloc of 61’ with Meretz and the Arab parties; coalition of Labor, Meretz and Shas (62 MKs) with the five Arab-party MKs supporting from outside. Rabin's assassination ‘by a Jewish assassin over the Oslo Accords’.

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    referenceIsrael Democracy Institute, '1996' (elections for the 14th Knesset) (1996) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. Held ‘six months after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and a wave of terrorist attacks carried out against civilian population centers in Israel by the Palestinian rejectionist organizations’; first direct election of the prime minister; Netanyahu beat Peres ‘by a very narrow margin of 30 thousand votes (less than one percent)’; Labor stayed the largest list but lost ten seats; Netanyahu's coalition of six groups, 66 MKs.

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    pressCNN, 'Gaza: Israel, Islamic Jihad ceasefire holds after deadliest clashes in a year' (7 August 2022) (2022) incident ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. The escalation was 'the most serious in nearly 15 months' since the May 2021 war; 'A key difference this time was the decision by Hamas to stay out of the fighting. Its statements blamed Israel for the escalation but consistently stopped short of threatening attacks in retaliation.' An Israeli official saw it as 'vindication' of steps 'to improve economic conditions in Gaza, for instance through increasing the number of permits for workers'; Hamas 'an enemy not a partner'.

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  4. More context

    Reading the numbers: what moves the polls, on both sides.

    Poll answers give positions, not motives, but a joint Israeli–Palestinian poll from July 2024 lets the two common readings, 'they don't want peace' and 'they only lack trust', be tested on the same data. The headline figures: 21% of Israeli Jews supported a two-state solution, down 13 points from 34% in 2022 and 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'; 42% supported annexing the West Bank 'without equal rights for Palestinians'. Among Palestinians, two-state support rose 7 points to 40%, and 33% supported 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews' (this page's arithmetic for the 2022 figures). Fear and distrust: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians said the other side's aim was 'to commit genocide against us'; only 10% and 6% said the other side could be trusted, the lowest since 2017; half of Jewish Israelis and 71% of Palestinians rated the other side's humanity at zero. What moves the numbers: offered a choice between a regional peace with two states and normalisation, or a regional war, 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis, 55% of Israeli Jews, chose peace; and after each of six incentives (steps the other side would take), a majority of Israelis backed a detailed plan they had mostly rejected, while four Israeli incentives did the same for Palestinians. The trend before the war: the same poll series shows the hardening began earlier. Israeli Jewish support for two states was 53% in June 2016, 43% in June 2018, 43% in September 2020, 34% in December 2022 and 21% in July 2024; Palestinian support was 52% in 2017, 43% in 2018 and 2020, 33% in 2022 and 40% in 2024. In 2018 a quarter of Israeli Jews said Palestinians can be trusted; in 2024, 10%. A caution on the series: Israeli respondents were interviewed by phone in 2018 and through an online panel in 2022 and 2024, and a change of method can move results by itself. In December 2022, nine months before 7 October, two-state support had already fallen from 43% in September 2020 to 34% among Israeli Jews and 33% among Palestinians. The share who thought the other side had 'peaceful intentions' fell on both sides in step: among Israeli Jews from 33% (2017) and 35% (2018) to 12%, among Palestinians from 44% and 39% to 17%. And incentives moved fewer people: on average 30% of opposed Israeli Jews changed their minds, against 45% in 2020; among Palestinians 12%, against 21%. So the slide in each side's trust ran in parallel for years, and 7 October deepened an existing fall on the Israeli side while Palestinian two-state support rose afterwards. Limits: two polls, one in wartime, hypothetical incentives, and an online panel for Israeli Jews, weighted. Two years on, a separate Palestinian-only poll (PSR, August 2026, so not part of the joint series above) found two-state support at 44% with 50% against, support for armed struggle as the most effective path falling 'from four out of ten to less than three out of ten', and support for negotiations rising to 'a little less than half, its highest level in four years'; yet '72% oppose Hamas disarming before Israel fully withdraws from Gaza'. The worst case for each side. For 'Israelis don't want peace': take the 21% and the 42% at face value; the drop came after 7 October, and a majority of Israeli Jews chose a peace that includes two states over war, with majorities reachable through incentives. For 'Israelis want peace and only lack safety': take the incentives at their best; 42% backing annexation without equal rights is a position on rights, not only on safety, and the zero humanity scores run both ways. Holds on the evidence here: on both sides, fear and distrust were at record levels in the July 2024 joint poll, and support moves substantially with terms, incentives and the alternative offered. Open, needs conditional questions over time: how much of each side's hard line is fear and how much is preference. Not supported: that either people simply does not want peace, or that the hard line on either side is only about safety.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate ✓

    Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights — Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states — Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (±3.5%), 17–20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (−6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondents’ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side’s behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.

