Trading the 'Triangle': land and people swapped for settlement blocs
Israel keeps the West Bank settlement blocs; in exchange, Arab-majority towns inside Israel near the Green Line (the 'Triangle' around Wadi Ara and Umm al-Fahm) become part of a Palestinian state, with their residents.
Check the effects of this card β pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Israel keeps the settlement blocs and increases its Jewish majority, without anyone having to move.
What happens to Palestinians
The Palestinian state gains land and population. Arab citizens of Israel in the Triangle lose Israeli citizenship, its rights and benefits, without being asked.
What it requires
- A two-state agreement with land swaps
- Moving the border so that Arab towns inside Israel, with some hundreds of thousands of citizens, fall on the Palestinian side
- Those citizens losing Israeli citizenship and becoming Palestinian, without moving house
- Their consent, or overriding it, which in a democracy would mean stripping citizens of their citizenship
Who supports it
Put forward by Avigdor Lieberman (the 'Lieberman Plan', 2004). The 2020 Trump plan (Peace to Prosperity, read) names ten 'Triangle Communities' (Kafr Qara, Ar'ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara, Jaljulia), says they 'largely self-identify as Palestinian', and 'contemplates the possibility, subject to agreement of the parties' that they 'become part of the State of Palestine'. Arab citizens of the towns concerned have rejected it: in 2014 residents of Umm al-Fahm told Al-Monitor that 'they identify themselves as Israeli citizens and object to a land-swap plan that will annex them to a future Palestine'. When the Trump plan was published in January 2020, 'Several Arab citizens, community leaders and politicians condemned the talk about placing their cities and villages under Palestinian control as racist and dangerous' (Jerusalem Post, Khaled Abu Toameh, 29 January 2020; only the article's lead is readable here). A 2000 survey by the weekly Kul al-Arab 'among 1,000 residents of Umm al-Fahm' is reported to have found that '83 percent opposed transferring their city to the PA' (The Algemeiner, 10 January 2014; the poll itself and MEMRI's translation are not read here β ). In 2020 the Prime Minister's office said Israel wouldn't pursue the idea (Times of Israel report, not read here β ).
What history says
- Population and territory exchanges such as GreeceβTurkey (1923), carried out over the heads of the people moved
- Border changes that turned citizens of one state into citizens of another without a vote
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
Borders redrawn between states, by agreement β unlikely on the record
if the Triangle's residents consent (Arab citizens of the Triangle would consent to being moved to a Palestinian state)
States exchange land by treaty; the people on it are asked, compensated, or already on the right side; the new lines are recognised.
- JordanβSaudi Arabia (1965) β held. A border adjustment between states in a peace deal (see 'Regional land swap (the Eiland plan)').
What it can slide into: If the people on the land are not asked: a transfer over their heads.
Forced displacement β unlikely on the record
if it is imposed over their heads, like the 1923 exchange (not: Arab citizens of the Triangle would consent to being moved to a Palestinian state; The rest of the world would accept a solution imposed by force or displacement)
Millions leave under pressure or at gunpoint, their homes taken or destroyed; the land is emptied for the other people.
- 1948 β permanent. Expulsion and flight, return barred (see 'Transfer the Palestinians out').
- Jews of Arab lands, 1948β1970s β permanent. Around 850,000 left or were driven out (see 'One Arab state from the river to the sea').
- The Balkans in the 1990s β permanent. The UN Commission of Experts called the expression 'relatively new' and defined it, for the former Yugoslavia, as 'rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area' (Final Report, S/1994/674, para. 129, quoting its first interim report).
What it can slide into: A new refugee question that outlives everyone who caused it, and the next war; for those who refuse to go, worse.
An interim that lasts β likely on the record
if they refuse and force is ruled out: they stay Israeli citizens and the plan stalls (not: Arab citizens of the Triangle would consent to being moved to a Palestinian state; not: The rest of the world would accept a solution imposed by force or displacement)
No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places β more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints β and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.
- The Oslo interim arrangements (1994β2000) β lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
- 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s β lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.
The hard questions
- Can a democracy strip hundreds of thousands of citizens of their citizenship because of their ethnicity, even if they don't move?
- The Trump plan says the Triangle communities 'largely self-identify as Palestinian'; residents of Umm al-Fahm told Al-Monitor they 'identify themselves as Israeli citizens' and object to being annexed to Palestine. What does it say about both states that people can be both, and choose to stay Israeli?
- If Jews' safety depends on a majority, does this plan show where that logic leads (see 'Jews can only be safe as a majority in their own state')?
What stands in the way
- Majority as safety β return as justice β The plan exists to shore up the Jewish majority, which is exactly what makes Arab citizens reject it.