Trap · reasoning move
◆ Seen this story before
Sounds like: “We've seen this story before.”
A precedent offered as the outcome of a present proposal: 'we share your goal, but we know how this ends.' Both sides have one, and both often use the same event.
Signs
'we've seen this before', 'remember what happened when…', 'every time we…'; one past event offered as the outcome of a present proposal.
Questions to ask
Which case, exactly, and is it the only one? What else happened in that case that the lesson leaves out? How is this proposal different from that one, in who agrees to it, who guarantees it and what happens if it fails?
Example
'We left Gaza and got Hamas; leave the West Bank and we'll get the same.'
The mirror
'Oslo gave us settlements, not a state; negotiating again will do the same.'
What it is.
An argument from precedent: 'we agree with what you want, but we know how this kind of thing ends.' It is often the most thoughtful argument a side has, because it grants the other side's good intentions and objects only to the likely result. Both sides in this conflict have their own precedents, and each reads the other's hopes as a naivety it has already paid for. That makes it worth testing rather than dismissing: a precedent is evidence, but one case is an incident, not a law (see 'The exception as proof').
The Israeli and pro-Israel version: Iran, and Gaza after 2005.
Iran: after the 1979 revolution, the communist Tudeh party 'collaborated with the Islamic regime for several months', and by 1983 it was outlawed, some 1,500 members arrested, and 'Islamic fundamentalists have become the only political force in the country' (Christian Science Monitor). The lesson drawn: a coalition's organised religious wing inherits the victory (see 'Allies in destruction'). Gaza: Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, without an agreement; on the eve of the withdrawal 84% of Palestinians polled called it a 'victory for armed resistance' (PSR); in 2007, after Hamas's takeover, Israel's cabinet declared Gaza 'hostile territory'. The lesson drawn: territory given up becomes a base, so withdrawal from the West Bank would repeat it (see 'Israel left Gaza in 2005 — there has been no occupation there since.').
pressChristian Science Monitor, 'Iranian crackdown deals communist party a heavy blow' (22 July 1983) (1983) ✓
Read via fetchsrc (2026-09-28). Claude van England, Brussels, 22 July 1983: 'the other estimated 1,500 Tudeh members officially arrested'; the party 'outlawed' five days after an arrest on 27 April; Kianouri in a television interview, 'With the help of our members within the armed forces, we used to prepare reports for the Soviet government'; an exiled militant: 'They had been tortured'; a diplomat: 'They looked in good shape and in full control of themselves'; 'Having collaborated with the Islamic regime for several months, Iranian communists are hated by the opponents of the Islamic Republic'; People's Mujahideen: 'Hundreds of their members have been executed'; 'Islamic fundamentalists have become the only political force in the country'.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 'Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (17)' (7–9 September 2005) (2005) ✓
Read t1995. Ramallah-based polling centre; director Khalil Shikaki. On the eve of the Gaza withdrawal: 84% ‘view Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance’ (up from 72% in June); 40% give Hamas most of the credit, 21% the PA, 11% Fateh; but 62% oppose (35% support) continued armed attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal, and 60% support collecting arms from armed factions. PSR's reading: ‘the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting dynamics’ — ‘a greater appreciation of the role of violence’ and ‘a greater optimism about the future’. Fateh led Hamas 47% to 30%.
primary documentIsraeli Security Cabinet decision declaring the Gaza Strip 'hostile territory' (19 September 2007) (2007) ✓
Israeli Foreign Ministry press release ('Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser'), 19 September 2007, read on UNISPAL (labelled there a non-UN document) on 29 Sept 2026. 'In today's unanimous decision, it was determined: Hamas is a terrorist organization that has taken control of the Gaza Strip and turned it into hostile territory.' Sanctions to 'restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce the supply of fuel and electricity' and to restrict 'the movement of people', 'following a legal examination' and with 'the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis'. The text does not use the phrases 'enemy entity' or 'laws of war'.
The Palestinian and pro-Palestinian version: Oslo, and the same withdrawal.
