Managing the conflict (the status quo)
No final settlement: occupation of the West Bank, separation from Gaza, periodic rounds of war.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Israelis keep full control and bear recurring war, terror and international isolation.
What happens to Palestinians
No state, no vote over the power that rules them; periodic war.
What it requires
- Indefinite military rule over millions of West Bank Palestinians
- Containment of Gaza
- Accepting recurring wars as the price
Who supports it
Before October 7 its logic was stated openly: two BESA Center researchers wrote in July 2014 that Israel could neither 'purge Hamas from Palestinian society' nor expect a political solution, so force was 'a long-term strategy of attrition' aiming at 'a period of quiet' (Inbar and Shamir; see 'Mowing the grass'), and in 2023 one of them wrote of 'The End of Mowing the Grass'. When the joint Palestinian-Israeli Pulse (PCPSR with Tel Aviv University, December 2022) asked what should happen next, choosing one of four options, only 13% of Israeli Jews, 8% of Palestinians and 7% of Arab citizens of Israel chose "maintain the status quo". More chose "reach a peace agreement" (30% of Israeli Jews, 31% of Palestinians, 58% of Arab citizens); the largest Palestinian choice was "waging an armed struggle" (40%), and 26% of Israeli Jews chose "waging a definitive war against the Palestinians" (PCPSR's joint-poll summary, read). The figures are answers to a one-of-four choice, not support or opposition, so they are not comparable with the support figures on other cards. Since the October 2025 ceasefire the status quo in Gaza has taken a new shape: the Israeli army holds more than half the Strip, roughly 53% behind the 'yellow line' and about 64% on an April 2026 'orange line' map given to aid groups. In May 2026 the Board of Peace's director-general, Nickolay Mladenov, warned that failure to advance the ceasefire agreement would lead to 'a dangerous status quo' leaving two million Gazans without a viable future: 'A status quo should not be an option to anyone' (CNN, 14 May 2026; see 'The Gaza plan: Board of Peace and a technocratic Gaza (2025)').
What history says
- The years 2007β2023 β which ended in October 7 and the war in Gaza
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
An interim that lasts β possible on the record
while the quiet holds (Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check)
No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places β more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints β and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.
- The Oslo interim arrangements (1994β2000) β lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
- 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s β lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.
Managed calm that is shattered β possible on the record
when it doesn't β as in 2007β2023, which ended on October 7 (not: Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check)
The quiet bought with permits and money holds until an attack ends it; the approach is discredited on both sides.
- The period before October 7 2023 β collapsed. Expanded work permits for Gazans were part of an effort to keep Hamas quiet (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: War, and less appetite on both sides for any gradual approach.
Permanent war β possible on the record
if no side can impose or settle, rounds of war continue (not: Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; not: Hamas would keep a long-term truce)
No side wins or leaves; rounds of war separated by armed quiet; each generation inherits the dead of the last.
- IsraelβHamas wars in Gaza (2008β2021) β repeated. Ceasefires each followed by a rebuilt arsenal and another war (see 'Hudna: a long-term truce without recognition'). Read from the other side, it was a round of strikes every few years under a closure that stayed in place between them. Both readings describe the same years (see 'Mowing the grass').
What it can slide into: Whatever the next atrocity makes thinkable.
The hard questions
- What does this offer Palestinians β and why would they accept it?
- How long can a democracy rule millions who can't vote for it?