United Arabia: dissolving the conflict into a larger federation
A thought experiment: the whole region, Israel and Palestine included, joins one large federation of autonomous states, so that the question of who owns the land between the river and the sea stops being about sovereignty.
Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Self-rule inside a federation where they are a small minority, which, after the history of Jews in the region, the majority argument sees as the end of their safety (see 'Jews can only be safe as a majority in their own state.').
What happens to Palestinians
Belonging to a large Arab whole without the fight over borders, but without the independent state their movement has sought for a century.
What it requires
- A federation strong enough to guarantee minorities, and loose enough that its members would join
- Jews accepting minority status in a much larger, mostly Arab and Muslim union
- Arab states accepting a Jewish member state as an equal
- Institutions that have never existed in the region
Who supports it
Nobody runs on it; it's here as a thought experiment, because it shows what the other solutions are trying to secure. Pan-Arab unions have been tried. The United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria, signed in Damascus on 22 February 1958, collapsed in late September 1961, 'just eight weeks' after nationalisation laws that Al Majalla says 'helped hasten the collapse' (Al Majalla, 'The United Arab Republic: A look at Egypt and Syria's shortlived union', undated in the copy read). The rival Iraq–Jordan Federation was signed on 14 February 1958; five months later the Iraqi monarchy that signed it was overthrown, in a chain of events the agreement 'would set into motion' when Iraqi units were ordered toward Jordan (Raymond Pierre Hylton, 'Iraq's Monarchy Is Toppled', EBSCO Research Starters). The idea is older than the conflict: the Sykes–Picot agreement of 1916 already provided for 'an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States' in the region (text as reproduced in the UN study 'The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem'); proposals to fit Palestine, with its Jews, inside such a federation came later. In 1941 Judah Magnes, president of the Hebrew University, urged 'a bi-national Palestine as an autonomous unit within a larger Arab federation', though 'neither the Jewish nor Arab leaders seem inclined' to take it up (JTA, 22 July 1941). In 1947 his Ihud association (by its own description 'not a political party … a group') still wanted 'the bi-national Palestine to be a member of this Regional Union' of Arab states (Ihud, Arab-Jewish Unity, 1947).
What history says
- The United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria, 1958–61)
- The Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan, 1958)
- The Ottoman Empire itself: a multi-ethnic polity in which Jews and Arabs were both subjects
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
A union that breaks up — possible on the record
if it comes apart, as the Egypt–Syria union did in 1961 (not: A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)
Member states merge on paper; rivalries between their rulers and regions pull them apart within a few years.
- The United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria, 1958–61) — broke up. Nasser and Syria's President Shukri al-Quwatli signed the union in Damascus on 22 February 1958, and it 'lasted until 1961'. Among the strains was a July 1961 decree 'calling for nationalising all banks and factories in Syria' (Al Majalla). See 'United Arabia: dissolving the conflict into a larger federation'.
- The Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan, 1958) — broke up. Iraq's and Jordan's Hashemite 'Arab Union', recognised by the US on 28 May 1958, did not outlast the summer: 'Following a coup d'etat in Baghdad on July 14, 1958', Jordan 'announced the dissolution of the Arab Union', 'effective from the 1st of August 1958' (US State Department, Office of the Historian). See 'United Arabia: dissolving the conflict into a larger federation'.
What it can slide into: Back to separate states, with the original conflict untouched.
Cantons that hold — unlikely on the record
if it holds together — a thought experiment more than a plan (A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure; Both publics would accept one shared state)
Cities and regions govern themselves, each by its own rules, joined by a small common centre for security and trade.
- Switzerland — held. Cantons with their own languages and religions sharing a small federal centre, built after a civil war (1847) (see 'Local rule: clans, cities and cantons').
- The Gulf emirates — stable. Ruler-led emirates in a federation: the UAE's 'highest constitutional authority' is the Federal Supreme Council, which 'consists of the rulers of the seven emirates' and elects the president from among them (UAE government portal). Stable, but monarchies, not democracies.
What it can slide into: If a canton is ruled by an armed movement that rejects the arrangement: the front, or division frozen in place.
The hard questions
- If the Egypt–Syria union lasted only from 1958 to 1961, what would hold a far larger one together?
- Would a Jewish minority be safer than it was in the Arab world before 1948?
- What does the thought experiment show about what each side needs from any solution?
What stands in the way
- Each side reads the other through its worst quote — A Jewish minority inside an Arab federation would be read through every quote about Jews in Arab lands.
- Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — It dissolves the majority into a much larger Arab one, which is the fear at its fullest.