Argument · heard from pro-Israel voices

“Israel left Gaza in 2005 — there has been no occupation there since.”

Israel pulled out every soldier and every settler in 2005 and handed Gaza to the Palestinians. Calling it 'occupied' after that is a lie, and what Gaza did with its freedom was elect Hamas and fire rockets.

Made publicly as a pro-Israel argument by Benjamin Netanyahu and Supreme Court of Israel

Where it's been said

“We withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 and from every square inch of Gaza in 2005.”
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel — Address to the UN General Assembly, 2011-09-23 ✓
“We should point out in this context that since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip.”
Supreme Court of Israel, court (HCJ 9132/07, Bassiouni) — Judgment, para. 12, 2008-01-30 ✓

Traps in play:◆ Motte and bailey◆ Proxy presented as outcome

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • In August–September 2005 Israel removed all 21 Gaza settlements, home to 'approximately 8,500 Israeli settlers'; 'Israeli police and soldiers began removing those who did not leave voluntarily on August 17', and the army left by 12 September, when the cabinet 'formally cancelled the military government in Gaza' (US Congressional Research Service).
    • Israel's Supreme Court ruled in 2008 that 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.
    • In September 2007, after Hamas took over, Israel's security cabinet decided unanimously that 'Hamas is a terrorist organization that has taken control of the Gaza Strip and turned it into hostile territory', which 'bears responsibility' for its 'hostile activity' against Israel. The same decision imposed sanctions to 'restrict the passage of various goods', 'reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and restrict 'the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip', while intending 'to avoid a humanitarian crisis' (Prime Minister's Office press release, 19 September 2007). Those are the powers the other side cites as continued control.
    • No Israeli soldiers were stationed in Gaza, and no Israeli ran its schools, courts, police or ministries: from 2007 Hamas did.
    • Rocket fire rose after the withdrawal, and Hamas took Gaza by force from the Palestinian Authority in 2007 — on this view the experiment was tried, and its outcome argues against repeating it in the West Bank.
    • Advocates' current version: since November 2025 the Security Council has endorsed a transitional authority for Gaza — it 'welcomes the establishment of the Board of Peace (BoP) as a transitional administration with international legal personality' — and ties Israel's remaining presence to disarmament: 'the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw from the Gaza Strip based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization … save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat' (Resolution 2803, 17 November 2025). On this view Israel's forces in Gaza are a wartime security arrangement the Council itself set out, not a return to occupation.
    • Inside the ICJ itself, three judges wrote that the Court should have left Gaza out of its 2024 opinion: since 2005 Gaza 'has been in a fundamentally different situation than that of the West Bank'; the Court 'did not have evidence before it which would allow it to assert whether and to which extent the control Israel continued exercising over the Gaza Strip after the 2005 withdrawal was justified by security motives, considering, in particular, the military actions conducted by Hamas directed at Israeli territory'; and the Opinion 'does not refer to any element that would demonstrate the existence of an intent or policy aiming to annex the Gaza Strip' (joint opinion of Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu, paras. 15–16, 29). Their own account keeps the other half: Israel withdrew 'while maintaining the control over the airspace and maritime zones, and land borders', and their conclusion is that the Court was 'unable to properly pronounce itself on the situation in Gaza prior to 7 October 2023' (para. 17). Vice-President Sebutinde, dissenting, wrote that 'the only time Israel has unilaterally withdrawn from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and not insisted on concurrent security guarantees for itself, the results have been disastrous for Israel'.
  2. What's true

    2005 was a real withdrawal, and it cost Israel something.

    The disengagement dismantled every settlement in Gaza and four in the northern West Bank, against fierce resistance from the settler movement. Direct military rule ended, and Israel's own Supreme Court concluded that the law of belligerent occupation no longer applied in full: Israel had no 'general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents' and no capability to manage civilian life there (Bassiouni, 2008). Hamas's violent takeover in 2007 and the rockets that followed are facts.

    law / courtHCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister (Supreme Court of Israel) (2008) ✓

    Judgment of 30 January 2008 (English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), para. 12; checked against the text. Re-read 2026-10-12, para. 12: Israel 'does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the laws of belligerent occupation'; its main obligations 'derive from the state of armed conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization', and also 'from the degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossings', the Strip being 'almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel'. Also para. 12: 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.

