Theme
“What the Ottomans and the British left behind”
Four centuries of Ottoman rule (1516–1917) ended more than a hundred years ago, but much of today's conflict still runs on Ottoman rules: who marries whom, who owns which land, who prays where, and where the borders are.
The picture
The millet system: religion as law for your community.
The Ottomans governed their non-Muslim subjects through religious communities (millets), each running its own courts for marriage, divorce and inheritance. Israel kept the system: there is no civil marriage, and each recognised community has its own religious courts, rabbinical courts for Jews and sharia courts for Muslim citizens. Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority inherited the same arrangement. It's why 'Israel has Sharia' is, in a narrow sense, true, and why same-sex couples can't marry there (see 'A religion doesn't justify having a country.' and 'Israel doesn't even have gay marriage — its gay-friendly image is pinkwashing.').
The 1858 Land Code: both sides argue in Ottoman categories.
The Ottoman Land Code sorted land into categories, private property (mulk), state land with rights of use (miri), and dead land (mawat), and tied rights to registration and continued cultivation. The British Mandate and then Jordan kept it in force in the West Bank. Israel has used it to declare 'state land' in the West Bank, 'over 900,000 dunams, 16% of the West Bank' in the count of the Israeli NGO Peace Now: land 'not officially registered' is treated as not privately owned 'unless it was cultivated'. Peace Now calls this 'a draconian interpretation' of the code; Israel's position, as Peace Now reports it, is that a declaration 'does not change the status of the land but only affirms it'. Palestinian owners contesting those declarations argue under the same code, with Ottoman tax and title records (the tapu registry).
advocacy / viewPeace Now, 'What is a declaration of state land?' finding ✓
Read 2026-10-02 (Israeli NGO opposed to settlements). 'The declaration is based on a draconian interpretation of the Othman land law from 1858'; 'Israel has succeeded in taking over 900,000 dunams, 16% of the West Bank'; 'Declaration of state land is only possible if the land is not officially registered'; Israel 'treated all unregistered lands as not privately owned, even if it was recorded as private in the tax books, unless it was cultivated'; 'This is why Israel claims that the declaration of state land does not change the status of the land but only affirms it, and therefore should not be considered as confiscation.'
The Status Quo at the holy places.
Ottoman decrees of 1757 and 1852 froze who controls what at the Christian holy places, down to who may clean which step in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; Britain, Jordan and Israel all kept them. The arrangement at the Temple Mount / Haram al-Sharif after 1967, Muslim prayer and Jewish visits without prayer, is known as the 'status quo' by descent from that system (see 'Al-Aqsa is in danger.'). (The Ottoman decrees and their dates are not yet sourced on this site ⚠.)
The borders, and the uti possidetis argument.
There was never an Ottoman province called Palestine: the land was divided among the sanjaks (districts) of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, and the vilayet (province) of Beirut (see 'Which Palestine?'). The British Mandate drew new lines over them in 1922, and those lines are what later arguments are about. The legal argument called uti possidetis juris holds that a new state inherits the administrative borders of the unit it emerged from, and the legal scholars Abraham Bell and Eugene Kontorovich argue that this gives Israel the Mandate's borders as they stood in May 1948 (Arizona Law Review, 2016) (see 'The West Bank isn't occupied — it's disputed territory, and Jews have every right to live there.'). What continues from the Ottomans and the Mandate is the territory's outline, not a state: the argument is about which people's state inherits it, and the UN's 1947 partition plan and later international law answered differently.
Traps here:◆ Which territory?
law / courtAbraham Bell & Eugene Kontorovich, 'Palestine, Uti Possidetis Juris, and the Borders of Israel', Arizona Law Review 58 (2016) 633 (2016) finding ✓
Abstract checked against the PDF: uti possidetis juris 'would dictate that Israel inherit the boundaries of the Mandate of Palestine as they existed in May, 1948', supporting claims to East Jerusalem, the West Bank and potentially Gaza (not the Golan).
law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓
19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'
The late Ottoman opening, and its limits.
