Trap Β· reasoning move
β Loud in public, quiet deals
Sounds like: βThey'll never agree to anything β just listen to them.β
Public rhetoric on both sides is total: no recognition, no compromise, destruction of the enemy. So any deal is taken to be impossible, and anyone who says otherwise is naive.
Signs
'they'll neverβ¦' based only on speeches; a deal called impossible by people who haven't looked at what the parties already do together; surprise when a secret channel surfaces.
Questions to ask
What do these parties already cooperate on, quietly? Who is the speech for, the other side or their own public (see 'Two languages, two stories')? Which statements have been acted on, and which never were?
Example
'Arab states will never accept Israel', said while Egypt and Israel share intelligence in Sinai.
The mirror
'we will never let money reach Hamas', said while approving the transfers.
Public rhetoric and private dealings often point in opposite directions.
Before the 1994 peace treaty, Jordan's King Hussein had 'for years β¦ been secretly meeting with the Israelis to broker peace', and Yitzhak Rabin 'had met with the king secretly for almost two decades' (Bruce Riedel, Brookings). Egypt, whose state media remain harshly anti-Israel, has worked with Israel on security in Sinai: 'Israeli warplanes have also carried out covert air raids in Sinai in coordination with Egypt, the New York Times reported' (Al Jazeera, April 2018; the Times report itself is not read here), and imports Israeli gas since 2020. Gulf states had security and intelligence contacts with Israel long before the Abraham Accords made them public. In April 2024 Jordan helped intercept Iranian drones heading for Israel. And the mirror: Israeli governments that vowed publicly to destroy Hamas approved Qatari cash transfers into Hamas-run Gaza for years (CNN: from 2018 Qatar made monthly payments, some $15 million of it in cash-filled suitcases, approved by Israel's security cabinet that August; the former senior defence official Amos Gilad said there was 'some belief that it would "weaken Palestinian sovereignty"', while an Israeli official called the suggestion that Netanyahu wanted a 'moderately weakened' Hamas 'utterly false' and said the money was meant 'to prevent a humanitarian crisis').
advocacy / viewBruce Riedel, '25 years on, remembering the path to peace for Jordan and Israel', Brookings Institution (23 October 2019) finding β
Read 2026-10-02. 'For years he [Hussein] had been secretly meeting with the Israelis to broker peace'; in September 1993 'Rabin secretly came across the border from Eilat to Aqaba'; 'Hussein had been dealing with the Mossad and Halevy for years'; 'a secret agreement the two [Hussein and Peres] had signed in London in 1987'; 'Rabin had met with the king secretly for almost two decades'. Riedel writes from US government service (he accompanied Defense Secretary Perry to Amman in 1995, as he says).
pressCNN, 'Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years β with Israel's backing' (11 December 2023) incident β
Read 2026-10-02 (served from edition.cnn.com). 'In 2018, Qatar began making monthly payments to the Gaza Strip. Some $15 million were sent into Gaza in cash-filled suitcases'; 'Israel approved the deal in a security cabinet meeting in August 2018'. Amos Gilad, former senior Defence Ministry official: backed by the prime minister 'but not by the Israeli intelligence community'; 'some belief that it would "weaken Palestinian sovereignty"'. Other half: an Israeli official called any suggestion that Netanyahu wanted a 'moderately weakened' Hamas 'utterly false'; 'Successive Israeli governments β¦ enabled money to go to Gaza. Not in order to strengthen Hamas but to prevent a humanitarian crisis'. Naftali Bennett says he 'stopped the cash suitcases' in 2021.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Sinai: What is happening and why' (2 April 2018) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. 'Israeli warplanes have also carried out covert air raids in Sinai in coordination with Egypt, the New York Times reported.' The underlying NYT report (David Kirkpatrick, 2018) is not read here; its figures (numbers of strikes) are not used. Also (2026-10-02): 'Security operations against rebels in Sinai have been ongoing since 2000, but the rebellion picked up the moment after the military coup in 2013'; 'In late 2014, Egypt declared a state of emergency in the region while Sinai's most active armed group pledged its allegiance to ISIL'; a major operation 'launched on February 18' 2018; 'Amnesty International also reported the use of cluster bombs in its operations.' Re-read 2026-10-12: 'In late 2014, Egypt declared a state of emergency in the region while Sinai's most active armed group pledged its allegiance to ISIL'; '2018 campaign: A major operation was launched on February 18 with Egyptian ground, air and naval forces along with border guards and police'.