    Open source ↗

    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

    Open source ↗

    primary documentIsraeli Security Cabinet decision declaring the Gaza Strip 'hostile territory' (19 September 2007) (2007) incident ✓

    Israeli Foreign Ministry press release ('Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser'), 19 September 2007, read on UNISPAL (labelled there a non-UN document) on 29 Sept 2026. 'In today's unanimous decision, it was determined: Hamas is a terrorist organization that has taken control of the Gaza Strip and turned it into hostile territory.' Sanctions to 'restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and to restrict 'the movement of people', 'following a legal examination' and with 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'. The text does not use the phrases 'enemy entity' or 'laws of war'. Re-read 2026-10-12: sanctions 'to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also be placed on the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip'; taking into account 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'.

    Open source ↗

  3. What's left out

    Israel kept control of Gaza's borders, sea, airspace and population registry — and even its own court said obligations remained.

    After 2005 Israel controlled Gaza's airspace and territorial waters, all its land crossings except Rafah (Egypt's), the movement of people and goods, the population registry, customs collection, and much of its electricity and fuel; it also enforced a buffer zone inside Gaza. The same 2008 ruling that denied effective control said Israel still had obligations from its control of the crossings and from Gaza's near-total dependence on Israeli electricity. The ICRC 'considers Gaza to remain occupied territory on the basis that Israel still exercises effective control over the Strip, notably through key elements of authority over the strip, including over its borders'. In July 2024 the International Court of Justice took that 'functional' view: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control' (para. 94). So both 'fully occupied' and 'not occupied at all' overstate it. And since the 2023 war the question has changed: the Israeli army has held large parts of Gaza on the ground — about 53% under the October 2025 ceasefire line (the 'yellow line'), and by April 2026 about 64% on a new 'orange line' map the army gave aid groups, as CNN reported. The functional view the ICJ took was argued in detail by the Israeli organisation Gisha in its 2011 study 'Scale of Control', which listed the powers Israel kept over Gaza's crossings, registry, taxes, sea and airspace.

    Traps here:◆ Which territory?◆ Motte and bailey

    law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓

    19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'

    Open source ↗

    law / courtHCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister (Supreme Court of Israel) (2008) ✓

    Judgment of 30 January 2008 (English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), para. 12; checked against the text. Re-read 2026-10-12, para. 12: Israel 'does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the laws of belligerent occupation'; its main obligations 'derive from the state of armed conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization', and also 'from the degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossings', the Strip being 'almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel'. Also para. 12: 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.

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    law / courtICRC: What does the law say about the responsibilities of the Occupying Power in the occupied Palestinian territory? finding ✓

    Read: Gaza remains occupied because Israel 'still exercises effective control … notably through key elements of authority … including over its borders (airspace, sea and land – at the exception of the border with Egypt)'; also 'The disputed status of a territory does not prevent the applicability of the law of occupation.' Re-read 2026-10-12, full sentence: 'The ICRC considers Gaza to remain occupied territory on the basis that Israel still exercises effective control over the Strip, notably through key elements of authority over the strip, including over its borders (airspace, sea and land – at the exception of the border with Egypt).'

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    pressCNN, 'Gaza risks becoming permanently divided, top official warns' (Tal Shalev, 14 May 2026) (2026) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 'Under the October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, Israeli forces withdrew to a demarcation line known as the “yellow line” which encompassed roughly 53% of Gaza.' Aid groups say the Israeli military gave them 'last month' (April 2026) a new map marking an 'orange line', 'which shows Israel now controlling about 64% of the territory'; CNN asked the Israeli military for comment. Nickolay Mladenov (Board of Peace) warned of the yellow line solidifying 'into a fence or wall, a permanent separation in Gaza'.

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    advocacy / viewGisha, 'Scale of Control: Israel's Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip' (November 2011) (2011) ✓

    Read in full 2026-10-14 (PDF supplied by the editor). 'This position paper illustrates how despite recent developments, Israel continues to control Gaza's airspace and territorial waters, the Palestinian population registry and passage of goods and people to and from Gaza. Israel still collects customs and value added tax for goods entering the Gaza Strip and maintains some physical presence in the Strip. Israel also controls Gaza's infrastructure by virtue of its control over supply of electricity and other inputs to the system.' It argues for 'a functional approach' to occupation, under which obligations follow the powers actually held, and treats the 'end of occupation' as a process. An Israeli human-rights organisation's position paper (November 2011).

    Open source ↗

    Also omitted: the withdrawal was unilateral, and Sharon's adviser described it as freezing negotiations.