Reform edicts in 1839 and 1856 ended the legal inferiority of Jews and Christians (see 'Under Islam, Jews were humiliated second-class dhimmis — and Islamists want to bring it back.'), and in 1844 the empire undertook to stop executing apostates (the so-called 'Edict of Toleration', which, the one detailed study of it read for this site finds (Michael Sours, Journal of Bahá'í Studies, 1998), 'was not about Jewish immigration, but the Islamic penalty for apostasy'). It was forced by Britain after a young Armenian Christian who had become Muslim and then returned to Christianity was executed, and a Greek Christian after him; the people it protected were former dhimmis who had crossed into Islam, often under pressure, and wanted to go back. Its effect was 'probably very limited': in Syria the order against execution was 'generally kept', but converts from Islam 'were usually persecuted and forced to leave their homes', and 'Christians and Jews, particularly children,' had been 'forced to adopt Islam' (Ma'oz, as quoted by Sours). A broader, independent study of apostasy in Islamic law fits that picture of a slow change: punishment for apostasy 'fell into desuetude' in 'the latter half of the 19th century', 'though it was almost nowhere expressly abolished' (Rudolph Peters and Gert De Vries, Die Welt des Islams, 1976). At the same time, the Ottoman government restricted the land market: debates between 1876 and 1908 produced 'protectionist restrictions on the newly constructed agrarian land market, especially in … Palestine', which cast 'non-Muslim subjects, both Christian and Jewish, as potentially suspect and unfit for landholding' and aimed to shield land 'from foreign investment and occupation' (the historian Nora Barakat, 2026, from her article's abstract). The 'red slip' that restricted Jewish visitors' stays, and how widely the rules were evaded, are not yet sourced here ⚠. The constitutional revolution of 1908 (named in the same article) opened a brief period of elections and newspapers in which both Arab and Zionist politics took shape (that period is not yet sourced here ⚠); the newspaper Filastin was founded in Jaffa in 1911 (see 'Palestine was definitely a thing — there was even a newspaper called Filastin in 1911 — and almost no Jews lived there, so Israel was a hostile takeover.').
primary documentOttoman Reform Edict (Islâhat Fermânı / Hatt-ı Hümâyûn), 18 February 1856, English text (Turkish Constitutional Law site) (1856) ✓
Read (2026-09-28): 'Every distinction or designation tending to make any class whatever of the subjects of my Empire inferior to another class, on account of their religion, language, or race, shall be for ever effaced from the Administrative Protocol'; 'The taxes are to be levied under the same denomination from all the subjects of my empire, without distinction of class or of religion'; non-Muslims subject to recruitment, 'the principle of obtaining substitutes, or of purchasing exemption, shall be admitted'.
historyMichael W. Sours, 'The 1844 Ottoman "Edict of Toleration" in Bahá'í Secondary Literature', Journal of Bahá'í Studies 8:3 (1998) finding ✓
Read 2026-10-02 (journal PDF). Abstract: 'In Bahá'í secondary literature, it has been commonly assumed that an Imperial Edict, referred to by Christian and Bahá'í authors as the "Edict of Toleration," issued in 1844 by the Ottoman government permitted Jews to return to Palestine'; finding: 'The Edict, therefore, was not about Jewish immigration, but the Islamic penalty for apostasy in the Ottoman Empire'; the first Bahá'í author to mention it was George Townshend, in his 1943–44 introduction to God Passes By. Note 8 quotes Marion Weinstein's 17 July 1919 article (reprinted in Star of the West 10:10): 'If Zionists will mingle with the other races and live in unity with them, they will succeed. If not, they will meet certain resistance.' Re-read in full 2026-10-10: the edict's text as published by Bickersteth, an assurance 'to prevent henceforward the execution and putting to death of the Christian who is an apostate'; trigger: a young Armenian Christian who 'had embraced Islam but then reverted to Christianity' was executed, then a Greek Christian; Rif'at Pasha: the Porte 'could not alter a divine law'; Stratford Canning secured the edict under the 'threat of a breach in good relations with Great Britain'. Effect: 'if the Edict had any impact on the prosecution of Christians for apostasy in the empire, it was probably very limited'; quoting Moshe Ma'oz (Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine): 'A noticeable number of Christians and Jews, particularly children, were forced to adopt Islam, and only a small proportion of these returned to their original faith'; the order 'was generally kept in Syria', but 'Muslim converts to Christianity were usually persecuted and forced to leave their homes'. Also: 'The Edict did concern religious toleration, but only in a rather narrow sense'; n. 35: 'Historians debate whether or not these two better-known edicts [1839 and 1856] were sincere or mere gestures to win European favor—gestures that were intentionally negated by other concurrent acts of government policy' (citing Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, and Ma'oz).
