Theme

“"Mowing the grass": how the status quo was kept”

Israeli strategists called the recurring Gaza rounds 'mowing the grass': no solution in sight, so degrade the enemy now and then and buy quiet. Palestinians hear the same phrase as the name of a cycle of punishment. Both describe the same years.

Where it's been said

“Against an implacable, well-entrenched, non-state enemy like the Hamas, Israel simply needs to “mow the grass” once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities.”
Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, BESA Center (Bar-Ilan University) strategists — BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 255, 2014-07-20 ✓
“Indeed, the Israeli regime’s military tactic of “mowing the grass” is well established.”
Yara Hawari, Al-Shabaka podcast host — Al-Shabaka, Rethinking Palestine podcast, 2022-08 ✓

Heard two ways

'Mowing the grass'

  • The milder meaning: Routine upkeep, as the metaphor suggests: a periodic, limited operation to 'degrade enemy capabilities' and win 'a period of quiet' (BESA, 2014).
  • The harder meaning: In its authors' own words, 'a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities', with 'no solution in sight' (BESA, 2014). Critics call it 'the Israeli regime's military tactic' in a violence that 'is cyclical' (Al-Shabaka, 2022).

Both meanings are sourced below. Neither is assumed for any given speaker; ask which one is meant. See one word, two meanings.

  1. Why people find it convincing

    • The phrase comes from Israeli strategic writing itself. In 2014 two BESA Center scholars wrote that Israel 'simply needs to "mow the grass" once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities'.
    • One of its two authors, Eitan Shamir, later wrote (October 2023) that their article had 'explained the Israeli rationale behind various rounds of conflict in Gaza': regular rounds against a conflict 'which had no foreseeable resolution and had to be managed'.
    • After October 7, 2023, one of the two authors wrote that the strategy had ended: 'Israeli deterrence completely collapsed.'
  2. The picture

    What its authors meant.

    Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir of the BESA Center (Bar-Ilan University) described the logic in July 2014, during the Gaza war. It assumes 'a protracted intractable conflict': Israel cannot 'purge Hamas from Palestinian society, nor is a political solution likely to be achieved'. Force is therefore 'not intended to attain impossible political goals'. It is 'a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities'. After a period of restraint, Israel strikes to degrade Hamas's capabilities, 'aiming at achieving a period of quiet'. The authors called the 'cycle of violence' a cliché and said 'there is no solution in sight'. They contrasted this with 'solution-oriented' Western thinking. What is true here: this was an honest statement that the rounds were not meant to end the conflict, only to manage it. That is what the status-quo card calls 'accepting recurring wars as the price'.

    Traps here:◆ Which name?

    advocacy / viewEfraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, 'Mowing the Grass in Gaza', BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 255, 20 July 2014 (2014) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). The strategy stated by its authors: 'protracted intractable conflict'; 'nor is a political solution likely to be achieved'; 'a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities'; 'aiming at achieving a period of quiet'; 'there is no solution in sight'; 'Israel simply needs to "mow the grass" once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities'. Cites over 1,500 rockets in 10 days and Hamas's rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire proposal. The longer journal version: Inbar & Shamir, 'Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict', Journal of Strategic Studies (2014). Re-read 2026-10-12: 'It is unlikely that Israel can purge Hamas from Palestinian society, nor is a political solution likely to be achieved'; 'The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but rather is a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities.' Re-read 2026-10-13: 'Those who forlornly ask “when is this going to end?” and use the cliché “cycle of violence,” have psychological difficulties digesting the facts that there is no solution in sight …'.

    Open source ↗

    How Palestinians hear it.

    In Palestinian writing the phrase is used as evidence against the policy. In an August 2022 Al-Shabaka podcast, recorded after Israel's strikes on Islamic Jihad in Gaza, host Yara Hawari called the violence 'cyclical' and 'the Israeli regime's military tactic of "mowing the grass"' 'well established'. She set it against '15 years of a crippling siege'. Her guest, Ibrahim Fraihat of the Doha Institute, called the bombing 'unprovoked'. He noted that Israel called it a preemptive strike tied to the arrest of an Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin, and that such a claim 'can't be verified'. What is true here: the strategy's own authors say the rounds do not aim at a political end. For the people living in Gaza, that means a war every few years with no horizon, whatever each round's trigger.

    Traps here:◆ Where does the story start?

    advocacy / viewAl-Shabaka, Rethinking Palestine podcast, 'From Jenin to Gaza to Nablus: Palestinian Resistance Under Attack' (Yara Hawari with Ibrahim Fraihat), August 2022 (2022) incident ✓

    Read (transcript, 2026-09-28). Hawari: violence in Gaza 'is cyclical. Indeed, the Israeli regime's military tactic of "mowing the grass" is well established'; '15 years of a crippling siege'. Fraihat: the bombing 'unprovoked'; Israel's stated reason a preemptive strike tied to the arrest of an Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin, which 'can't be verified'.

    Open source ↗

    What both readings leave out.