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    dataThe Palestine/Israel Pulse: A Joint Poll, press release (PSR and Tel Aviv University, for publication 24 January 2023; fieldwork December 2022) (2023) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-10. 1,270 Palestinians face to face; 900 Israelis online (6–13 December 2022). Two-state support 'from 43% in September 2020 to 33% among the Palestinians and 34% among Israeli Jews', 'the lowest support for all groups since the start of the Oslo process'; 'Slightly more Israeli Jews support one unequal state under Israeli rule than the two-state solution'. Incentives: 'an average of 30% of Israeli Jews (compared to 45% in September 2020) who were initially opposed changed their minds'; Palestinians 12% (compared to 21%); 'declining effectiveness of reciprocal incentives'. Peaceful intentions of the other side: Palestinians about Israeli Jews 44% (June 2017), 39% (2018), 18% (2020), 17%; Israeli Jews about Palestinians 33%, 35%, 19%, 12%. 'No peace partner': Israeli Jews 84%, Palestinians 61%.

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    dataPalestinian-Israeli Pulse: A Joint Poll, summary report (Tami Steinmetz Center, Tel Aviv University, and PSR; June–July 2018) (2018) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-10. Palestinians 2,150 face to face (±2.5%); Israelis 1,600 'interviewed by phone in Hebrew, Arabic or Russian between 25 June and 8 July 2018'. Two-state support 'only 43% of Palestinians and Israeli Jews'; six months earlier 46% each; a year earlier 52% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli Jews; among Jews 'an incremental but steady decline since June 2016, when it stood at 53%'. Trust: Palestinians, 89% feel Israeli Jews are 'untrustworthy'; Israeli Jews, '68% believe that Palestinians cannot be trusted', down from 77% in June 2017; 'A quarter in this poll indicated that they believe that Palestinians can be trusted.'

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    dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Press Release: Public Opinion Poll No. 97 (12 August 2026; fieldwork 5–8 August 2026) (2026) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-14. 'The sample consisted of 1,270 respondents: 830 interviewed in the West Bank across 83 residential localities and 440 in the Gaza Strip across 44 localities. The margin of error was 3.5%.' 'Hamas has also experienced a significant decline in popularity. Its overall support has fallen to 24%, compared with 35% ten months earlier, while Fatah remains at 24%. Among likely voters, Fatah would receive 32% and Hamas 29%, with third forces receiving 18%. Confidence in Hamas's ability to represent Palestinians has also declined, from 41% to 28%, while 44% now say that neither Hamas nor Fatah deserves to lead.' 'Forty-nine percent say they believe that the legislative elections will indeed be held next November, while 44% believe that the elections will not be held on schedule.' 'Support for the two-state solution stands at 44%, while 50% oppose it'; 'support for a specific two-state formula based on the 1967 borders is considerably higher, at 56%'. In Gaza, interviews were conducted 'in areas west, south, and north of what has become known as the “Yellow Line,” areas where there is no Israeli military presence'; 'Interviews with residents of areas under Israeli military occupation, such as Rafah and parts of northern Gaza and Khan Younis, were conducted in shelters.' Also from the release: 'Support for armed struggle as the most effective means of achieving statehood fell from four out of ten to less than three out of ten, while support for negotiations rose from a little over a third to a little less than half, its highest level in four years'; 'half still believe armed resistance has been effective'; '72% oppose Hamas disarming before Israel fully withdraws from Gaza'. 'Only 20% believe Hamas emerged victorious, 15% believe Israel did, and 60% believe neither side won.'

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    How to talk about this.