Oslo: in the seven years after the 1993 accords, settlers in the West Bank and Gaza rose from 115,700 to almost 177,000 and construction began on 17,190 housing units, by an Israeli journal's count from Israeli statistics and Peace Now, which also noted 'violations of the Oslo Accords on both sides'. The lesson drawn: negotiations buy time for facts on the ground (see 'Israel never wanted peace — it breaks every ceasefire and uses talks to take more land.'). Gaza again: the plan behind the 2005 withdrawal said it would 'dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility' while Israel kept the perimeter, the airspace and the sea; and Sharon's adviser Dov Weisglass told Haaretz that 'the significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process', the 'formaldehyde' needed so 'there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'. The lesson drawn: Israeli withdrawals are not steps toward a state.
data'Facts on the Ground since the Oslo Agreement, September 1993', Palestine-Israel Journal 7(4), 2000 ('Settlements or Peace') (2000) ✓
Read t2003. Unsigned data summary; its own call is for ‘our government’ to freeze settlement expansion and negotiate ‘a return to the 1967 borders with minor territorial exchanges’. Opens: ‘There were clearly violations of the Oslo Accords on both sides’. Data (Central Bureau of Statistics; Peace Now): settlers in the West Bank and Gaza 115,700 at end-1993, 176,973 in mid-1999; construction begun on 17,190 housing units September 1993–July 2000; housing stock up 52.49%; bypass roads; 740 house demolitions; closure days. Says most Israelis saw 1993–2000 as ‘years of peace’.
primary documentIsrael: Revised Disengagement Plan, Addendum A — Main Principles (Cabinet Resolution, 6 June 2004), UNISPAL copy (non-UN document) (2004) ✓
Read 1 Oct 2026. 'The completion of the plan will serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.' And on security after the relocation: 'The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast'; Gaza 'shall be demilitarized'; Israel 'reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both preventive and reactive'; existing arrangements on goods, the monetary regime, customs, post and workers 'shall remain in force'. The gov.il copy is walled.
pressBBC News, 'Sharon plan "blocked peace talks"' (6 October 2004) (2004) ✓
Read 2026-09-30. Weisglass to Haaretz: 'The significance of the plan is the freezing of the peace process'; 'It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians'; 'this whole package called the Palestinian state … has been removed indefinitely from our agenda'. Later, on Israeli radio: no intention to freeze the 'political process as such', 'But there was definitely an intention not to hold a political process with the PNA in its present state'. Sharon's office: the roadmap is 'the only plan liable to help progress towards a viable political agreement', Palestinian violence to blame for any freeze.
Working it out: what a precedent can carry.
Notice that both sides use the same event, the 2005 withdrawal, as their precedent, and each keeps the half that suits it: one keeps Hamas's takeover and what followed, the other keeps the plan's continued control and Weisglass's 'formaldehyde'. The same PSR poll that found 84% calling the withdrawal a victory for resistance also found 62% opposed to continued attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal, which neither lesson keeps. Three tests apply to any precedent. Is it one case or a set? Iran in 1979 and Gaza in 2005 are single cases; a pattern needs more, and this site has not yet sourced other cases either way. Is the comparison like for like? A Gaza withdrawal without an agreement is not the same as a negotiated West Bank settlement; a revolution in Iran is not the same as a coalition abroad. What would make this time different, and does anyone propose it? Safe on the evidence: each side's fear rests on something that really happened. Possible, if the conditions match: that the precedent repeats. Not supported by one case alone: that it must.
dataPalestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 'Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (17)' (7–9 September 2005) (2005) ✓
Read t1995. Ramallah-based polling centre; director Khalil Shikaki. On the eve of the Gaza withdrawal: 84% ‘view Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as victory for armed resistance’ (up from 72% in June); 40% give Hamas most of the credit, 21% the PA, 11% Fateh; but 62% oppose (35% support) continued armed attacks from Gaza after a full withdrawal, and 60% support collecting arms from armed factions. PSR's reading: ‘the unilateral nature of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip has generated conflicting dynamics’ — ‘a greater appreciation of the role of violence’ and ‘a greater optimism about the future’. Fateh led Hamas 47% to 30%.
Why it works on us
- Precedents are real evidence, and ignoring them is how mistakes get repeated.
- People who lived through a failure know things that outsiders don't.
- It grants the other side's good intentions and objects only to the result, which feels fair.