Solutions

Binationalism: one state shared by two nations

One state in which Jews and Arabs are recognised as two national communities with guaranteed shared power, not a majority ruling a minority; the idea behind Brit Shalom and Ihud before 1948.

Check the effects of this card → pick what you believe, choose the defusions you would use, and see where it leads.

What happens to Israeli Jews

A home in the whole land without ruling over another people; but without a Jewish majority or state, which the majority argument holds to be the only guarantee of safety (see 'Jews can only be safe as a majority in their own state.').

What happens to Palestinians

Equal standing in the whole land without partition; but Jewish national rights recognised in a land the PLO's 1968 Charter called 'an indivisible territorial unit' (see 'From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free.').

What it requires

  • Both peoples accepting parity regardless of numbers
  • Institutions that guarantee each nation's voice: joint government, vetoes, autonomy in culture and education
  • Shared security forces trusted by both
  • A way to handle immigration (the Law of Return, the right of return) that neither side sees as a demographic weapon

Who supports it

Brit Shalom ('Covenant of Peace'), founded in 1925 'in the home of Arthur Ruppin in Jerusalem', sought 'bi–national autonomy under the British Mandate, where Arabs and Jews would have equal status', with 'an independent bi–national state' as its final objective; its 'members weren't numerous', among them Martin Buber, Samuel Hugo Bergman, Gershom Scholem and Henrietta Szold, it saw itself as Zionist despite 'a certain amount of tension' with the Zionist institutions, and it 'existed for merely a few years' (Central Zionist Archives, 'Brit Shalom'). Ihud ('Union'), formed in August 1942 with Judah Magnes leading it and serving as its chair, opposed the Biltmore Program's call for a Jewish state; on 14 March 1946 Buber presented its platform to the Anglo-American Committee and Magnes called for 'a bi-national state with Jewish and Arab parity'; after the 1947 partition vote Magnes wrote to his colleagues, 'We have failed ‘for all eternity’' (Monty Noam Penkower, 'Judah Leib Magnes: The Last Year', American Jewish Archives Journal 71:2, 2019); the 1946 Anglo-American Committee recommended 'That Jew shall not dominate Arab and Arab shall not dominate Jew in Palestine' and 'That Palestine shall be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state' (report on the Avalon Project), under the Mandate 'pending the execution of a trusteeship agreement under the United Nations' (Recommendations 3 and 4); and in 1947 three members of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed 'an independent federal state' that 'would comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State', with Jerusalem as its capital, after a transition of no more than three years. The US State Department's editorial summary confirms the plan's sponsors, the 'independent federal state', the transition 'not to exceed three years' and Jerusalem as capital (FRUS 1947, vol. V, doc. 796); the quoted 'would comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State' is from the UN Yearbook 1947–48, not read here ⚠; the majority's partition plan was adopted instead. It found little support: of Magnes's 1941 version, JTA reported that 'neither the Jewish nor Arab leaders seem inclined' to take it up (JTA, 22 July 1941; see 'United Arabia: dissolving the conflict into a larger federation'), and in 1947 Ihud had 'not even achieved the appointment of a special United Nations subcommittee' to study it (Penkower, 2019). A related idea today is the 'A Land for All' confederation (see 'Two states, one homeland (confederation)'); who else advocates binationalism now, and whether any party does, is not yet sourced here ⚠.

What history says

  • Belgium's linguistic communities and Switzerland's cantons, as models of shared power (not yet sourced here ⚠)
  • Lebanon's confessional system, power-sharing written down as transitional: since the Constitutional Law of 21 September 1990 the constitution makes 'the abolition of political confessionalism' 'a basic national goal' to be 'achieved according to a staged plan', while seats in the Chamber stay divided by 'Equal representation between Christians and Muslims' and 'Proportional representation among the confessional groups' 'until such time as the Chamber enacts an electoral law on a non-confessional basis' (Preamble H, Arts. 24 and 95, the Lebanese Parliament's English text). How far the transitional plan has moved since, and the 1975–1990 civil war in which the earlier arrangement broke down, are not yet sourced here ⚠
  • Cyprus 1960, a bicommunal constitution that broke down. For a population 'approximately 80 per cent Greek Cypriot and 18 per cent Turkish Cypriot' it had each community elect its own president or vice-president, with vetoes 'separately or jointly' on some legislation, and a guarantee by Greece, Turkey and Britain; it 'encountered difficulties almost from the birth of the republic'. In November 1963 President Makarios proposed 13 amendments, among them abolishing the vetoes, on the stated grounds that its 'sui generis provisions' created 'sources of friction'; the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber called that 'false propaganda' and 'contended that the Greek Cypriots had never attempted to implement the constitution in good faith'. Violence between the communities broke out on 21 December 1963; within ten days a joint peacemaking force under British command patrolled a ceasefire line, the 'green line', through Nicosia (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 'UNFICYP History').

Where this can lead

Each outcome holds only under its conditions. The label is how likely those conditions look on the record, by the weakest of them; set your own in the builder.

Cantons that hold — unlikely on the record

if both nations accept sharing power and the institutions hold (Both publics would accept one shared state; A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

Cities and regions govern themselves, each by its own rules, joined by a small common centre for security and trade.

  • Switzerland — held. Cantons with their own languages and religions sharing a small federal centre, built after a civil war (1847) (see 'Local rule: clans, cities and cantons').
  • The Gulf emirates — stable. Ruler-led emirates in a federation: the UAE's 'highest constitutional authority' is the Federal Supreme Council, which 'consists of the rulers of the seven emirates' and elects the president from among them (UAE government portal). Stable, but monarchies, not democracies.

What it can slide into: If a canton is ruled by an armed movement that rejects the arrangement: the front, or division frozen in place.

A shared state that breaks down — possible on the record

if power-sharing freezes or breaks, as in Lebanon and Cyprus 1960 (not: A shared state's institutions would hold under pressure)

The institutions deadlock along national lines; each community arms or turns to outside patrons; the state survives on paper or not at all.

  • Lebanon — collapsed. A confessional power-sharing state that fell into civil war (1975–90). The 1989 Taif Agreement, which 'brought a formal end to the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990)', revised the shares, moving parliamentary seats from a '55:45 Christian-Muslim ratio' to 'an even 50:50', under Syrian supervision. A Conciliation Resources analysis argues it 'exacerbated confessional tension and competition' in practice.
  • Bosnia after Dayton (1995) — froze. Initialed at Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December, it kept one state made of 'two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska', with a demarcated boundary between them (the agreement's text, Office of the High Representative). That two-entity structure is still in place.

What it can slide into: Civil war, partition, or one group ruling the other.

The hard questions

  • After a century of war, is there enough trust for either side to accept a veto held by the other?
  • What happens when the demographic balance shifts?
  • How many partners did Brit Shalom and Ihud find on the Arab side, and would it be different now?

What stands in the way

Arguments that point here