    Acknowledge first: Israeli governments expanded settlements through the Oslo years, and some Israeli leaders have said openly that they oppose a Palestinian state. Ask one question: 'which Israel: the governments, or the voters who elected Rabin, Barak and Olmert?', though voters also turned Barak out months after Camp David (Sharon won the February 2001 election with 62.5%), and Olmert's 2008 offer was never put to a vote: amid a corruption inquiry he announced in July 2008 that he would resign once his party chose a new leader (CNN). Share one checkable thing: the 2000 and 2008 offers and their terms, which both sides describe differently. What not to say: 'Israelis are all right-wing now'. Israelis are divided: many protested against their government for a hostage deal, but those protests were about the hostages, not a Palestinian state, and support for two states among Israeli Jews fell to 21% in 2024, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s' (Palestinian-Israeli Pulse). From the other side: grant the rejected offers, then ask what an Israeli government would have to do now to be believed.

    referenceJewish Virtual Library, 'Sharon Elected Israeli Prime Minister (February 6, 2001)' (2001) aggregate ✓

    Read: Sharon 62.5%, Barak 37.5% with 99.9% counted.

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    dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate ✓

    Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights — Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states — Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (±3.5%), 17–20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (−6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondents’ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side’s behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.

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    pressCNN, 'Israel's prime minister to step down' (30 July 2008) incident ✓

    Read 2026-10-02 (served from edition.cnn.com). 'Citing "a wave of investigations and criticism" at the hands of his political opponents, he said he will resign once his Kadima party elects a new chairman'; 'Olmert has been embroiled in a corruption inquiry'; Barak had said he 'would pursue new elections if Olmert didn't step down'; 'Olmert had said he would resign only if he is indicted on corruption charges'.

    Open source ↗

  5. Where it leads if pressed

    Working it out: which Israel, which peace, and when.

    'Israel never wanted peace' treats a state, its governments and its voters across fifty years as one will. The record separates them. Governments that made peace: treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) have held for decades; Barak's offers at Camp David and Taba (2000–01) and Olmert's in 2008, whose reach the participants still dispute. Governments and leaders that undermined it: settlers rose from about 110,000 in the West Bank in 1993 to about 465,000 today (Peace Now, which says Rabin froze most construction and that the policy 'changed drastically' after his assassination); Netanyahu, out of office in 2001, told settlers he would 'interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders'; Sharon's adviser called the disengagement plan the 'formaldehyde' that would stop a political process; in 2024 the prime minister said full security control west of the Jordan 'is contrary to a Palestinian state', and the Knesset voted 68 to 9 against 'a Palestinian state on any piece of land west of the Jordan River'. Voters: they elected Rabin in 1992 and turned Barak out after Camp David (Sharon won 62.5% in 2001); in July 2024 support among Israeli Jews for two states was 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. The worst case for each side. For 'Israel never wanted peace': take every undermining act; Israel still signed and kept two peace treaties, made offers in 2000 and 2008, elected Rabin, who was murdered by a Jewish extremist while pursuing a deal, and relocated its settlements out of Gaza under the 2004 disengagement plan, though that plan's own text also kept Israel's control of Gaza's perimeter, airspace and sea and was described by Sharon's adviser as 'formaldehyde'. For 'Israel always wanted peace': take every offer; the settlement figures, the Ofra tape, 'formaldehyde' and the 2024 Knesset vote are on the record, and in 2024 only 21% of Israeli Jews backed two states while 42% backed annexing the West Bank 'without equal rights for Palestinians'. Holds on the evidence here: Israeli governments have both made peace and undermined it, and the current government and Knesset openly oppose a Palestinian state. Could happen as voters and leaders change: a return to negotiation; support has moved before. Not supported: that 'Israel' as a whole never wanted peace, or that it has consistently sought it.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    law / courtEgypt–Israel Peace Treaty (1979) ✓

    Treaty of 26 March 1979, read on Yale's Avalon Project. Art. I(2): 'Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary … and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.'

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    primary documentTreaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan (26 October 1994), Avalon Project (1994) ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). Art. 3(2): 'the permanent, secure and recognised international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967'; Art. 3(3): each other's territory 'inviolable'.

    Open source ↗

    primary documentEU Special Representative Miguel Moratinos, 'Non-Paper' on the Taba negotiations (January 2001), UNISPAL copy (2001) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-29). Prepared by the EU envoy 'after consultations with the Israeli and Palestinian sides'. Refugees: 'The Palestinian side reiterated that the Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in accordance with the interpretation' of Resolution 194; options: return to Israel, to Israel swapped territory, to the Palestine state; rehabilitation in host country; relocation to third country. 'The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon … a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years … was raised verbally)'. 'The Palestinian side did not present a number.' UNRWA to be phased out over 'five years, as a targeted period'. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program, which was discussed but not agreed upon … No numbers were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first three years of this program (40,000 in the first five years of this program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally).'