Speaking in actions.
Israel in particular tends to ignore the loud voices and answer in deeds: water supplied to Jordan under the 1994 treaty ('30 million cubic metres annually', a Jordanian official said) and, in July 2021, an extra sale of '50 million cubic metres', which the Israeli side said would 'effectively double the supply for the year' (Al Jazeera); a water-for-energy 'declaration of intent' signed in Dubai in November 2021, under which Jordan 'would receive 200 million cubic metres β¦ of desalinated water from Israel, in return for 600 megawatts of electricity generated from a UAE-funded solar energy plant in Jordan' β which hundreds protested in Amman as 'a normalisation project' (Al Jazeera), and which Jordan's foreign minister said in November 2023 it would 'not sign β¦ any longer' while 'Israel continues to kill children in Gaza'; gas for Egypt and Jordan; air defence shared against Iran; security coordination with the Palestinian Authority; work permits. Arab states do the same: Jordan's interceptions, Egypt's control of the Rafah crossing, the UAE keeping the Accords through the whole war. The actions say what can't be said in public: shared interests in stability, in the economy, and against Iran and jihadist groups.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Hundreds protest in Jordan against water-energy deal with Israel' (26 November 2021) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. 'Under the deal, Jordan would receive 200 million cubic metres β¦ of desalinated water from Israel, in return for 600 megawatts of electricity generated from a UAE-funded solar energy plant in Jordan'; the 'declaration of intent' signed in Dubai by Jordan's water minister, Israel's energy minister and the UAE's climate change minister, with US envoy John Kerry present. Protesters said it 'moved towards normalising ties with Israel while it continues to occupy the Palestinian territories'; police arrested 16 students (per a detainee's brothers); 'this is a normalisation project'; engineer Rund Awwad: 'more of a political deal'. Jordan's November 2023 refusal to sign is on aj-jordan-wont-sign-2023.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Jordan, Israel agree to water deal; more West Bank trade' (8 July 2021) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. Lapid and Safadi 'approved Israel's sale of 50 million cubic metres of water'; 'An Israeli official said that would effectively double the supply for the year'; 'A Jordanian official said Israel gives the kingdom 30 million cubic metres annually under their 1994 peace treaty'; EcoPeace's Gidon Bromberg: 'the largest quantity ever sold between the two countries'; Jordan's export ceiling to the West Bank 'would increase from about $160m to $700m per year'.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Jordan says it won't sign energy and water exchange deal with Israel' (16 November 2023) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. Safadi: 'We will not sign this agreement any longer. Can you imagine a Jordanian minister sitting next to an Israeli minister to sign a water and electricity agreement, all while Israel continues to kill children in Gaza?'; the 1994 peace deal 'will have to remain on the back burner gathering dust for now'; 'Israel has not upheld its part of the agreement'.
Quiet deals aren't peace, and they can keep a conflict going.
Acting instead of saying can also mean managing instead of resolving (see 'Shrinking the conflict: less control now, no final deal'). Deals made in private leave publics on every side hearing only the loud version, so their expectations have no reason to change, and leaders who have made quiet compromises can be undone when they surface. Some rhetoric is also sincere: Hamas's and the Iranian regime's stated aims have been acted on. The lesson isn't 'ignore what they say' but 'don't treat what they say as the whole of what they'll accept'. And the pattern can itself be used as a claim nobody can check. At the UN in September 2026, facing a walkout, Israel's prime minister said that 'many of their leaders even thanked us privately for taking out Iran's nukes. It's hard to imagine more mind-blowing hypocrisy.' It may be true, and the documented cases above make it plausible; but a private thank-you cannot be verified, and a quiet deal asserted from a podium is an argument, not yet evidence.
