Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal
Leave the final status open and make occupation lighter step by step: roads linking the Palestinian areas without checkpoints, more work permits and economic ties, more room for Palestinian self-rule, while Israel keeps security control.
Check the effects of this card β pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Israel keeps security control and every option open. The friction points, soldiers at checkpoints and raids, shrink, which lowers the cost of the status quo.
What happens to Palestinians
Fewer checkpoints, more movement, more jobs and more self-rule, but no state, no end to settlement, and no date when it would end.
What it requires
- An Israeli government willing to give up day-to-day control without getting a peace agreement in return
- A Palestinian leadership willing to accept improvements that aren't statehood
- Enough quiet on the ground that the steps aren't reversed after the next attack
- Money and infrastructure: bypass roads and tunnels linking Areas A and B, crossings, industrial zones
Who supports it
Set out by the Israeli philosopher Micah Goodman in 'Catch-67' (2017) as a response to a deadlock in which neither withdrawal nor annexation seems possible. On taking office in June 2021, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett promised the Knesset to contribute to 'the reduction of friction and the shrinking of the conflict' (New York Times translation, 30 September 2021, which also says the phrase 'was coined by Micah Goodman'), and his government expanded work permits: in July 2021 it announced '16,000 more permits for Palestinians from the occupied West Bank', bringing the number allowed to work in Israel to 106,000, after talks between Defence Minister Gantz and President Abbas (AFP via France 24, 28 July 2021). By design it is not a final solution. Objections from the Israeli right (that it takes security risks for nothing in return) are not yet sourced here β . To its critics, in the New York Times' summary, it is 'merely a rebranding of Israel's decades-old approach', 'a clever public relations strategy that obscures a long-standing intention by successive Israeli leaders, including Bennett, to expand settlements in the occupied West Bank, entrench Israel's presence there and make it harder to reverse the 54-year occupation'.
What history says
- The Oslo interim arrangements: the 1995 Interim Agreement's Area C was to be 'gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction' (see 'Which territory?'); how much of the interim regime is still in force is not yet sourced here β
- Israel's 'economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s: permits and investment instead of a political process (not yet sourced here β )
- The period before October 7 2023, when Israel issued work permits to Gazans (their number and the stated purpose are not yet sourced here β )
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
An interim that lasts β possible on the record
if the quiet holds (Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check)
No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places β more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints β and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.
- The Oslo interim arrangements (1994β2000) β lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
- 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s β lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.
Managed calm that is shattered β possible on the record
if armed groups break the calm (not: Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; not: Hamas would keep a long-term truce)
The quiet bought with permits and money holds until an attack ends it; the approach is discredited on both sides.
- The period before October 7 2023 β collapsed. Expanded work permits for Gazans were part of an effort to keep Hamas quiet (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: War, and less appetite on both sides for any gradual approach.
The hard questions
- Is a lighter occupation a step toward ending it, or a way to make it last?
- What would make the steps irreversible, and does either side want them to be?
- What happens to the approach after a mass-casualty attack, as with the work permits before October 7?
- Can it work without a horizon the Palestinians can see, and without a partner the Israelis trust?
What stands in the way
- A state as staging post β security as permanent control β Every step that eases control is read by Israelis as a risk and by Palestinians as a way to make control permanent.
- Whoever moves first loses β Easing steps that are reversed after the next attack teach both sides that moving first costs.