    The disengagement was not negotiated with the Palestinian Authority; on the eve of the pullout, 84% of Palestinians polled saw it as ‘victory for armed resistance’ and 40% gave Hamas most of the credit (21% the PA), yet 62% opposed continued attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal; the pollsters wrote that ‘the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal’ had raised both ‘a greater appreciation of the role of violence’ and a greater optimism about reconstruction and state building (PSR poll 17, 7–9 September 2005). Sharon's senior adviser Dov Weisglass told Haaretz in 2004 that the plan's significance was 'the freezing of the peace process', supplying 'the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'; he later said the intention was not to hold a political process 'with the PNA in its present state' (BBC). That doesn't erase the withdrawal, but it complicates 'we gave them a chance for peace'.

    pressBBC News, 'Sharon plan "blocked peace talks"' (6 October 2004) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 2026-09-30. Weisglass to Haaretz: 'The significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process'; 'It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'; 'this whole package called the Palestinian state … has been removed indefinitely from our agenda'. Later, on Israeli radio: no intention to freeze the 'political process as such', 'But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA in its present state'. Sharon's office: the roadmap is 'the only plan liable to help progress towards a viable political agreement', Palestinian violence to blame for any freeze. Re-read 2026-10-12: after the interview 'he said there had been no intention to freeze the "political process as such". "But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA [Palestinian National Authority] in its present state,"'; Sharon's office: 'the Palestinian violence should be blamed for any freeze'.

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    advocacy / viewGisha, 'Scale of Control: Israel's Continued Responsibility in the Gaza Strip' (November 2011) (2011) ✓

    Read in full 2026-10-14 (PDF supplied by the editor). 'This position paper illustrates how despite recent developments, Israel continues to control Gaza's airspace and territorial waters, the Palestinian population registry and passage of goods and people to and from Gaza. Israel still collects customs and value added tax for goods entering the Gaza Strip and maintains some physical presence in the Strip. Israel also controls Gaza's infrastructure by virtue of its control over supply of electricity and other inputs to the system.' It argues for 'a functional approach' to occupation, under which obligations follow the powers actually held, and treats the 'end of occupation' as a process. An Israeli human-rights organisation's position paper (November 2011).

    Open source ↗

    dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 'Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (17)' (7–9 September 2005) (2005) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. Ramallah-based polling centre; director Khalil Shikaki. On the eve of the Gaza withdrawal: 84% ‘view Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance’ (up from 72% in June); 40% give Hamas most of the credit, 21% the PA, 11% Fateh; but 62% oppose (35% support) continued armed attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal, and 60% support collecting arms from armed factions. PSR's reading: ‘the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting dynamics’ — ‘a greater appreciation of the role of violence’ and ‘a greater optimism about the future’. Fateh led Hamas 47% to 30%.

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  4. More context

    How to talk about this.

    Acknowledge first: Israel withdrew every soldier and settler from Gaza in 2005, and what followed was Hamas's takeover in 2007 and rocket fire. Ask one question: 'who controlled Gaza's borders, airspace, sea and population registry after 2005?'; the answer is why the ICJ held in 2024 that Israel's obligations under the law of occupation continued in proportion to that control — though Israel's Supreme Court had held in 2008 that Israel no longer had effective control there. Share one checkable thing: the ICJ's 2024 advisory opinion, which found Israel's obligations continued in Gaza in proportion to its control. What not to say: 'Gaza was an open-air prison' as if Hamas had no choices, or 'Israel had nothing to do with Gaza' as if the blockade didn't exist. From the other side: grant that the 2005 withdrawal was real, then ask what a next withdrawal would need to succeed.

    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

    Open source ↗

    law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓

    19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'

    Open source ↗

    law / courtHCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister (Supreme Court of Israel) (2008) ✓

    Judgment of 30 January 2008 (English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), para. 12; checked against the text. Re-read 2026-10-12, para. 12: Israel 'does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the laws of belligerent occupation'; its main obligations 'derive from the state of armed conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization', and also 'from the degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossings', the Strip being 'almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel'. Also para. 12: 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.

    Open source ↗

    primary documentIsraeli Security Cabinet decision declaring the Gaza Strip 'hostile territory' (19 September 2007) (2007) incident ✓

    Israeli Foreign Ministry press release ('Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser'), 19 September 2007, read on UNISPAL (labelled there a non-UN document) on 29 Sept 2026. 'In today's unanimous decision, it was determined: Hamas is a terrorist organization that has taken control of the Gaza Strip and turned it into hostile territory.' Sanctions to 'restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and to restrict 'the movement of people', 'following a legal examination' and with 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'. The text does not use the phrases 'enemy entity' or 'laws of war'. Re-read 2026-10-12: sanctions 'to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also be placed on the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip'; taking into account 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'.