referenceInstitute for Palestine Studies, PalQuest, 'Isa al-Isa' (biography) (1911) ✓
Read (2026-09-28): 'In January 1911, he founded the newspaper Filastin, which began as a twice-weekly publication and was principally concerned with the welfare of the Orthodox community; later it warned of the dangers of Zionism'; closed by the Ottoman authorities in October 1913; signed the statement of 12 December 1918 to the Paris Peace Conference and the British Foreign Office 'protesting the Zionist movement's attempt to turn Palestine into a Jewish National Home'; co-founded the Muslim-Christian Association in Jaffa to oppose the Balfour Declaration. Archive issues of Filastin: National Library of Israel's historical Arabic press collection (not consulted here). Re-read 2026-10-12: 'In October 1913, the Ottoman authorities closed down his newspaper, claiming that it had published articles inciting ethnic prejudice.'
historyNora Elizabeth Barakat, 'Building an Ottoman National Economy', Comparative Studies in Society and History (2026), doi:10.1017/s0010417526100413 (2026) finding ✓
Abstract read via OpenAlex (2026-10-12): late Ottoman (1876–1908) debates over agrarian policy in the Arab provinces 'produced protectionist restrictions on the newly constructed agrarian land market, especially in an extended geography encompassing Palestine and the Hijaz Railway'; 'Restrictions on the land market constructed Muslim cultivators as ideal landholders and non-Muslim subjects, both Christian and Jewish, as potentially suspect and unfit for landholding'; officials sought to shield land 'from foreign investment and occupation'; a discourse of national economy emerged 'after the constitutional revolution of 1908'. The article itself is not read.
historyRudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries, 'Apostasy in Islam', Die Welt des Islams 17 (1976), doi:10.1163/157006076x00017 (1976) finding ✓
Opening paragraph read via OpenAlex (2026-10-12): Islamic legal scholars 'elaborated a complex set of rules pertaining to the legal status of those Moslems, who gave up their religion'; 'This doctrine remained valid until, in the latter half of the 19th century, punishment for apostasy fell into desuetude, though it was almost nowhere expressly abolished. At the same time the principle of freedom of religion was gaining ground in the Moslem world.' The article itself is not read.
And what the British left behind.
The Ottoman layer governs marriage, land and holy places; the British layer shaped the state itself. Israel inherited the Mandate's legal machinery (its Law and Administration Ordinance of 19 May 1948: 'The law which existed in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) shall remain in force', subject to later laws, s. 11), a legal continuity that the uti possidetis argument leans on, though David Kretzmer answers that Israel's founders 'did not claim that the new State was established in the whole of the territory of the Mandate' (Verfassungsblog, 2024); and inheriting a territory's laws is not the same as inheriting all of its territory (see 'The West Bank isn't occupied — it's disputed territory, and Jews have every right to live there.'). And, like Britain, never adopted a written constitution: it has Basic Laws instead, and a parliament that can change most of them by simple majority, which is why the 2023 fight over the courts became a fight over the whole constitutional order. The Mandate's Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, written to suppress Jewish and Arab revolts alike, are still cited as law: Israeli courts found the authority for punitive house demolitions in Regulation 119, and the ICJ noted in 2024 that the measure 'appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences' (paras. 209–210); Jordan and Israel kept parts of them in the West Bank. From 1948 to 1966 the same regulations were the legal basis of the military administration Israel imposed on its own Arab citizens: movement permits, curfews, land seizures. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol announced its abolition to the Knesset on 8 November 1966; resting on military regulations, it needed no law to end it (ECF). Attempts in the Knesset to end it had failed in 1962 and, by one vote, in 1963, and over the following two years its 'repressive powers were transferred to the police and intelligence services' (PalQuest). Both halves are worth remembering: the system could be reformed from within, and the reform moved part of the control rather than ending it. And the Mandate's criminal code still applies in Gaza, including its ban on same-sex relations. The electoral system is the one part that isn't British: the single national list with proportional representation comes from the Zionist movement's own congresses and the pre-state Jewish assembly, and it is what gives small parties their veto. A state tested this hard runs on an unwritten British constitution, Ottoman personal law and a pre-state coalition system, and reforming any of it has kept being postponed because of the constant challenges to the state. That may be one of the most practical places to start (see 'Before any solution: governments that can deliver it').