Traps here:β The strict enemy frame
primary documentBenjamin Netanyahu, address to the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2026 β full text (Jewish Virtual Library) (2026) incident β
Read (2026-09-28). Passages quoted on this site: 'It will take time for the world to acknowledge what is so plain to see: that Hamas used Palestinian civilians as human shields; that it used hospitals, schools and mosques as terrorist command posts; that it stole much of the food we let into Gaza.' | 'You didn't protest when we left Bethlehem. When it was controlled by us, it was 80 to 90 percent Christian. We gave it to the Palestinian Authority, and today it's 80 to 90 percent Muslim. The Christians were pushed out.' | answering ErdoΔan, 'He says he's going to be the ruler of Jerusalem. No, sir, you won't. This is our country, our city, our eternal capital.' | 'Several foreign countries have spent untold billions to spread lies about my country. The first to do so was Qatar β¦ their goal was clear: brainwash young minds to hate Israel, hate America and hate the West.' | 'In defending itself, Israel is also defending many of the countries whose delegates just left this hall. In fact, I want you to know that many of their leaders even thanked us privately for taking out Iran's nukes'; 'Accusing Israel of genocide is the greatest lie of the century'; the 'moral cowards' remark after the walkout. Re-read 2026-10-13: 'many of their leaders even thanked us privately for taking out Iran's nukes. It's hard to imagine more mind-blowing hypocrisy, but that's exactly what it is.'
Reading the numbers: the size of the quiet deals, and two figures that don't add up.
Quiet deals come with numbers, and reading them carefully is part of the point. Water: a Jordanian official said Israel supplies '30 million cubic metres annually' under the 1994 treaty; in July 2021 Israel agreed to sell 50 million more, which an Israeli official said would 'effectively double the supply for the year'. Those two statements do not fit together: 30 plus 50 is 80, about 2.7 times the treaty amount, not double (this page's arithmetic). Either the base was larger than 30, or 'the supply' meant something else; the reports do not say, so neither figure should be quoted as settled. The 2021 water-for-energy declaration would have given Jordan 200 million cubic metres of desalinated water a year, about 6.7 times the 30 million treaty figure, in return for 600 megawatts of solar power; after the Gaza war began, Jordan's foreign minister said 'We will not sign this agreement any longer'. Money: from 2018 Qatar sent about $15 million a month into Gaza in cash, about $180 million a year at that rate (this page's arithmetic; the reports do not say how long each rate lasted), under a deal Israel's security cabinet approved in August 2018. The worst case for each side. For 'they'll never cooperate': the treaty water has flowed for decades, the 2021 sale was agreed, Israel approved money into Gaza, Israeli warplanes struck in Sinai in coordination with Egypt (as Al Jazeera relays the New York Times), and in December 2025, during the Gaza war, Israel approved a $35 billion gas export deal with Egypt that Netanyahu called 'the largest gas deal in Israel's history', all while public rhetoric ran the other way. For 'the quiet deals show peace is close': the largest of them, the 200-million-cubic-metre exchange, was frozen when the war began, and the Gaza cash is argued over: an Israeli official said the aim was 'to prevent a humanitarian crisis', not to strengthen Hamas, and Naftali Bennett says he 'stopped the cash suitcases' in 2021. Holds on the evidence here: practical deals across the conflict lines are real and measurable, and they are vulnerable to public anger. Open, needs consistent figures: their true scale. Not supported: quoting either water figure as settled, or reading speeches alone as the whole of what parties will accept.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
pressAl Jazeera, 'Jordan, Israel agree to water deal; more West Bank trade' (8 July 2021) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. Lapid and Safadi 'approved Israel's sale of 50 million cubic metres of water'; 'An Israeli official said that would effectively double the supply for the year'; 'A Jordanian official said Israel gives the kingdom 30 million cubic metres annually under their 1994 peace treaty'; EcoPeace's Gidon Bromberg: 'the largest quantity ever sold between the two countries'; Jordan's export ceiling to the West Bank 'would increase from about $160m to $700m per year'.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Hundreds protest in Jordan against water-energy deal with Israel' (26 November 2021) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. 'Under the deal, Jordan would receive 200 million cubic metres β¦ of desalinated water from Israel, in return for 600 megawatts of electricity generated from a UAE-funded solar energy plant in Jordan'; the 'declaration of intent' signed in Dubai by Jordan's water minister, Israel's energy minister and the UAE's climate change minister, with US envoy John Kerry present. Protesters said it 'moved towards normalising ties with Israel while it continues to occupy the Palestinian territories'; police arrested 16 students (per a detainee's brothers); 'this is a normalisation project'; engineer Rund Awwad: 'more of a political deal'. Jordan's November 2023 refusal to sign is on aj-jordan-wont-sign-2023.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Jordan says it won't sign energy and water exchange deal with Israel' (16 November 2023) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. Safadi: 'We will not sign this agreement any longer. Can you imagine a Jordanian minister sitting next to an Israeli minister to sign a water and electricity agreement, all while Israel continues to kill children in Gaza?'; the 1994 peace deal 'will have to remain on the back burner gathering dust for now'; 'Israel has not upheld its part of the agreement'.