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  5. Where it leads if pressed

    When someone says 'Gaza has been occupied since 1967, nothing changed in 2005' — or 'Gaza hasn't been occupied since 2005' — what are they actually claiming?

    A legal status

    Then the answer is in between: occupation law applied partly after 2005, in proportion to Israel's control (ICJ 2024) — and fully again where the army holds ground since 2023.

    → Which territory?
    Who is to blame for Gaza

    Then the label is standing in for the real question. Look at the specific controls (crossings, sea, electricity) and the specific choices (Hamas's takeover and rockets) separately.

    → Proxy presented as outcome

    Working it out: three periods, three answers.

    'No occupation since 2005' is a legal claim, and its answer depends on the period and on what 'occupation' requires. 2005 to 2023: Israel withdrew its settlers and soldiers but, in its own disengagement plan, would 'guard and monitor the external land perimeter', keep 'exclusive authority in Gaza air space' and act at sea. The ICRC holds that this is effective control, so Gaza stayed occupied; the International Court of Justice in 2024 said Israel's obligations 'remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control'. Three of its judges disagreed on this point: since 2005 Gaza was 'in a fundamentally different situation' from the West Bank, and the Court lacked evidence on whether the control was 'justified by security motives, considering … the military actions conducted by Hamas'. Israel's own Supreme Court, in 2008, held that Israel no longer had effective control, but still had obligations arising from its control of the crossings and Gaza's dependence on Israeli electricity. So for these years, 'occupied' is the majority legal view, not a settled verdict, and 'no obligations at all' is the view the record supports least. Since the 2023 war: Israeli forces have been inside Gaza; under the October 2025 ceasefire they withdrew to a line enclosing 'roughly 53% of Gaza', and by aid groups' maps of April 2026 about 64%. For territory under direct Israeli military control, the 2005 argument no longer applies at all. The worst case for each side. For 'there has been no occupation': take the three judges at their strongest; they still described continued Israeli control of airspace, sea and borders, and Israel's own court found obligations remained; Israel's own cabinet decided in September 2007, after Hamas's takeover, to 'restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and 'the movement of people', powers only a party with that control can use; and since 2023 Israeli troops have held much of the territory. For 'Gaza was simply occupied all along': take the ICRC at its strongest; the withdrawal was real, Hamas governed inside, judges of the world court thought the question unsettled for 2005–2023, and Palestinians themselves saw the withdrawal as a real change: on its eve, 84% called it a 'victory for armed resistance' (PSR poll, 2005). Holds on the evidence here: Israel kept control of Gaza's borders, sea and airspace after 2005 and holds much of its territory now. Arguable, for 2005–2023: either legal label, as the judges' split shows. Not supported: that Israel had no obligations to Gaza after 2005, or that the 2005 withdrawal changed nothing.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

    Open source ↗

    law / courtICRC: What does the law say about the responsibilities of the Occupying Power in the occupied Palestinian territory? finding ✓

    Read: Gaza remains occupied because Israel 'still exercises effective control … notably through key elements of authority … including over its borders (airspace, sea and land – at the exception of the border with Egypt)'; also 'The disputed status of a territory does not prevent the applicability of the law of occupation.' Re-read 2026-10-12, full sentence: 'The ICRC considers Gaza to remain occupied territory on the basis that Israel still exercises effective control over the Strip, notably through key elements of authority over the strip, including over its borders (airspace, sea and land – at the exception of the border with Egypt).'

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    law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓

    19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'

    Open source ↗

    law / courtJoint opinion of Judges Tomka, Abraham and Aurescu, ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (19 July 2024), UNISPAL copy (2024) ✓

    Read 2026-10-01; icj-cij.org bot-walled, link taken from UNISPAL's advisory-opinion page. Para. 13: the Court 'should have limited its Opinion to the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and should not have included the Gaza Strip'. Para. 15: 'since 2005 the Gaza Strip has been in a fundamentally different situation than that of the West Bank. In 2005, Israel withdrew from the territory of the Gaza Strip and dismantled the settlements which it had established, while maintaining the control over the airspace and maritime zones, and land borders.' Para. 16: 'The Court did not have evidence before it which would allow it to assert whether and to which extent the control Israel continued exercising over the Gaza Strip after the 2005 withdrawal was justified by security motives, considering, in particular, the military actions conducted by Hamas directed at Israeli territory, even before 7 October 2023.' Para. 17: the Court 'should have concluded that it was unable to properly pronounce itself on the situation in Gaza prior to 7 October 2023'. Para. 29: the Opinion 'does not refer to any element that would demonstrate the existence of an intent or policy aiming to annex the Gaza Strip'. Other half, in the same opinion (para. 3): 'a large number of Israel's policies and practices in the territories it occupies since 1967 are in breach of its obligations under international law', and 'we can endorse most of the observations presented in section IV of the Opinion', including that West Bank settlement is contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

