Solutions

Regional land swap (the Eiland plan)

Make the land bigger: Egypt gives Sinai land to enlarge Gaza, the Palestinians give Israel part of the West Bank where settlements stand, and Israel gives Egypt land in the Negev.

Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Israel keeps the main settlement blocs without taking Palestinian land in net terms, and gives up desert land in the Negev.

What happens to Palestinians

A larger Gaza with room, in Eiland's words, for 'a large international port', 'an international airport' and 'a new city that could host a million residents', in exchange for 12 percent of the West Bank. The rest follows the two-state model.

What it requires

  • Egypt ceding 720 km² of northern Sinai next to Gaza (24 km of coast from Rafah toward, but not including, el-Arish), which Eiland says 'triples the size of the Gaza Strip, whose current size is 365 sq km'
  • The Palestinian state ceding 12 percent of the West Bank to Israel, territory 'where Israeli settlements and military facilities have existed for decades'
  • Israel giving Egypt up to 720 km² in the southwestern Negev (the Paran region), plus a 10 km tunnel 'under full Egyptian sovereignty' linking Egypt and Jordan
  • All three states, and the Palestinians, agreeing — the plan works only as a package

Who supports it

Proposed by Giora Eiland, former head of Israel's National Security Council, in 'Regional Alternatives to the Two-State Solution' (Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, January 2010), which argues that 'Within the currently-defined, narrow confines of the conventional two-state parameters, no Israeli-Palestinian agreement is likely', so that 'Regional alternatives that widen the scope of actors taking responsibility for a settlement' are needed. Its terms: 'Egypt will transfer a territory of 720 sq km to Gaza', a strip from Rafah toward (but not including) el-Arish, which 'triples the size of the Gaza Strip'; the Palestinians 'will relinquish 12 percent of the West Bank, which will be annexed to Israel'; and Egypt 'will receive from Israel a territory in the southwestern Negev (the Paran region)' of 'up to 720 sq km' (BESA Memorandum No. 4, full text read). Egypt has publicly rejected moving Gazans into Sinai, a related but different idea: in October 2023 President Sisi said Egyptians would reject 'the forced displacement of millions of Palestinians into Sinai', which would turn the peninsula into 'a base for attacks against Israel', and suggested they could instead be moved to Israel's Negev 'till the militants are dealt with' (Reuters, 18 October 2023). A rejection of the land swap itself by Egypt is not yet sourced here ⚠. The plan's own publisher also ran a critique: Stuart A. Cohen (BESA Perspectives Paper, 7 February 2010) wrote that Eiland 'provides no evidence whatsoever that his assessments are shared by any individual in Jordan, in Palestine or in Egypt', that ceding 12 percent 'would require the Palestinians to relinquish all claims not merely to Jerusalem and its environs, but also to Ofra, Kiryat Arbah, and Ariel', and that re-negotiating the peace treaty with Egypt would put one of Israel's 'two such local anchors' of stability at risk; he argued instead for unilateral Israeli steps.

What history says

  • Border adjustments between states in peace deals (e.g. Jordan–Saudi Arabia 1965; not yet sourced here ⚠)
  • The Taba arbitration (1988), a dispute over a small area of Sinai that Israel and Egypt took to international arbitration (not yet sourced here ⚠)
  • October 2023: the idea of moving Gazans to Sinai resurfaced as a wartime displacement concept, which is exactly what Egypt feared (see 'Palestinians leave ('transfer' / 'voluntary emigration')')

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

Borders redrawn between states, by agreement — unlikely on the record

if Egypt gives up land and the Arab states back it (Egypt would give up sovereign land in Sinai for a larger Gaza; Arab states would pay for and guarantee a deal, not only recognise it)

States exchange land by treaty; the people on it are asked, compensated, or already on the right side; the new lines are recognised.

What it can slide into: If the people on the land are not asked: a transfer over their heads.

An interim that lasts — likely on the record

if Egypt refuses (not: Egypt would give up sovereign land in Sinai for a larger Gaza)

No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places — more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints — and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.

  • The Oslo interim arrangements (1994–2000) — lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
  • 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s — lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').

What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.

Forced displacement — unlikely on the record

if 'a bigger Gaza in Sinai' becomes a way to push Gazans out (The rest of the world would accept a solution imposed by force or displacement)

Millions leave under pressure or at gunpoint, their homes taken or destroyed; the land is emptied for the other people.

  • 1948 — permanent. Expulsion and flight, return barred (see 'Transfer the Palestinians out').
  • Jews of Arab lands, 1948–1970s — permanent. Around 850,000 left or were driven out (see 'One Arab state from the river to the sea').
  • The Balkans in the 1990s — permanent. The UN Commission of Experts called the expression 'relatively new' and defined it, for the former Yugoslavia, as 'rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area' (Final Report, S/1994/674, para. 129, quoting its first interim report).

What it can slide into: A new refugee question that outlives everyone who caused it, and the next war; for those who refuse to go, worse.

The hard questions

  • Why would Egypt give up sovereign land in Sinai? Eiland offers it 'seven compensations', among them Negev land and a tunnel to Jordan; are they enough?
  • How do you keep 'a bigger Gaza in Sinai' from becoming a way to push Gazans out of Palestine altogether?
  • Does trading West Bank land for desert land answer the Palestinians' attachment to their actual places?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here