pressCNN, 'Qatar sent millions to Gaza for years β with Israel's backing' (11 December 2023) incident β
Read 2026-10-02 (served from edition.cnn.com). 'In 2018, Qatar began making monthly payments to the Gaza Strip. Some $15 million were sent into Gaza in cash-filled suitcases'; 'Israel approved the deal in a security cabinet meeting in August 2018'. Amos Gilad, former senior Defence Ministry official: backed by the prime minister 'but not by the Israeli intelligence community'; 'some belief that it would "weaken Palestinian sovereignty"'. Other half: an Israeli official called any suggestion that Netanyahu wanted a 'moderately weakened' Hamas 'utterly false'; 'Successive Israeli governments β¦ enabled money to go to Gaza. Not in order to strengthen Hamas but to prevent a humanitarian crisis'. Naftali Bennett says he 'stopped the cash suitcases' in 2021.
pressAl Jazeera, 'Sinai: What is happening and why' (2 April 2018) incident β
Read 2026-10-02. 'Israeli warplanes have also carried out covert air raids in Sinai in coordination with Egypt, the New York Times reported.' The underlying NYT report (David Kirkpatrick, 2018) is not read here; its figures (numbers of strikes) are not used. Also (2026-10-02): 'Security operations against rebels in Sinai have been ongoing since 2000, but the rebellion picked up the moment after the military coup in 2013'; 'In late 2014, Egypt declared a state of emergency in the region while Sinai's most active armed group pledged its allegiance to ISIL'; a major operation 'launched on February 18' 2018; 'Amnesty International also reported the use of cluster bombs in its operations.' Re-read 2026-10-12: 'In late 2014, Egypt declared a state of emergency in the region while Sinai's most active armed group pledged its allegiance to ISIL'; '2018 campaign: A major operation was launched on February 18 with Egyptian ground, air and naval forces along with border guards and police'.
pressS&P Global Platts, 'Israel approves $35 bil Egypt gas export deal', as published by Hellenic Shipping News (22 December 2025) (2025) incident β
Read (2026-10-12). The Israeli government approved the $35 billion agreement to expand gas exports from the Leviathan field to Egypt, which Netanyahu called 'the largest gas deal in Israel's history' (17 December 2025); 'some 130 Bcm of gas' to Egypt's Blue Ocean Energy to 2040; phase one from the first half of 2026, 20 Bcm at 2 Bcm a year; phase two 110 Bcm, bringing Leviathan's sales to Egypt to 12 Bcm a year. Egypt's own production in the first nine months of 2025 was 31.8 Bcm (JODI), and it has become a net LNG importer.
Working it out: why loud refusal and quiet cooperation travel together.
Why do loud refusal and quiet cooperation travel together? Two explanations fit the record, and they overlap. The first: rulers need the quiet deals, their publics do not want them, and visibly hostile symbols cost little. The publics are hostile: in the Arab Opinion Index of 2022, 84% of 33,300 respondents in 14 Arab countries disapproved of their country recognising Israel and 8% accepted it. The symbols are sometimes set at maximums that are not carried out: the Palestinian penal code makes selling land to a foreign country a crime that 'can result in capital punishment under Palestinian law, but President Mahmoud Abbas has never ratified a death sentence', and in 2022 Iraq's parliament, 275 members present and all in favour, made contact with 'any Israeli entity or representative' punishable 'by death or imprisonment'. The second explanation: the measures are real policy with their own aims. The same land-sale case ended in a sentence of life with hard labour, which is deterrence, not only display. And the land question has a history of moves and answers: Israel took the West Bank from Jordan in 1967 and held it, in Stephen Schwebel's 1970 phrase, 'pending a peace settlement', while from 1979 to 1992 Israeli authorities 'declared 908,000 dunams' there as state land (the state comptroller, as cited by B'Tselem). With the land in limbo and settlement growing, every private sale to Israelis turns limbo into fact, so deterring sales keeps a Palestinian position intact. Each side's move gives the other a reason for its next one (see 'The argument that isn't meant to win'). The worst case for each side. For 'the refusals are only for show': a life sentence was actually imposed, and an 84% public refusal is not something rulers invent. For 'the refusals are sincere, so the deals mean nothing': the deals on this page happen anyway, and the maximum penalty in the land-sale case has never been carried out. Holds on the evidence here: public hostility and quiet cooperation coexist, and the harshest penalty in the land-sale law has not been ratified in the case on this site. Arguable: how much of the loud refusal answers the public and how much is policy; the record supports both. Not supported: that the refusals are only theatre, or that the quiet deals prove them insincere.
