The Trump plan: 'Peace to Prosperity' (2020)
A demilitarised Palestinian state on most of the West Bank, plus Gaza and land swaps; Israel annexes the settlements and the Jordan Valley, with 'the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years'.
Check the effects of this card β pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Israel keeps all settlements and the Jordan Valley, and gains recognition and security control. Settlers stay where they are.
What happens to Palestinians
A state on most of the West Bank and Gaza, but in non-contiguous pieces linked by roads and tunnels, demilitarised and with Israeli security control. No return to Israel. The capital is outside Jerusalem's historic core.
What it requires
- Israel annexing all settlements and most of the Jordan Valley, as enclaves inside and around a Palestinian state; the plan's map incorporates 'Approximately 97% of Israelis in the West Bank' into contiguous Israeli territory (critics' figure of about 30% of the West Bank is not sourced here β )
- A Palestinian state on the rest plus Gaza, 'fully demilitarized', with Israel in charge of overall security and borders; the plan says land swaps give it 'land reasonably comparable in size to the territory of pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza' and put 'approximately 97% of Palestinians in the West Bank' in contiguous territory (critics' estimates of 67β71% of the West Bank are not sourced here β )
- A capital in 'the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis', with Jerusalem otherwise 'an undivided city' under Israel
- 'There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel'; return to the Palestinian state, limited and subject to Israeli agreement, plus compensation
- Hamas disarmed and Gaza under a government accepting the plan
- 'the potential to facilitate more than $50 billion in new investment over ten years'
- Optionally, transferring the 'Triangle' Arab towns inside Israel to the Palestinian state, if both sides agree
Who supports it
Released 28 January 2020 with the support of Netanyahu and Gantz. The Palestinian leadership rejected it at once, and Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo 'unanimously rejected the plan', though 'some Arab countries expressed timid welcome of US efforts and three Arab countries sent their ambassadors' to the White House announcement. In PCPSR's poll of 5β8 February 2020, opposition to the package 'stood at 94% and support at 4%' (PCPSR, Poll No. 75, 11 February 2020). In August 2020 the UAEβIsrael agreement pledged full normalisation 'in return for suspending Israel's annexation plans in the West Bank' (the Abraham Accords); Palestinians noted that Netanyahu said annexation was only 'temporarily delayed' and 'still on the agenda' (Al Jazeera, 14 August 2020). Plan text: Peace to Prosperity (trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov PDF, read 2026-09-30).
What history says
- Allon Plan (1967): Israel keeps the Jordan Valley and returns the populated highlands, the plan's ancestor
- Bantustans in apartheid South Africa: the comparison its critics made, for the enclave map
- The Abraham Accords (2020): the plan's annexation was traded for normalisation, so the regional part went ahead without the Palestinian part
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
A state in enclaves β unlikely on the record
if Palestinians accept less than earlier offers and Israelis accept a state at all (A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims; A majority of Israeli Jews would accept a Palestinian state with security guarantees)
A Palestinian state in separate areas linked by roads and tunnels, surrounded by Israeli territory that controls its borders, airspace and security.
- The Allon Plan (1967) β ancestor. Israel keeps the Jordan Valley and returns the populated highlands (see 'The Trump plan: 'Peace to Prosperity' (2020)').
- Bantustans in apartheid South Africa β ended in 1994. The comparison the 2020 plan's critics made for its enclave map. The UN Special Rapporteur Michael Lynk said it 'endorses the creation of a 21st century Bantustan in the Middle East', offering 'a one and half state solution' (UN News, 31 January 2020). For what the plan itself proposed, see the Trump plan on the solutions page.
What it can slide into: If the enclaves are not viable: an interim that lasts, or a front.
An interim that lasts β possible on the record
if Palestinians reject it, as in 2020: the regional part goes ahead without them (not: A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims)
No final deal; Israel's control is lighter in places β more permits, more Palestinian self-rule, fewer checkpoints β and the arrangement is renewed rather than ended.
- The Oslo interim arrangements (1994β2000) β lasted. The 1993 Declaration of Principles set 'a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement', with permanent-status talks to begin 'not later than the beginning of the third year' (Avalon Project text). The interim arrangements have outlasted that schedule (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
- 'Economic peace' policies of the 2000s and 2010s β lasted. Permits and investment as the track that moves. Its best-known proponent framed it as a step: 'An economic peace is not a substitute for a political peace, but an important element to achieving it' (Netanyahu at Bar-Ilan, 2009, Al Jazeera full text). In the outcome this card describes, the economic track is the only one that moves (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal').
What it can slide into: Either steps toward a settlement, or an occupation made easier to keep.
The hard questions
- Can a state be sovereign if another state controls its borders, airspace and security, and surrounds its enclaves?
- Why would Palestinians accept this after turning down earlier offers (Camp David, Taba, Olmert; how they compare is argued on 'The Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.'), and why would Israel accept more after 2005 and October 7?
- What happens to the Triangle towns' Arab citizens, who were never asked whether they want to be moved to another state?
What stands in the way
- A state as staging post β security as permanent control β Israel keeps overall security control, the borders and the Jordan Valley around a demilitarised state: for Israel the minimum for safety, for Palestinians permanent control with a flag on top.
- Majority as safety β return as justice β It settles the refugee question on the majority side alone β no return to Israel, limited return to the Palestinian state subject to Israeli agreement β so it offers 'end of claims' without anything the other side counts as justice.
- Recognise the Jewish state β recognise the Nakba β It asked Palestinians to recognise Israel as the Jewish state and offered no recognition of the Nakba; Palestinians rejected it at once.
- Distrust as premise β Drafted with one side and presented to the other, it was read by Palestinians as confirmation that the process was never neutral, and its annexation map as the real plan behind the offer.