Two states
A Palestinian state alongside Israel, roughly on the 1967 lines with agreed land swaps.
Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.
What happens to Israeli Jews
Stay citizens of Israel within agreed borders; some settlers relocate or become residents of Palestine.
What happens to Palestinians
Citizens of their own state; Arab citizens of Israel remain Israeli; most refugees settle in Palestine or receive compensation.
What it requires
- Borders based on the 1967 lines, with swaps for large settlement blocs
- Evacuating or transferring settlements outside the blocs (tens of thousands of settlers)
- Security arrangements Israel trusts after Gaza 2005 and October 7
- An agreed answer for refugees: symbolic return, compensation, return to the Palestinian state
- A Jerusalem arrangement both sides can live with
- Mutual recognition — of states and of peoples
Who supports it
Palestinian-Israeli Pulse joint poll (PCPSR / Tel Aviv University), fieldwork July 2024, published September 2024 (pcpsr.org/en/node/989, read 28 September 2026 and re-read 30 September 2026: Palestinians 40% two states, 33% 'a single Palestinian state with limited rights for Jews' and 25% one democratic state; Israeli Jews 21% two states ('a 13-point decline from 2022 and the lowest since comparable questions were asked in the early 1990s'), 42% 'annexation of the West Bank without equal rights for Palestinians' and 14% one democratic state. Arab citizens: 72%, per the Pulse Summary Report of 12 September 2024 (read): '72% of Israeli Arabs, compared to 60% in 2022 and 59% in 2020, support the concept of the two-state solution'.)
What history says
- Czechoslovakia 1993 — a peaceful split
- India/Pakistan 1947 — partition with mass violence
- Taba 2001 and Olmert–Abbas 2008 — detailed models that did not produce an agreement
Where this can lead
Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.
Two states at peace — unlikely on the record
if both publics accept it, spoilers are contained a guarantor stays and settlers outside the new border accept evacuation (A majority of Israeli Jews would accept a Palestinian state with security guarantees; A majority of Palestinians would accept a state beside Israel as the end of claims; Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; An outside guarantor would stay and act when tested; Settlers would accept evacuation with compensation)
Two recognised states with an agreed border; embassies, trade and travel between them; security arrangements that hold; claims formally ended on both sides.
- Egypt–Israel (1979) and Jordan–Israel (1994) — held. Both treaties have lasted decades through wars, intifadas and Gaza (see 'Cold peace') — the nearest regional precedent, though between existing states, not a new one.
What it can slide into: If a spoiler campaign succeeds or a guarantor leaves: the cold peace, or the front.
Two states, cold peace — possible on the record
if the governments and their guarantors hold it together, whatever the publics think (Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; An outside guarantor would stay and act when tested; Arab states would pay for and guarantee a deal, not only recognise it)
The agreement holds between governments — borders, security cooperation, some trade — while each public stays hostile and contact across the border is policed socially.
- Egypt and Jordan with Israel — held, cold. Armies cooperate and gas flows, while 'normalisation' is sanctioned by unions and syndicates and public opinion moved the other way (see 'Cold peace').
What it can slide into: It can warm with time and contact, or break at the next war.
A new state that becomes a front — possible on the record
if spoilers are not contained and armed groups do not keep a truce (not: Leaders on both sides can keep their own spoilers in check; not: Hamas would keep a long-term truce)
The territory handed over becomes a base for attacks; the stronger side answers with closure and force; the withdrawal is read on both sides as having failed.
- Gaza after 2005 — collapsed. Rockets after the disengagement and Hamas's 2007 takeover (see the deadlock 'A state as staging post').
- Southern Lebanon after 2000 — collapsed. Hezbollah's build-up after the Israeli withdrawal (same deadlock).
What it can slide into: Renewed occupation or war, and a public on each side convinced that the other never wanted peace.
The hard questions
- What guarantees security after Israel's 2005 Gaza withdrawal was followed by Hamas rule and rockets?
- Who evacuates settlers who refuse — and who stops militias on either side?
- Can a Palestinian leadership that doesn't recognise Jewish peoplehood sign an end of claims?
- Can a Knesset that voted 68 to 9 in July 2024 against a Palestinian state 'on any piece of land west of the Jordan River', warning that 'Hamas takes over such a Palestinian state', ever ratify one? (Jewish Chronicle, via JNS)
What stands in the way
- Each side reads the other through its worst quote — Each side sees the other's state as a staging post for its own destruction.
- A state as staging post ↔ security as permanent control — Demilitarisation, border control and the Jordan Valley: each side's minimum is the other's red line.
- Majority as safety ↔ return as justice — No agreed number of returnees: 'end of claims' against 'right of return'.
- Recognise the Jewish state ↔ recognise the Nakba — 'End of conflict' requires both recognitions, and neither side will go first.
- Whoever moves first loses — Needs withdrawals and recognitions that each side has learned not to give first.
- Distrust as premise — No agreement survives if every act of the other side is read as a trick.