Solutions

The Gaza plan: Board of Peace and a technocratic Gaza (2025)

End the war, release the hostages, disarm Hamas, and run Gaza through a technocratic committee of Palestinians and international experts under an international Board of Peace, with an international force, while a Palestinian state stays a conditional 'pathway'.

Check the effects of this card β†’ pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Israel keeps security control during a phased withdrawal and gets its hostages back and Hamas removed from power, without committing to a Palestinian state.

What happens to Palestinians

Gazans get an end to the war, reconstruction and a technocratic administration of Palestinians and international experts, but under international supervision. Statehood remains a possibility rather than a commitment, and the West Bank isn't addressed.

What it requires

  • A ceasefire and the release of all hostages, in exchange for Palestinian prisoners and detainees
  • Hamas and other factions having no 'role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form'; 'Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty', and those who wish to leave get 'safe passage'
  • A technocratic committee 'made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts' running Gaza's services, under 'a new international transitional body, the "Board of Peace", which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J Trump'
  • A 'temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF)' that 'will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces'; Israeli forces withdrawing in stages as security is established
  • Reconstruction funded internationally; 'No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return'
  • Palestinian Authority reform, after which 'the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood' β€” conditional and undated

Who supports it

Plan text: the 20-point plan of 29 September 2025 (full text as published by Al Jazeera, read 30 September 2026). Announced 29 September 2025; a ceasefire and hostage release followed in October 2025; endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 on 17 November 2025, 'by a vote of 13-0-2, with Russia and China abstaining'. The resolution makes no reference to the two-state solution or the ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion, 'omissions several Council members, including Algeria, France, Pakistan, Guyana, and Sierra Leone, criticized as legally significant' (ASIL Insights, 2025). Hamas's response of 3 October 2025 agreed 'to release all occupation captives – both living and the remains' and to 'hand over the administration of the Gaza Strip to a Palestinian body of independents [technocrats]', but 'did not address the issue of disarmament', and said Gaza's future should rest on 'a unanimous national position' (Al Jazeera, 3 October 2025). Israel's army still held a large part of Gaza under the ceasefire line: roughly 53% behind the 'yellow line', and by April 2026 about 64% on an 'orange line' map given to aid groups (see 'Israel left Gaza in 2005 β€” there has been no occupation there since'). In May 2026 the Board of Peace's director-general, Nickolay Mladenov, warned that failure to advance the agreement would lead to 'a dangerous status quo', and that the yellow line could solidify 'into a fence or wall, a permanent separation in Gaza' (CNN, 14 May 2026). Its technocratic-committee idea had an Arab precursor: the League of Arab States' Cairo statement of March 2025 welcomed 'the Palestinian decision to establish a Gaza Administration Committee under the umbrella of the Palestinian government β€” comprising qualified individuals from the Strip for a transitional period', and reaffirmed 'that security remains an exclusive Palestinian responsibility'; it rejected any displacement of Gazans (UN document A/79/820–S/2025/151). The attached plan specifies the committee as 'an independent body comprised of technocrats and non-factional figures working under the umbrella of the Palestinian government' for 'a transitional period of six months', an 'early recovery phase (6 months) and the reconstruction phase (5 years)', and 'total losses and needs' of '$53.2 billion' (Arab proposal, annexed to the same UN document).

What history says

  • Kosovo and East Timor: UN-supervised transitional administrations ahead of self-government (East Timor's ended in independence in 2002, see 'International trusteeship: an outside administration for a transition'; how each fared is not sourced here ⚠)
  • Iraq 2003–04: a foreign-appointed authority governing an occupied population, with lessons about legitimacy
  • Oslo's interim arrangements (1993–99): a temporary regime meant to lead to final status, which stalled

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

A transition that leads to self-government β€” unlikely on the record

if Gazans accept the transition, armed groups are disarmed and the guarantors stay (Gazans would accept an administration no Palestinian voted for, for a transition; Rearmament could be prevented during a long truce; An outside guarantor would stay and act when tested)

An outside or technocratic administration runs the territory for a set period, rebuilds, disarms, and hands over to an elected local government.

What it can slide into: If the handover never comes: an interim that lasts; if disarmament fails: war.

An outside administration that loses legitimacy β€” possible on the record

if Gazans reject an administration they did not choose (not: Gazans would accept an administration no Palestinian voted for, for a transition)

The appointed authority governs, but the population treats it as occupation by other means; armed groups recruit on that.

What it can slide into: Insurgency, or a hasty handover to whoever is strongest.

An interim that lasts β€” possible on the record

if the quiet holds but the pathway to a state stalls (Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; not: A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims)

No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places β€” more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints β€” and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.

  • The Oslo interim arrangements (1994–2000) β€” lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
  • 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s β€” lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').

What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.

A truce that ends in war β€” likely on the record

if disarmament fails (not: Rearmament could be prevented during a long truce)

The truce buys time; one or both sides use it to rearm; it ends early, in a war fought from better positions.

  • The Treaty of Hudaybiyyah (628) β€” ended early. The treaty as the early sources give it 'agreed to remove war from the people for ten years'; the hadith collection of Abu Dawud gives the terms as: 'They agreed to abandon war for ten years … there should be sincerity between them and … not theft or treachery' (Sunan Abi Dawud 2766, graded hasan by al-Albani; sunnah.com). Twenty-two months later, after allies of the Quraysh (the Bani Bakr, 'possibly with Quraysh help') attacked Muhammad's allies in December 629, the truce was treated as broken and Mecca was taken in 630 (Daniel Pipes, Middle East Quarterly, a pro-Israel journal, citing the early biographies; a Muslim-tradition account of the breach is not yet read here ⚠). Arafat compared the Oslo agreement to it in 1994 (see the PLO page and 'Flattened words').
  • Israel–Hamas ceasefires in Gaza (2008–2021) β€” collapsed. Each followed by a rebuilt arsenal and another war. Israeli strategists called the rounds 'mowing the grass': quiet bought by force, with 'no solution in sight'. Palestinian analysts describe the same cycle as a 'well established' tactic under '15 years of a crippling siege' (see 'Mowing the grass').

What it can slide into: The next war, and less belief on both sides that any truce is real.

The hard questions

  • Who disarms Hamas if Hamas refuses, and will the international force take on that job?
  • Can a technocratic committee have legitimacy with Gazans if no Palestinian has voted for it?
  • What makes the 'pathway' to statehood more than a promise, and what happens in the West Bank meanwhile?

What stands in the way

  • A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control β€” Disarmament and a transitional authority are read as the precondition for safety by one side and as permanent control by the other.
  • Whoever moves first loses β€” Who disarms and who withdraws first is the plan's core dispute.
  • Distrust as premise β€” Every stage depends on believing the other side will do its part β€” Hamas disarming, the army withdrawing, the international force staying β€” and each side reads the other's delays as proof it never meant to.

Arguments that point here