    Open source ↗

    dataPeace Now, '30 Years After Oslo – The data that shows how the settlements proliferated following the Oslo Accords' (2023) (2023) aggregate ✓

    Read (2026-09-28): 1993, 'approximately 110,000 settlers in the West Bank' and 'around 140,000 in East Jerusalem'; today about 465,000 and 230,000; Rabin 'decided to freeze most of the construction in the settlements, but after his assassination and the rise of Benjamin Netanyahu to the prime minister's office, this policy changed drastically'; 'The settlement enterprise did not suffer from the Oslo Accords but rather thrived'. No figure for 2000 is given there. Re-read 2026-10-12: 'The settlement enterprise did not suffer from the Oslo Accords but rather thrived. Israel continued to expand, develop, and authorize settlements in the West Bank unabated. Even in years when few new settlements were established (1993-1997), infrastructure work continued.'

    Open source ↗

    primary documentNetanyahu recorded at Ofra (2001), aired on Israel's Channel 10 in 2010 (2001) incident ✓

    Al Jazeera, 18 July 2010, on the Channel 10 broadcast of the 2001 Ofra video; the two lines quoted on the page are from this report. Re-read 2026-09-30: 'America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction'; 'I'm going to interpret the accords in such a way that would allow me to put an end to this galloping forward to the '67 borders'; Netanyahu 'did not hold political office when the recording was made'; he 'was speaking with settlers who lost family members to Palestinian attacks'. The report does not name the settlement (Ofra in other reports, e.g. Gideon Levy's Haaretz column 'Tricky Bibi', not read here); the video was shot 'apparently without Netanyahu's knowledge'. Also: 'Nobody said what defined military zones were. Defined military zones are security zones; as far as I'm concerned, the entire Jordan Valley is a defined military zone.'

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    pressBBC News, 'Sharon plan "blocked peace talks"' (6 October 2004) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 2026-09-30. Weisglass to Haaretz: 'The significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process'; 'It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'; 'this whole package called the Palestinian state … has been removed indefinitely from our agenda'. Later, on Israeli radio: no intention to freeze the 'political process as such', 'But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA in its present state'. Sharon's office: the roadmap is 'the only plan liable to help progress towards a viable political agreement', Palestinian violence to blame for any freeze. Re-read 2026-10-12: after the interview 'he said there had been no intention to freeze the "political process as such". "But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] in its present state,"'; Sharon's office: 'the Palestinian violence should be blamed for any freeze'.

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    pressCNN, 'Netanyahu again rejects Palestinian sovereignty amid fresh US push for two-state solution' (21 January 2024) (2024) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). Netanyahu on X: 'I will not compromise on full Israeli security control over all the territory west of Jordan - and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.' PMO statement: 'after Hamas is destroyed Israel must retain security control over Gaza to ensure that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel, a requirement that contradicts the demand for Palestinian sovereignty.' Biden, the day before: 'There are a number of types of two-state solutions … a number of states that have limitations, and so I think there's ways in which this can work.'

    Open source ↗

    pressThe Jewish Chronicle (JNS), 'Knesset votes 68-9 against establishment of Palestinian state' (18 July 2024) (2024) incident ✓

    Read 2026-09-30. Resolution text: 'The Israeli Knesset opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state on any piece of land west of the Jordan River. The existence of a Palestinian state in the heart of Israel will pose an existential threat'; 'It will be only a matter of time before Hamas takes over such a Palestinian state'; passed 68 to 9, put forward by MK Ze'ev Elkin; in February 2024 the plenum voted 99–11 to back the government's rejection of 'unilateral recognition'.

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    referenceIsrael Democracy Institute, '1992' (elections for the 13th Knesset) (1992) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. Labor under Yitzhak Rabin 44 seats, Likud 32 (first Labor win over Likud since 1973), Meretz (Ratz, Mapam, Shinui) 12; the right ‘lost many votes due to fragmentation’; a ‘preventive bloc of 61’ with Meretz and the Arab parties; coalition of Labor, Meretz and Shas (62 MKs) with the five Arab-party MKs supporting from outside. Rabin's assassination ‘by a Jewish assassin over the Oslo Accords’.

    Open source ↗

    referenceJewish Virtual Library, 'Sharon Elected Israeli Prime Minister (February 6, 2001)' (2001) aggregate ✓

    Read: Sharon 62.5%, Barak 37.5% with 99.9% counted.

