Solutions

Local rule: clans, cities and cantons

Instead of one national government per people, power lies with local communities that already govern themselves: Arab clans and cities, Jewish towns and communities, federated or coordinated above.

Check the effects of this card β†’ pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

The case for it (in all its variants): the land is not two uniform peoples but many very different local communities. On the Palestinian side, much of social and political life runs through extended families and clans (the hamula), Bedouin tribes, and strong city identities: Hebron is not Ramallah, and Nablus is not Gaza. On the Israeli side, Haredi towns, kibbutzim, settlements, Druze villages and Tel Aviv live by very different norms. National governments on both sides have struggled to rule all of them from the top. Proper local control, among people who already trust each other, may be the level at which coexistence actually works, and the national question then matters less.

What happens to Israeli Jews

Depends on the variant. In the emirates plan, Israel keeps sovereignty and much of the West Bank countryside. In the confederal variant, Jewish communities govern themselves inside a shared structure, with no Jewish state.

What happens to Palestinians

Depends on the variant. In the emirates plan, city-states under clan leadership, normalised with Israel but with no Palestinian nation-state. In the confederal variant, self-government everywhere with shared power above.

What it requires

  • Recognising local leaderships (clan councils, city governments, community bodies) as the real authorities, with a thin shared level for security, borders, water and the economy
  • Local leaders with real legitimacy among their own people, not appointed from outside
  • Security arrangements between the local units, and armed groups disarmed or folded into accountable local forces
  • Shared rules on land, residence and movement between the local units
  • Both national movements accepting that the nation-state is not the main unit of government, which each has spent a century fighting for

Who supports it

Variations: (1) Mordechai Kedar's 'Palestinian Emirates' or eight-state plan: in his words (Foreign Policy Blogs interview, March 2014), 'The eight-state solution is based on the sociology of the Middle East, which has the tribe as the major corner stone of society'; the units are Gaza ('Hamas started an emirate in Gaza, which is a full state') and the West Bank cities of Hebron, Jericho, Ramallah, Nablus, Tulkarem, Qalqilyah and Jenin, whose tribes he says 'are very different from each other'. What happens to the rural areas is not in that interview ⚠. (2) The July 2025 letter from Sheikh Wadee' al-Jaabari, for five Hebron sheikhs, to Israel's Economy Minister Nir Barkat, offering 'full recognition of Israel as a Jewish state' and an autonomous 'Emirate of Hebron' aligned with the Abraham Accords, first reported by the Wall Street Journal; per JTA (9 July 2025), the plan had been developed with Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan and Kedar, and 'some members of his family formally disowned him' in a video statement affirming the clan's commitment to 'Islamic and national principles'. Official Hamas or PA statements on it are not sourced here ⚠. (3) Israeli attempts since 2024 to work through Gaza clans and local armed groups instead of Hamas or the PA. (4) Democratic confederalism ('Apoism'), from Abdullah Γ–calan's writings and practised in Rojava: communes and co-chaired councils of every community, federated from below. Γ–calan founded the PKK (listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the EU and the US), which on 12 May 2025 'officially announced its decision to lay down its arms and dissolve its organisations', after Γ–calan called on it in late February to disband (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, June 2025). No major Israeli or Palestinian party currently runs on any variant.

What history says

  • Israel's 'Village Leagues' (1978 to the mid-1980s): governing the West Bank through rural notables, rejected as collaboration, and abandoned
  • Rojava, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (from 2012–14): co-chaired multi-ethnic councils, praised for women's participation and local pluralism, criticised for one-party dominance and for forced displacement documented by Amnesty International (2015). In March 2025 it agreed to integrate into the new Syrian state.
  • The Gulf emirates: stable, clan-based city-states, but monarchies, not democracies
  • Switzerland: cantons with their own languages and religions sharing a small federal centre, built after a civil war (1847)
  • Bosnia after Dayton (1995): ethnic cantons that froze the division

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

Cantons that hold β€” unlikely on the record

if local leaders are legitimate and the common centre holds (Local leaders would be seen as legitimate, not installed from outside; A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

Cities and regions govern themselves, each by its own rules, joined by a small common centre for security and trade.

  • Switzerland β€” held. Cantons with their own languages and religions sharing a small federal centre, built after a civil war (1847) (see 'Local rule: clans, cities and cantons').
  • The Gulf emirates β€” stable. Ruler-led emirates in a federation: the UAE's 'highest constitutional authority' is the Federal Supreme Council, which 'consists of the rulers of the seven emirates' and elects the president from among them (UAE government portal). Stable, but monarchies, not democracies.

What it can slide into: If a canton is ruled by an armed movement that rejects the arrangement: the front, or division frozen in place.

An outside administration that loses legitimacy β€” likely on the record

if local rule is seen as installed from outside, as the Village Leagues were (not: Local leaders would be seen as legitimate, not installed from outside)

The appointed authority governs, but the population treats it as occupation by other means; armed groups recruit on that.

What it can slide into: Insurgency, or a hasty handover to whoever is strongest.

A shared state that breaks down β€” unlikely on the record

if the units are legitimate but the centre does not hold (the Bosnia pattern) (Local leaders would be seen as legitimate, not installed from outside; not: A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

The institutions deadlock along national lines; each community arms or turns to outside patrons; the state survives on paper or not at all.

  • Lebanon β€” collapsed. A confessional power-sharing state that fell into civil war (1975–90). The 1989 Taif Agreement, which 'brought a formal end to the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990)', revised the shares, moving parliamentary seats from a '55:45 Christian-Muslim ratio' to 'an even 50:50', under Syrian supervision. A Conciliation Resources analysis argues it 'exacerbated confessional tension and competition' in practice.
  • Bosnia after Dayton (1995) β€” froze. Initialed at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December, it kept one state made of 'two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska', with a demarcated boundary between them (the agreement's text, Office of the High Representative). That two-entity structure is still in place.

What it can slide into: Civil war, partition, or one group ruling the other.

The hard questions

  • Is it local rule from below, or divide-and-rule from above? Michael Milstein, a former senior IDF intelligence officer, called the Hebron plan a 'divide and conquer' approach that would erode the idea of statehood: 'no one in the Palestinian arena buys into this'; Hebron activist Issa Amro called the report a 'dangerous fabrication' (both in JTA, July 2025). Comparisons to the Village Leagues and Bantustans are not sourced here ⚠. What makes a local leadership legitimate rather than installed?
  • Who guarantees security between the units when one of them is ruled by an armed movement that rejects the whole arrangement?
  • Clan rule can entrench elders, patriarchs and armed families rather than democracy. Who protects women, dissidents and minorities inside a unit?
  • Local autonomy cuts both ways. Israel's Haredi communities already largely govern themselves, with their own schools, rabbinical authority and, by law until June 2023, draft deferment for yeshiva students; on 25 June 2024 a unanimous nine-judge Supreme Court ruled that, since the deferment law expired on 30 June 2023, 'the current legal situation does not allow an exemption from the draft for yeshiva students' (Israel Democracy Institute summary). Is the Jewish side's own test of local rule any easier?
  • What happens in the countryside between the cities, where the settlements and most of the land are?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here