law / courtICJ Advisory Opinion on the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2024) finding ✓
19 July 2024 (read on UNISPAL's copy of the Court's text). Para. 94: Israel's withdrawal 'has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.' Para. 254: 'Israel is not entitled to sovereignty over or to exercise sovereign powers in any part of the Occupied Palestinian Territory on account of its occupation.' Paras. 209–210: punitive demolitions under Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulation 119. Verified 2026-09-30 against the Court's English PDF on UNISPAL (186-20240719-adv-01-00-en): paras. 94, 209–210 and 254 as quoted; para. 210 in full reads 'the measure of punitive demolition appears never to have been used against properties connected to Israeli civilians having committed similar offences'. Para. 119 (re-read 2026-09-30): 'the transfer by Israel of settlers to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as Israel's maintenance of their presence, is contrary to the sixth paragraph of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention'. Paras. 205–206 (read 2026-10-02, same PDF): 'through its practice of restricting movement, Israel differentiates in its treatment of Palestinians with reference to their freedom of movement'; the Court 'has taken note of Israel's security concerns', but 'the protection of the settlers and settlements … cannot be invoked as a ground to justify measures that treat Palestinians differently', and restrictions 'on all Palestinians solely on account of their Palestinian identity are disproportionate'; conclusion: the policies 'amount to prohibited discrimination' under the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD. Paras. 225 and 229 (full PDF 186-20240719-adv-01-00-en, re-read 2026-10-12): Article 3 of CERD 'refers to two particularly severe forms of racial discrimination: racial segregation and apartheid'; 'The Court observes that Israel's legislation and measures impose and serve to maintain a near-complete separation in the West Bank and East Jerusalem between the settler and Palestinian communities. For this reason, the Court considers that Israel's legislation and measures constitute a breach of Article 3 of CERD.' (It does not say which of the two forms.) Para. 94 re-read 2026-10-13 in the Court's PDF on UNISPAL, verbatim: 'Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has not entirely released it of its obligations under the law of occupation. Israel's obligations have remained commensurate with the degree of its effective control over the Gaza Strip.'
referenceEconomic Cooperation Foundation, 'Abolition of the Military Governance of Arab-Populated Areas in Israel (1966)' (1966) ✓
Read (2026-09-28): 'A notice given to the Knesset by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol on 8 November 1966, by which military governance of Arab-populated areas in Israel was abolished … legally based on the Palestine Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 … no formal legislative measure was required to abolish it.' Links the Hebrew notice.
referenceInstitute for Palestine Studies, PalQuest, 'Palestinians Under Military Rule in Israel, 1948-1966' ✓
Read (2026-09-28): military rule 'from 1948 until the end of 1966. Over a two-year period, the military government was dismantled and its repressive powers were transferred to the police and intelligence services'; Knesset attempts to end it failed in 1962 and in 1963 'by one vote'; 'many Jews opposed the continuation of military rule'.
primary documentIsrael, Law and Administration Ordinance No. 1 of 5708-1948 (19 May 1948), text on PalQuest (Institute for Palestine Studies) ✓
Read 2026-10-02. s. 11: 'The law which existed in Palestine on the 5th Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948) shall remain in force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or to the other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of State, and subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of the State and its authorities.' s. 16: the Minister of Justice may issue new texts of such laws.
advocacy / viewDavid Kretzmer, 'The principle of uti possidetis juris and the borders of Israel', Verfassungsblog (9 October 2024), in the debate on the 2024 ICJ Advisory Opinion finding ✓
Read 2026-10-02. On 'the Bell/Kontorovich/Sebitunde argument': 'at the time of independence Israel's political leaders did not claim that the new State was established in the whole of the territory of the Mandate. In fact, the founding fathers of the State of Israel claimed the opposite: they accepted the principle of partition'; the Provisional Government 'related to territories held by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) that were not included in the Jewish State under the UN Partition Borders as occupied territory'; summarises Malcolm Shaw (the principle may be departed from to protect peace) and Ariel Zemach (never applied to let a minority claim sovereignty over the whole territory), and calls their grounds 'convincing'.
Where it leads if pressed
Why it matters now.
Many of the most concrete disputes, over marriage, land and holy sites, are fought in legal categories neither side created. Knowing that doesn't settle them, but it takes some heat out of the claim that any one of them is a modern Israeli or Palestinian invention. Any solution will have to decide what to keep of the Ottoman layer, as every government since 1917 has.