    The Israeli reading leaves out what the 'period of quiet' was like for Gazans: the closure went on between rounds (Hawari's '15 years of a crippling siege'). The Palestinian reading leaves out what set off the rounds; for the 2014 round, the paper cites more than 1,500 rockets in ten days and a rejected Egyptian ceasefire. It also leaves out that the armed groups rebuilt in between; the paper's whole logic is to degrade them again when they do. Each side starts the clock at the other's move. Both describe the same mechanism: strike, ceasefire, rebuild, strike again. Both say it was never meant to solve anything: one side calls that realism, the other punishment.

    Traps here:◆ Where does the story start?◆ The exception as proof

    advocacy / viewEfraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, 'Mowing the Grass in Gaza', BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 255, 20 July 2014 (2014) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). The strategy stated by its authors: 'protracted intractable conflict'; 'nor is a political solution likely to be achieved'; 'a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities'; 'aiming at achieving a period of quiet'; 'there is no solution in sight'; 'Israel simply needs to "mow the grass" once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities'. Cites over 1,500 rockets in 10 days and Hamas's rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire proposal. The longer journal version: Inbar & Shamir, 'Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict', Journal of Strategic Studies (2014). Re-read 2026-10-12: 'It is unlikely that Israel can purge Hamas from Palestinian society, nor is a political solution likely to be achieved'; 'The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but rather is a long-term strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities.' Re-read 2026-10-13: 'Those who forlornly ask “when is this going to end?” and use the cliché “cycle of violence,” have psychological difficulties digesting the facts that there is no solution in sight …'.

    Open source ↗

    advocacy / viewAl-Shabaka, Rethinking Palestine podcast, 'From Jenin to Gaza to Nablus: Palestinian Resistance Under Attack' (Yara Hawari with Ibrahim Fraihat), August 2022 (2022) incident ✓

    Read (transcript, 2026-09-28). Hawari: violence in Gaza 'is cyclical. Indeed, the Israeli regime's military tactic of "mowing the grass" is well established'; '15 years of a crippling siege'. Fraihat: the bombing 'unprovoked'; Israel's stated reason a preemptive strike tied to the arrest of an Islamic Jihad leader in Jenin, which 'can't be verified'.

    Open source ↗

    Where it led.

    In October 2023 Eitan Shamir, one of the two authors, wrote that 'Israeli deterrence completely collapsed' on October 7 and that the day marked 'a significant departure from the "Mowing the Grass" strategy'. Israel, he argued, must now 'dismantle the Hamas regime in Gaza'. Deterrence, he added, remained 'the most central and fundamental principle'. In short, by one of its authors' own account, the deterrence the strategy relied on collapsed on October 7, and he concluded that managing the conflict was no longer enough. Others, including Thomas Friedman whom he quotes, drew the opposite conclusion: Hamas cannot be uprooted by force either. This is the loop the builder shows as 'If nothing changes': the status quo slides into a shattered calm and then permanent war. The two authors disagree with the Palestinian reading on much, but they agree on this: the rounds were never a solution.

    Traps here:◆ What happened next?

    advocacy / viewEitan Shamir, 'The End of Mowing the Grass: If Israel Wants to Continue to Exist, It Must Uproot Hamas from Gaza', BESA Center, October 2023 (2023) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 'On October 7, 2023, Israeli deterrence completely collapsed'; October 7 marks 'a significant departure from the "Mowing the Grass" strategy'; Israel must 'dismantle the Hamas regime in Gaza'; deterrence remains 'the most central and fundamental principle'. Answers Thomas Friedman (NYT, 16 Oct 2023), who argued Hamas cannot be completely uprooted. Re-read 2026-10-12: by Eitan Shamir alone (22 October 2023): 'A decade ago, in 2013, I published an article with Professor Ephraim Inbar entitled "Mowing the Grass." In it, we explained the Israeli rationale behind various rounds of conflict in Gaza'; regular rounds 'provided a sufficient course of action at that stage of the ongoing conflict, which had no foreseeable resolution and had to be managed'.

    Open source ↗

    Reading the numbers: the scale of a 'round', and of what came after.

    The strategy assumed limited rounds. The figures show what a round cost and how far the war after October 7 departed from it. The 2014 round lasted 50 days. The UN commission counted 2,251 Palestinians killed, 1,462 of them civilians (about 65%), on UN data; Israel's own report counted about 2,125, of whom 'at least 44 percent' had been 'positively identified' as militants, which would put civilians at no more than 56% on its count. In Israel, six civilians and 67 soldiers were killed. That is about 45 Palestinians killed a day, on either count (this page's arithmetic). Over the whole period from January 2000 to September 2023, Hamas's own document gives 11,299 Palestinians killed by Israel, about 476 a year on average. The war after October 7: a household survey estimates 75,200 violent deaths (63,600–86,800) from 7 October 2023 to 5 January 2025, 456 days, about 165 a day (140 to 190 at the bounds), roughly three and a half times the daily rate of 2014 and about 33 times its total (this page's arithmetic). The worst case for each side. For 'mowing the grass was a gentle policy': take Israel's own 2014 count; even on it, at least about 1,000 of the dead were not identified as militants in a 50-day round, and the closure continued between rounds. For 'the current war is just another round': take the survey's lowest bound; 140 deaths a day for over a year is about three times 2014's daily rate and many times its total, which is why the strategy's own author called October 7 'a significant departure'. Holds on the evidence here: the rounds were deadly and recurrent; the war after October 7 was of a different order in both rate and total. Open, needs consistent definitions across counts: a like-for-like civilian share for each round. Not supported: that the post-October 7 war was a continuation of the same strategy, or that the earlier rounds cost little.