What the labels (Holds, Open, Arguable β¦) mean
dataArab Center for Research and Policy Studies (Doha), Arab Opinion Index 2022 (2022) aggregate β
Read 2026-09-29 (the Index's own 2022 brief, English; Qatar-based institute, see its org page, 'Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies'). 'face-to-face interviews conducted with 33300 individual respondents in 14 Arab countries'; 'An overwhelming majority (84%) of Arabs disapprove of recognition of Israel by their home countries, with only 8% accepting formal diplomatic recognition'; highest refusal Algeria and Mauritania 99%, Libya 96%, Palestine 95%, Jordan 94%, Iraq 92%, Tunisia 90%; in Morocco and Sudan more than two-thirds refused, with support '20% or less'. Post-2023 figures come from the Index's Gaza survey (not read here).
pressAl Jazeera, 'Palestinian sentenced to life for selling land to Israelis' (31 December 2018), on the Ramallah court's sentence of Issam Akel incident β
Read 2026-10-01. Citing Wafa: the Ramallah High Court found the man guilty 'of violating a penal code from 1960 that bans the sale of land to a foreign country'; life with hard labour; 'This crime can result in capital punishment under Palestinian law, but President Mahmoud Abbas has never ratified a death sentence'; identified by Israeli media and confirmed to AFP as Isaam Akel, a Palestinian-American from East Jerusalem; US ambassador Friedman's call for his release. The 1960 code itself not read.
law / courtIraq's 'Criminalizing Normalization and Establishment of Relations with the Zionist Entity Law' (26 May 2022) β as described by Yerevan Saeed, 'Iraq's Anti-Normalization Law Could Prove a Risky Political Stunt', Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (6 June 2022) (2022) β
Read 1 Oct 2026. The law 'prohibits any Iraqi individual, institution, or organization from communicating with any Israeli entity or representative in the "cultural, political, scientific, commercial, economic, media or security sphere" and dictates that such ties are punishable by death or imprisonment'; 'Out of 329 members of parliament, 275 Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds attended the session, and all voted in favor'; the US State Department said it 'stands in stark contrast to the progress Iraq's neighbors have made in building bridges and normalizing relations with Israel'. The law's own text is not read here.
law / courtStephen M. Schwebel, 'What Weight to Conquest?', American Journal of International Law 64 (1970) 344 (1970) finding β
Crossref (2026-09-29): 'What Weight to Conquest?', American Journal of International Law, April 1970, doi:10.2307/2198669; reprinted in Schwebel's Justice in International Law (Cambridge UP, 1994), doi:10.1017/cbo9780511551765.032. Read 2026-10-01: the Cambridge chapter summary (the opening paragraphs): Rogers 'appeared to uphold the legality of continued Israeli occupation of Arab territory pending "the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency." In this Secretary Rogers is on sound ground. That ground may well be based on appreciation of the fact that Israel's action in 1967 was defensive, and on the theory that, since the danger in response to which defensive action was taken remains, occupation β though not annexation β is justified, pending a peace settlement.' The body of the article (the better-title argument) is not read β .
Not yet read at the source. Tried: 2026-10-01: full text behind the publisher; only the reprint's record read.
advocacy / viewB'Tselem, 'Under the Guise of Legality: Israel's Declarations of State Land in the West Bank' (March 2012), on the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 (2012) finding β
Read 1 Oct 2026 (full PDF). 'According to Israel, the declaration policy was based on the land laws applying in the West Bank in general, and on the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 β¦ in particular. Since the Code was in force at the time Israel occupied the West Bank, Israeli authorities claimed that they are required to respect it under international law'; per the state comptroller, 'from 1979 to 1992, the Custodian declared 908,000 dunams' as state land, raising state land from about 9.1 to about 25 percent of the West Bank (excl. East Jerusalem). B'Tselem's own conclusion: the policy 'was unlawful', on due-process and discrimination grounds. Israeli human-rights NGO. The Mejelle's 1984 repeal is not in this source.
Why it works on us
- Public statements are what most people see, and on this conflict they are often maximalist on every side.
- Leaders do sometimes mean exactly what they say; ignoring rhetoric has been costly before (see 'Each side reads the other through its worst quote' in the deadlocks).