Organisations and sources · Covert influence network posing as Israelis

Iran-based fake-account network (removed by Meta, 2024)

What it is

Removed by Meta in the first quarter of 2024. Meta says it 'originated in Iran and targeted Israel'; the operators are not named in the passages read here.

Unnamed operators in Iran (per Meta).

Who funds it

Not stated in the report as read here.

What it wants

No public statement of aim: it posed as Israelis. What it did is documented by Meta's takedown report.

Why it makes its arguments

Amplifier: it spreads arguments that others originated.

Stated aim, in its own words: None: it presented itself as Israelis. Meta says it 'originated in Iran and targeted Israel'. (Meta Q1 2024 report)

Is there reason to doubt it?

  • Do its messages fit one side? No. It posted 'supportive commentary about Israel' and backed Ben-Gvir, while other accounts 'posed as young liberal Israeli women' at anti-government protests. Meta's report does not say what the network was for, and no purpose is inferred here. (Meta Q1 2024 report)

Only what is documented: stated aims in the actor's own words, and sourced tests of them. 'No evidence found' is a finding too. See the argument that isn't meant to win.

Its record

  • Meta removed 22 Facebook accounts, eight Pages, eight Groups and 23 Instagram accounts. It used 'fictitious personas posing as Israelis', posting 'criticism of Hamas and supportive commentary about Israel'. One cluster backed Netanyahu before 7 October, then switched to Itamar Ben-Gvir 'while criticizing Netanyahu's handling of Israel's response to the attack'; others 'posed as young liberal Israeli women and posted about anti-government protests', or 'as liberal Israelis posting in support of the LGBTQ+ community'. Meta says it removed the network 'before they were able to build an audience' (about 900 Page followers, 1,400 Group members and 3,200 Instagram followers), and credits 'public research by the Israeli Democracy Institute'.
  • It worked both ends of Israeli politics at once. The same pattern is documented for Russia's Internet Research Agency in the US, which staged a protest and its counter-protest at one Houston mosque on the same day (see 'The argument that isn't meant to win').

Citation cluster

An amplifier with no side in the argument it joined: it posed as Israelis on the right and on the left.

How to read a claim sourced from here

When an account's identity is the argument ('as a young Israeli woman…'), check whether the person exists. This network was caught posing on both sides of Israel's own divide.

Where it comes up

Sources

  • Meta, 'Quarterly Adversarial Threat Report, Q1 2024' ✓
    What was readRead (2026-09-28). 'found links to STOIC, a political marketing and business intelligence firm based in Tel Aviv, Israel. It is now banned from our platform'; 510 Facebook accounts, 11 Pages, one Group, 32 Instagram accounts; about 500 Page followers, ~2,000 Instagram followers; targeted the US and Canada; commented on pages of media and 'political and public figures, including US lawmakers'; 'supportive commentary about Israel' (incl. its military actions, per the report's summary table); criticism of Muslims and UNRWA; comments 'often met with critical responses from authentic users calling them propaganda'; some comments 'likely generated using artificial intelligence'. The report does not name who commissioned the operation. Iran-based network: 22 Facebook accounts, eight Pages, eight Groups, 23 Instagram accounts; 'originated in Iran and targeted Israel'; 'fictitious personas posing as Israelis'; 'supportive commentary about Israel'; support for Itamar Ben-Gvir while criticising Netanyahu; accounts that 'posed as young liberal Israeli women and posted about anti-government protests'. Re-read 2026-10-12: the comments 'included links to the operation's websites and were often met with critical responses from authentic users calling them propaganda'.