    What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable …) mean

    primary documentUN Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict, report A/HRC/29/52 (June 2015), UNISPAL (2015) aggregate ✓

    Read: para. 20 (2,251 killed incl. 1,462 civilians, OCHA Protection Cluster data of 31 May 2015; the counts of the UN, Israel, the State of Palestine and NGOs 'differ'); para. 21 (six civilians and 67 soldiers killed in Israel). Re-read 2026-10-13 on UNISPAL, para. 20: 'While the casualty figures gathered by the United Nations, Israel, the State of Palestine and non-governmental organizations differ, regardless of the exact proportion of civilians to combatants …'.

    Open source ↗

    pressDefense News, 'Israel Preempts UN Inquiry With Detailed Account of 2014 Gaza War' (14 June 2015), on Israel's report 'The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects' (May 2015) aggregate ✓

    Read 2026-10-02. 'of the approximately 2,125 Palestinians killed during the 50-day war, at least 44 percent "have been positively identified as Hamas militants or militants or other terrorist organizations."'; the report's 'measures Israel took to reduce death and injury to Gazan civilians' and its claim that Hamas exploited its civilian population are Israel's own case, as the article presents it. The Israeli report itself was not read here (the copy found was a repost on GlobalSecurity.org, not used).

    Open source ↗

    primary documentHamas Media Office, 'Our Narrative… Operation Al-Aqsa Flood' (21 January 2024), PDF via Palestine Chronicle (2024) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 'targeted the Israeli military sites, and sought to arrest the enemy's soldiers to pressure on the Israeli authorities to release the thousands of Palestinians held in Israeli jails'; 'between January 2000 and September 2023, the Israeli occupation killed 11,299 Palestinians … the great majority of them were civilians'; fighters 'only targeted the occupation soldiers and those who carried weapons'; 'if there was any case of targeting civilians; it happened accidently'; 'Maybe some faults happened … due to the rapid collapse of the Israeli security and military system'. Re-read 2026-09-30, 'Why Operation Al-Aqsa Flood?', point 7: 'The Israeli Judaization plans to the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, its temporal and spatial division attempts, as well as the intensification of the Israeli settlers' incursions into the holy mosque' (first in its list).

    Open source ↗

    data'Violent and non-violent death tolls for the Gaza conflict: new primary evidence from a population-representative field survey', The Lancet Global Health (2026) (2026) aggregate ✓

    Spagat, Pedersen, Shikaki, Robbins, Bendavid, Hegre, Guha-Sapir, The Lancet Global Health 14 (April 2026). Read in full: 2,000 households, 30 Dec 2024 – 5 Jan 2025; 75,200 (63,600–86,800) violent deaths; 56.2% women, children, over-64s; 12,200 missing; 16,300 non-violent deaths, 8,540 excess; MoH 34.7% below the central estimate. Abstract re-read via OpenAlex 2026-10-12: 'The MoH figure for this period (49 090 violent deaths) was 34·7% below our central estimate'; 'violent deaths have substantially exceeded official figures whereas the demographic composition of casualties aligns with MoH reporting. Non-violent excess deaths, although substantial, are lower than some projections have suggested.' From the abstract: women, children and over-64s were '56·2% (95% CI 50·4-61·9) of violent deaths, totalling 42 200 deaths (95% CI 33 100-51 300)'. The age-and-sex figures used on counting-the-dead (32,900 men and 16,600 women aged 18–64 killed; 8,470 of the 12,200 missing being men of that age) come from the earlier full reading; the full text is walled today (2026-10-12) and they are not re-checked.

    Open source ↗

    advocacy / viewEitan Shamir, 'The End of Mowing the Grass: If Israel Wants to Continue to Exist, It Must Uproot Hamas from Gaza', BESA Center, October 2023 (2023) incident ✓

    Read (2026-09-28). 'On October 7, 2023, Israeli deterrence completely collapsed'; October 7 marks 'a significant departure from the "Mowing the Grass" strategy'; Israel must 'dismantle the Hamas regime in Gaza'; deterrence remains 'the most central and fundamental principle'. Answers Thomas Friedman (NYT, 16 Oct 2023), who argued Hamas cannot be completely uprooted. Re-read 2026-10-12: by Eitan Shamir alone (22 October 2023): 'A decade ago, in 2013, I published an article with Professor Ephraim Inbar entitled "Mowing the Grass." In it, we explained the Israeli rationale behind various rounds of conflict in Gaza'; regular rounds 'provided a sufficient course of action at that stage of the ongoing conflict, which had no foreseeable resolution and had to be managed'.

    Open source ↗

Where this argument points

This argument comes up in the debate about these solutions — for, against or around them:

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