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    law / courtHCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister (Supreme Court of Israel) (2008) ✓

    Judgment of 30 January 2008 (English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), para. 12; checked against the text. Re-read 2026-10-12, para. 12: Israel 'does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the laws of belligerent occupation'; its main obligations 'derive from the state of armed conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization', and also 'from the degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossings', the Strip being 'almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel'. Also para. 12: 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.

    Open source ↗

    pressCNN, 'Gaza risks becoming permanently divided, top official warns' (Tal Shalev, 14 May 2026) (2026) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 'Under the October 2025 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, Israeli forces withdrew to a demarcation line known as the “yellow line” which encompassed roughly 53% of Gaza.' Aid groups say the Israeli military gave them 'last month' (April 2026) a new map marking an 'orange line', 'which shows Israel now controlling about 64% of the territory'; CNN asked the Israeli military for comment. Nickolay Mladenov (Board of Peace) warned of the yellow line solidifying 'into a fence or wall, a permanent separation in Gaza'.

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    primary documentIsraeli Security Cabinet decision declaring the Gaza Strip 'hostile territory' (19 September 2007) (2007) incident ✓

    Israeli Foreign Ministry press release ('Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser'), 19 September 2007, read on UNISPAL (labelled there a non-UN document) on 29 Sept 2026. 'In today's unanimous decision, it was determined: Hamas is a terrorist organization that has taken control of the Gaza Strip and turned it into hostile territory.' Sanctions to 'restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and to restrict 'the movement of people', 'following a legal examination' and with 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'. The text does not use the phrases 'enemy entity' or 'laws of war'. Re-read 2026-10-12: sanctions 'to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also be placed on the movement of people to and from the Gaza Strip'; taking into account 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'.

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    dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 'Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (17)' (7–9 September 2005) (2005) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. Ramallah-based polling centre; director Khalil Shikaki. On the eve of the Gaza withdrawal: 84% ‘view Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance’ (up from 72% in June); 40% give Hamas most of the credit, 21% the PA, 11% Fateh; but 62% oppose (35% support) continued armed attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal, and 60% support collecting arms from armed factions. PSR's reading: ‘the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting dynamics’ — ‘a greater appreciation of the role of violence’ and ‘a greater optimism about the future’. Fateh led Hamas 47% to 30%.

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    The legal label is a proxy for a real question — what does Israel owe Gaza, and what would a withdrawal that works look like?

    If 'not occupied' means Israel owes Gaza nothing, the argument runs into its own court and the ICJ: whoever controls the crossings, the sea and the electricity has obligations for what passes through them. If 'still occupied' means nothing changed in 2005, the mirror argument ignores the settlers who were removed and the Hamas government that took over. The useful question for both sides is the one the 2005 experiment raised: how can a withdrawal leave both security for Israel and a working, accountable government in Gaza? Solutions on this site that involve a withdrawal have to answer it.

    Traps here:◆ Proxy presented as outcome

    law / courtHCJ 9132/07 Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister (Supreme Court of Israel) (2008) ✓

    Judgment of 30 January 2008 (English translation, Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project), para. 12; checked against the text. Re-read 2026-10-12, para. 12: Israel 'does not have a general duty to ensure the welfare of the residents of the Gaza Strip or to maintain public order in the Gaza Strip according to the laws of belligerent occupation'; its main obligations 'derive from the state of armed conflict that exists between it and the Hamas organization', and also 'from the degree of control exercised by the State of Israel over the border crossings', the Strip being 'almost completely dependent upon the supply of electricity from Israel'. Also para. 12: 'since September 2005 Israel no longer has effective control over what happens in the Gaza Strip'.

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    law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓

    19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'

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    primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) incident ✓

    Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.

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The usual reply — and its own traps

Arguments travel in pairs. Here is what the other side typically answers. Check whether both lean on the same trick.

heard from pro-Palestinian voices“Israel is an apartheid state.” Both lean on: ◆ Motte and bailey

Where this argument points

This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions — for, against or around them:

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