Solutions

The original Mandate: a confederation on both banks of the Jordan

Go back to the map before 1922, when the Mandate for Palestine still included Transjordan: a confederation of Israel, a Palestinian state and Jordan across both banks of the river, in which Jews are a minority of the whole but keep their own state, army and immigration, and Palestinians gain room, a state and a shared economy.

Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

A state and an army of their own, which is what safety requires, without having to be a majority of the whole land or rule over Palestinians. The bet is that safety comes from the power to defend yourself, not from numbers (see 'Jews can only be safe as a majority in their own state.').

What happens to Palestinians

A state, and a much larger space to live, work and settle across both banks, with Palestinians on both banks joined in one framework (a large part of Jordan's population is of Palestinian origin; how large is not sourced here ⚠).

What it requires

  • Jordan's monarchy agreeing to share sovereignty, which King Abdullah II has publicly rejected: 'For 25 years, I have been saying no to displacement, no to resettlement, no to the alternative homeland' (February 2025, via the Royal Court as reported by Anadolu; see 'Jordan is Palestine — the Palestinians already have their state.')
  • Israel accepting that its security depends partly on confederal institutions
  • Guaranteed self-defence for each member, so that being a minority in the whole doesn't mean depending on others' goodwill
  • A solution for refugees inside the larger area, including resettlement on the east bank by choice

Who supports it

Rarely proposed today, and no government runs on it. Its historical roots: the Mandate for Palestine originally covered Transjordan, until in September 1922 the League Council approved a British memorandum declaring the national-home provisions 'not applicable to the territory known as Transjordan' (see 'Jordan is Palestine — the Palestinians already have their state.'); the Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919) imagined Jewish settlement in Palestine within a larger Arab framework, conditional on Arab independence — UNSCOP later judged it 'did not acquire validity, since the condition attached … was not fulfilled'; and in 1946 British and American officials drew up a scheme 'for two autonomous provinces in a Palestine that continued to be governed under a British High Commissioner' (the Morrison–Grady plan), which the Arab states at the London Conference (attended by neither the Palestinian Arabs nor the Jews, who had both refused the invitation) opposed in favour of 'a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority' in which Jewish citizens 'would have full civil rights, equally with all other citizens' and 'Special safeguards' for their religious and cultural rights, and the Zionist Congress in Basel rejected as 'a travesty of Britain's obligation under the Mandate' (as recounted in the UN study 'The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem', prepared for the UN's Palestinian-rights committee). The idea of Jews as a self-defending minority inside a larger whole is the opposite of the 'majority is safety' logic, which is why it's worth setting out even though almost nobody proposes it.

What history says

  • The Mandate map of 1920–22, before Transjordan was separated
  • The Faisal–Weizmann Agreement (1919)
  • Federal or confederal systems with strong member states, such as Switzerland's cantons or the United Arab Emirates

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

Cantons that hold — unlikely on the record

if Jordan joins and the confederation's institutions hold (Jordan would take responsibility for the West Bank again; A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

Cities and regions govern themselves, each by its own rules, joined by a small common centre for security and trade.

  • Switzerland — held. Cantons with their own languages and religions sharing a small federal centre, built after a civil war (1847) (see 'Local rule: clans, cities and cantons').
  • The Gulf emirates — stable. Ruler-led emirates in a federation: the UAE's 'highest constitutional authority' is the Federal Supreme Council, which 'consists of the rulers of the seven emirates' and elects the president from among them (UAE government portal). Stable, but monarchies, not democracies.

What it can slide into: If a canton is ruled by an armed movement that rejects the arrangement: the front, or division frozen in place.

An interim that lasts — likely on the record

if Jordan declines, fearing it would become the Palestinian state (not: Jordan would take responsibility for the West Bank again)

No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places — more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints — and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.

  • The Oslo interim arrangements (1994–2000) — lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
  • 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s — lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').

What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.

A shared state that breaks down — unlikely on the record

if it is tried and the member armies become each other's threat (Jordan would take responsibility for the West Bank again; not: A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

The institutions deadlock along national lines; each community arms or turns to outside patrons; the state survives on paper or not at all.

  • Lebanon — collapsed. A confessional power-sharing state that fell into civil war (1975–90). The 1989 Taif Agreement, which 'brought a formal end to the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990)', revised the shares, moving parliamentary seats from a '55:45 Christian-Muslim ratio' to 'an even 50:50', under Syrian supervision. A Conciliation Resources analysis argues it 'exacerbated confessional tension and competition' in practice.
  • Bosnia after Dayton (1995) — froze. Initialed at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December, it kept one state made of 'two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska', with a demarcated boundary between them (the agreement's text, Office of the High Representative). That two-entity structure is still in place.

What it can slide into: Civil war, partition, or one group ruling the other.

The hard questions

  • Would Jordan's king, and Jordanians, accept it, given their fear of being turned into the Palestinian state?
  • Can a minority with its own army be safe inside a larger union, or would each army become the other's threat?
  • Does it answer the 'from the river to the sea' slogans by making the river matter less, or give both sides more to fight over?

What stands in the way

  • Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — The whole point is a Jewish minority with its own defence; it asks Israelis to drop the majority logic and Palestinians to give up return to Israel proper.
  • Distrust as premise — A confederation with separate armies can make each army the other's threat.

Arguments that point here