    Open source ↗

    dataPCPSR / Tami Steinmetz Center, The Palestine/Israel Pulse, joint poll (September 2024) (2024) aggregate ✓

    Palestinian-Israeli Pulse, joint poll, July 2024 (read): one democratic state with equal rights — Palestinians 25%, Israeli Jews 14%; two states — Palestinians 40%, Israeli Jews 21%, 'the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'. Re-read 2026-10-10, press release: Palestinians 1,270 face to face (±3.5%), 17–20 July; Israelis 900 (500 Jews by online panel with an oversample of 200 settlers, 200 Arabs), weighted (±3.34%). Israeli Jews' two-state support 21%, 'a 13-point decline from 2022'; 42% of Israeli Jews support 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians'; Palestinians 40% two states ('a 7-point rise compared to 2022'), 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews'. Trust: 'Only 10% of Israeli Jews and 6% of Palestinians agree that it is possible to trust the other side', 'the lowest level since the question was first asked in 2017'. Intentions: 66% of Israeli Jews and 61% of Palestinians chose 'to commit genocide against us'. Humanity score: 51% of Jewish Israelis gave Palestinians zero; 71% of Palestinians gave Israelis zero. Detailed package (since 2018): Palestinians 34% (+8), Israeli Jews 25% (−6). Regional peace with two states and normalisation vs a regional war: 65% of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis (55% of Jews) chose peace. Incentives: after each of six 'unilateral' incentives a majority of Israelis supported the plan; four Israeli incentives did the same among Palestinians; a paired incentive on 'combatting incitement against the other in textbooks' gave 61% net support among Israeli Jews. Also (2026-10-10): average humanity score 'Palestinians gave Jews an average score of 6 out of 100; Jews gave Palestinians an average score of 14'; 'One percent of Palestinians gave Israeli Jews a score of 80 or higher, and 2.7% of Israeli Jews scored Palestinians in this range'; the pollsters: 'This question could reflect respondents’ perception of the inherent qualities of the other side, or their assessment of the other side’s behavior, or both.' Also (2026-10-10): '41% of Palestinians believe the current war is so extreme and unprecedented, it might actually create an opportunity for a breakthrough for peace, like after 1973; more people in Gaza agree (54%, vs. 31% in the West Bank). 52% of Arabs in Israel agree, and 23% of Israeli Jews'; regional peace vs war: 'There was minimal difference between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza'.

    Open source ↗

    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

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    The mirror of 'never miss an opportunity', and the deadlock both create.

    Each side's version says the other never wanted peace, so talks can look pointless and force the only option. Put together they form the deadlock 'Whoever moves first loses': each side's lesson from its last concession is not to make the next one. The useful questions are narrower. Who, on each side, wanted which deal, when, and what defeated it? The answers point at specific leaders and movements, which can change, rather than at peoples, which can't. The mirror conviction grew inside Israel's own peace camp as the offers failed. Einat Wilf, a Labor Knesset member in 2010–13 who still calls herself a leftist, put it in 2018: 'we were blind — maybe willfully blind — to what they wanted', and 'the Palestinians have actually never, not for a single moment, accepted the two-state solution' — while defining her own position as 'East of the Green Line: not us. West of the Green Line: not them.' Each side's disappointed moderates become the other side's proof.

    Traps here:◆ The strict enemy frame

    pressRaphael Ahren, 'A self-declared leftist wages war on the Palestinian “right of return”', The Times of Israel, 30 July 2018 (interview with Einat Wilf) (2018) incident ✓

    Text pasted by the site's maker (ToI is walled to automated fetches): Wilf served in the Knesset 2010–2013, first with Labor then Ehud Barak's Independence faction; 'we were blind — maybe willfully blind — to what they wanted'; 'never, not for a single moment, accepted the two-state solution'; 'East of the Green Line: not us. West of the Green Line: not them.'; 'UNRWA should be dismantled'.

    Open source ↗

The usual reply — and its own traps

Arguments travel in pairs. Here is what the other side typically answers. Check whether both lean on the same trick.

heard from pro-Israel voices“The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” Both lean on: ◆ "They all…"

Where this argument points

This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions — for, against or around them:

Keep exploring

From the archive

How newspapers reported related events at the time — suggested by the archive's own tags, not yet reviewed for this argument. Open a scan and judge for yourself.

Scans: kvetch-of-the-day news archive.