Solutions

A Middle East union: solving it inside a regional framework

Israel and a Palestinian state, alongside their neighbours, join an EU-style regional framework, with open trade, shared infrastructure, security guarantees and eventually freedom of movement, so that borders matter less and the conflict is settled as part of a regional bargain.

Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Israel accepted as a normal part of the region, with its security embedded in alliances, and a market of hundreds of millions; but open borders raise demographic fears (see 'Jews can only be safe as a majority in their own state.').

What happens to Palestinians

A state that isn't a small enclave but part of a large open economy, with the Arab world's weight behind the settlement; but the risk that normalisation happens without them (whether the Abraham Accords did that is argued on 'The Arab world loves Palestine in words and abandons Palestinians in deeds.'; named critics are not yet sourced here ⚠).

What it requires

  • A two-state or confederal settlement as the entry ticket
  • Arab states offering normal relations in return, as the Arab Peace Initiative did in 2002
  • Regional security arrangements that also contain Iran and its allies
  • Decades of economic integration before political union, as in Europe

Who supports it

The Arab Peace Initiative (Beirut, 28 March 2002) offered to 'Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace' in exchange for 'Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines', a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and 'a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194'; it also rejected 'all forms of Palestinian patriation' that conflict with host countries' circumstances (official translation, UNSCO copy). No Israeli government formally accepted it: in 2016 Netanyahu said he accepted its 'general idea', then rejected it as a basis for talks unless it was altered to reflect Israel's demands, adding that if it was 'take it or leave it', Israel would leave it; in 2013 the Arab League had clarified that land swaps could modify the 1967 lines (as summarised by Mitchell Plitnick, LobeLog, 14 June 2016, a critic of Netanyahu's policy). Shimon Peres's book The New Middle East (Henry Holt, 1993, with Arye Naor), written after the Oslo accord, set out a vision of regional economic revival and integration (per its publisher's description and library subject headings). The Abraham Accords (2020) and the planned India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor are partial steps toward regional integration. The corridor's memorandum was signed on 9 September 2023, four weeks before October 7, by Saudi Arabia, the EU, India, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy and the United States, to bring 'economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe'; the memorandum names Israel and Jordan among the countries that goods would 'transit to, from, and between', but neither signed it (memorandum text, White House archive; checked against the American Presidency Project's copy). Whether any government advocates political union is not yet sourced here ⚠.

What history says

  • The European Coal and Steel Community (1951): former enemies bound together by shared industry (not yet sourced here ⚠)
  • The Gulf Cooperation Council, a regional bloc of Arab monarchies (not yet sourced here ⚠)
  • The Abraham Accords' trade and tourism links (not yet sourced here ⚠)

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

A region bound by shared interests — possible on the record

if Arab states commit and the region's spoilers can be kept out (Arab states would pay for and guarantee a deal, not only recognise it; Iran and its allies could be kept from wrecking a deal)

Trade, energy, water and tourism tie the region's states together; the conflict is managed inside the bloc rather than by it alone.

  • The European Coal and Steel Community (1951) — held. Former enemies bound together by shared industry (see 'A Middle East union: solving it inside a regional framework').
  • The Abraham Accords' trade and tourism links — partly. Regional ties that went ahead without the Palestinian part, with thin public backing: by March 2022 positive views of the Accords 'hover between 19% to 25%' in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE (Washington Institute polls; see 'Cold peace').

What it can slide into: If it works around the Palestinians rather than with them: an interim that lasts, or a spoiler's attack.

An interim that lasts — possible on the record

if governments integrate around the conflict, leaving it unsolved (Arab states would pay for and guarantee a deal, not only recognise it; not: A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims)

No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places — more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints — and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.

  • The Oslo interim arrangements (1994–2000) — lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
  • 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s — lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').

What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.

Managed calm that is shattered — possible on the record

if spoilers strike to stop the integration (not: Iran and its allies could be kept from wrecking a deal)

The quiet bought with permits and money holds until an attack ends it; the approach is discredited on both sides.

What it can slide into: War, and less appetite on both sides for any gradual approach.

The hard questions

  • Would regional integration settle the conflict, or let governments work around it? (President Biden told donors on 20 October 2023 that Hamas attacked in part to disrupt Israel–Saudi normalisation, knowing he was 'about to sit down with the Saudis'; a month earlier Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had said resolving the Palestinian issue would be crucial to it — Al Jazeera, 21 October 2023.)
  • Can Europe's post-war path be repeated where the wars aren't over?
  • Who would enforce security inside a union that includes enemies of each other?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here